A History of Mistrust: Niv Farago on US-DPRK Relations

By | March 09, 2012 | No Comments

A History of Mistrust:  the United States and North Korea
An Interview with Niv Farago

Conducted by Steven Denney and Joe Litt, Yonsei University

North Korea, despite its dismal GDP, relatively small population and status as the world’s “Hermit Kingdom,” garners a great deal of international attention. One reason for the attention, without a doubt, is North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  The heyday of international attention was given to this program during the 1990s, when negotiations to freeze and eventually dismantle the nuclear weapons program of the reclusive former Soviet satellite state were conducted with the United States and her allies.  Despite reaching what seemed to be a promising agreement (the well-known 1994 Agreed Framework), efforts by the United States and other regional powers eventually came to naught.  Similar efforts were made in the first decades of the new millennium to again freeze and dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, ending in the same way they did in the previous decade.  Given the recent developments regarding North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, a look at the history of negotiations, with a focus on the negotiations surrounding the Agreed Framework and China’s role on the Korean peninsula, will help us better understand what is at stake and what to expect. In this interview with Niv Farago, we go back to the original negotiations between North Korea and the United States to find the reason things did not go according to plan, in addition to discussing China’s role in negotiations on the Korean peninsula.  

Niv Farago, via Korea Foundation

Niv Farago is a Korea Foundation research fellow and a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies in the University of Cambridge. He earned his master’s degree in International Studies from Yonsei University in the Republic of Korea, and his bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern Politics and History from Tel Aviv University. His fields of interest include international relations theory and nuclear non-proliferation.

Q:  In your opinion, what has been the biggest obstacle to reaching the end goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula? 

The main problem, if we are talking about the negotiations that preceded the 1994 Agreed Framework, was that the United States demanded full capitulation of North Korea to IAEA demands before anything significant would be given to North Korea. At that time, North Korea could not afford that. It takes time to build the level of trust necessarily for a country like North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.

At the time of the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations, the view was that North Korea had enough plutonium for the creation of two nuclear weapons. In the process of verification of the stockpile of plutonium that North Korea possessed, North Korea did not allow the US to access the sites, which could have proved that North Korea did not report its entire stockpile of plutonium. Now, having said that, we must also remember that North Korea froze its plutonium separation activity early in the negotiations with the US, so that was quite an achievement. Not only did North Korea freeze its plutonium separation activity, it also froze its plutonium program. During negotiations, North Korea also offered to dismantle the plutonium related nuclear facilities — all the nuclear facilities it had at that time — in exchange for light water reactors (LWRs) and the normalization of relations. It took time for the Clinton administration to realize that if it did not take this bargain, there would be a severe crisis on the peninsula.

Q: Do you think that the sense of impending crisis in North Korea played a factor in the Clinton administration’s decision to overlook the fact that there was a certain amount of unreported plutonium (a violation of the safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty)?

This played a very significant role in Clinton’s decision to make a compromise. During the spring of 1994, US Secretary of Defense William Perry warned that if the crisis was not resolved it could eventually develop into a war. The US had to decide whether or not to strike North Korea’s nuclear installations, and if the situation had evolved into a war, then hundreds of thousands could have died. Kim Young-sam, the South Korean president at the time, was not prepared to allow Clinton to start a war on the peninsula – and this was made clear to Clinton. So, the looming crisis played a very significant role in the decision not to strike and to instead make arrangements to reach a settlement.

Ultimately, this was a very good decision because in 1994 North Korea had, according to estimates, between 0-10 kg of plutonium, meaning they had the ability to produce between 0-2 nuclear weapons. During the lifespan of the Agreed Framework, the North Korean plutonium program remained frozen, meaning that no plutonium was separated. Until 2002, North Korea had the ability to produce between 0-2 nuclear weapons. Technically speaking, this was a huge success.  Only after the Agreed Framework collapsed did North Korea start to separate and reprocess spent fuel and separate plutonium, which started at 0-10 kg and increased to 40-50 kg by 2009.

After the Agreed Framework collapsed, the US tried to paint North Korea into a corner during the Six Party Talks. The Americans insisted that North Korea must initially capitulate to IAEA demands.  Only then would it be given security guarantees and the process of normalization would begin.

James Kelly Arrives in South Korea after a Visit with North Koreans in Beijing, April 2003

Q: Conventional analysis points to the clandestine uranium enrichment program as the main reason for the eventual collapse of the Agreed Framework.  Do you agree with this assessment?

Technically speaking, the Agreed Framework collapsed as a result of US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in early October of 2002 when he confronted North Korean officials with evidence that a secret uranium enrichment program was underway.  There is more to the starting of a uranium enrichment program and the breakdown of the Agreed Framework than conventional analysis suggests, though.

North Korea’s decision to pursue a uranium enrichment program may have resulted from the immense pressure that was put on North Korea to extinguish its missile program while Washington failed to promote the construction of the promised LWRs.  In other words, it was a failure at “trust building” between North Korea and the United States that led to the breakdown in relations and the collapse of the Agreed Framework.

When Kelly arrived in North Korea, the North Koreans were initially very happy and excited, at least according to the account of the British diplomatic mission in Pyongyang at that time. North Korea saw this as an opportunity to table what appeared to be America’s lackadaisical approach to negotiations. The North Koreans had wanted to discuss the construction of LWRs and other issues related to the original negotiations with the Americans for a long time, but they never had the opportunity. Thus, they viewed Kelly’s trip as an opportunity to really engage the Americans.  However, as [the] results of the meeting show, the trip did not go so well.

During the visit, Kelly confronted North Korea in regards to the uranium issue. However, the US knew about North Korea’s uranium activity since at least 1998, but President Clinton chose not to confront North Korea over this issue. Some claim that after Bush came into office, North Korea raised the level of its uranium production and increased the procurement of components for the program.  This is technically true, but we must remember that North Korea also raised the level of its uranium enrichment efforts (to develop nuclear weapons) in 1999, which was before the Bush administration came into office.

The US, instead of pushing forward the implementation of its part of the Agreed Framework, was demanding that North Korea strip bare-naked its missile capabilities. The US focused on numerous aspects of North Korea’s missile capabilities, including missile exports, which were an important source of hard currency — and we might say an insurance policy as well, in case the Agreed Framework collapsed. Moreover, US negotiators made demands regarding North Korea’s indigenous research and development of missiles, as well as the deployment of missiles — not to mention the elimination of existing stockpile of missiles. Interestingly, North Korea’s quest for the uranium path began after North Korea was goaded by the US into missile talks.

Q: One American official, who was deeply involved in US-DPRK negotiations, including the Agreed Framework negotiations, labeled the North Korea as “liars.”  There are no small number of reports, dossiers and opinion pieces, which depict North Korea as the country responsible for the repeated breakdown in negotiations.  They often point to the clandestine uranium production program, a direct violation of the “spirit” of the Agreed Framework, as evidence. Do you agree with this assessment?

Of course, the uranium project was a violation of the spirit of the Agreed Framework. However, we have to ask ourselves, “Why did North Korea begin its uranium project in the first place?” Or, more specifically, “Why did North Korea raise the level of its uranium related activities towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s?” One of the main reasons is that the US was not delivering on its own promises resulting in a breakdown in trust – as I indicated in an earlier response.  I do not agree with the notion that North Korea is simply a “liar.”  Labeling North Korea in this way has a way of overshadowing the fact that North Korea upheld its original obligation to freeze its plutonium program for nearly a decade.

Q: Would you characterize North Korea’s efforts to reach an agreement with the US regarding nuclear weapons on the peninsula as “more serious” than the Americans?

I would not say that North Korea was “more serious” in its intention to bring about a denuclearization than the Americans – absolutely not. The US had much interest in reaching an agreement. However, the way in which America pursued its side of the bargain was very problematic.  There were various reasons that made the American side problematic.  One was a consequence of a non-supportive Republican Congress that, in general, opposed the Clinton administration negotiating modus operandi and the original agreements made.

Kim Jong Il with King Sihanouk in Pyongyang, July 2004, via KCNA

Another reason – and I would stress this one over the first – is the lack of trust that North Korea had in the United States.  This was a result of the perceived enthusiasm with which the US sought disarmament of not only North Korea’s nuclear weapons but also of its missiles, with little tangible benefits for complying with US demands (such as progress on the construction of the LWRs). As Kim Il-song told the Cambodian King – note that I may be paraphrasing here – “first they wanted to take my nuclear capability; now they want to stripe me of my missile capability; next they will want to stripe me bare naked — leaving me with nothing.” In sum, there was much enthusiasm on behalf of the Americans to disarm North Korea and less enthusiasm to deliver on the original promises.

Q: What is your opinion of the notion that North Korea was simply stringing the US and other parties throughout the entire Agreed Framework negotiations?  Were all these concessions simply part of ploy by North Korea to get aid and assistance, only to renege on its original commitments? Is it possible that North Korea has never had – nor has – any intent of ever disarming?

How can we know, since the US has never fully carried out its side of the bargain? We must remember that North Korea kept its plutonium program frozen for almost a decade while the US dithered on its pledge to construct ensure the construction of the two LWRs and see to it that relations were normalized.

The notion that North Korea was – or is – willing to give up its nuclear weapons is a difficult matter.  The key thing here is trust. It takes time to build the sort of trust that would lead to nuclear disarmament. This puts us at a sort of crossroads similar to where Clinton found himself in the early 1990s.  If the US is serious about dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program, then it must make a critical decision. The US could take a similar decision that Clinton took in 1994.  Then, Clinton knew that North Korea may have had up to 10 kg of plutonium. He knew that, but he also reasoned that it would be wiser to prevent North Korea from obtaining more plutonium or, worse yet, risk starting a war on the peninsula.

The US now finds itself sitting at a similar strategic juncture.  The important subject now is the uranium program. Is the US capable of coming to North Korea with the suggestion – with a new grand bargain – that would allow North Korea to keep what it has, but at the same time [coerce] North Korea into freezing its uranium program?

According to Siegfried Hecker, North Korea currently has at Yongbyon a uranium enrichment facility with 2,000 centrifuges, which, according to Hecker, are for producing nuclear fuel. However, these centrifuges could easily produce, if North Korea so chooses, highly enriched uranium for the production of two nuclear devices per year.

Siegfried Hecker testifies before Congress | Image via Johnny Erling, "Urananreicherung: Nuclearwissenschaftler warnt die Welt vor NordKorea," Die Welt, Nov. 21, 2010.

Now, the question is what happens if the international community fails to reach some kind of settlement with North Korea in the near future.  Since North Korea withdrew from the NPT, nuclear activity there is unsupervised.  Currently, the US has insufficient leverage over Pyongyang to pressure it to comply fully with IAEA demands.  So, the key question now is this:  Is the US willing to recognize the limits of its power and reach a settlement, in the way Clinton did, in order to induce North Korea to put a freeze on its uranium production? In other words, is the US willing to condone for the time being remaining outstanding issues such as special IAEA inspections, unaccounted-for reprocessing activities, undeclared stockpiles of nuclear weapons and continued research, development and deployment of missiles in North Korea in violation of the MTCR?

Indeed, after three months of talks held in Beijing, and in spite of Washington’s problematic past with regard to fulfilling its long-term contractual obligations, Pyongyang announced on 29 February 2012 a temporary moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches and uranium enrichment activities at Yongbyon. It also agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to return to Yongbyon, after almost three years of absence, in order to monitor the site. In return, Washington agreed to send to the North 240,000 metric tons of food aid in monthly shipments of 20,000 metric tons. Washington also announced that it was ‘”prepared to take steps to improve our bilateral relationship [with Pyongyang] in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality” and to allow cultural, educational and sports exchanges.’[1] The aforementioned conciliatory gestures are intended to allow the resumption of the six-party talks and further negotiations with Pyongyang regarding the remaining outstanding issues between North Korea and the IAEA.

However, when the talks resume, if Washington insists on conditioning further engagement on upfront and complete compliance of North Korea to US and IAEA demands this may lead to the collapse of the fledgling attempt at engagement with Pyongyang. The key to success in engaging with Pyongyang is patience and a long process of mutual trust building.

Q:  What effect does the recent US-supported overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, despite his compliance with Western demands to abandon his nuclear weapons program, have on future negotiations with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program? 

Although North Korea, to my knowledge, has made no public statements regarding the events that unfolded in Libya, I guess they witnessed what happened to Qaddafi and drew their own conclusions.

From a North Korea perspective, America’s inability to expediently fulfill its obligations under the Agree Framework and the American maneuvers that took place following the 2007 agreement between North Korea and the United States impinge on America’s ability to negotiate with North Korea.  Add to this what happened to Qaddafi, despite his image as a “good boy” for giving up his nuclear weapons program and cooperating with the West, and American credibility seemingly decreases even further. Plausibly, from a North Korean perspective, the US and her Western allies stabbed Qadaffi in the back.

Q:  What role does China play now, outside of the Six Party Talks mechanism and how does this relate to the role the US plays in current negotiations?

Inside or outside the Six Party mechanism, China’s role is similar.  China is the country that keeps North Korea afloat and keeps it from collapsing.  It guarantees the survivability of the North Korean regime.  I think the US recognizes this.  The US saw the Six Party mechanism to build a legitimate, internationally supported case against North Korea.  The Six Party mechanism was to serves as a kind of preparatory mechanism for taking the issue to the UN Security Council and imposing ‘severe and incisive’ sanctions.  However, China prevented the US from painting North Korea into a corner.  The US has had to come to terms with China’s role in the region as North Korea’s guarantor and its own limitations in putting pressure on the North Korean regime.  I think the breakthrough agreement in 2007 was, among other things, a realization in Washington that despite the fact that North Korea had carried out a nuclear test, China was not willing to take drastic measures like severe and incisive sanctions against North Korea.  Although China has – and might continue –to support some sanctions related to North Korea’s nuclear effort, it will not agree to the imposition of severe and incisive sanctions.

Kim Il Sung in Beijing with Premier Zhou Enlai in 1958 | Image via Beijing City Government

Q:  What is the nature of modern-day Sino-NK relations?  Is a nuclear-armed North Korea perceived by China as more of a liability than a so-called “buffer zone?” 

Recently, there is a lot of talk within some Chinese academic and policy circles that North Korea is more of a liability rather than a buffer-zone against American influence – capitalism, imperialism or whatever the perceived threat.  Several Chinese academics that I spoke with during my fellowship in Korea acknowledged that in China there is talk of North Korea being a major liability to China.  However, we must remember that the body that makes the decision in China is the Central Military Committee, not the Foreign Ministry or influential academics.  We must also remember that actions speak louder than words.  As we can see, over the last few years, China has stepped up its level of economic activity with North Korea.  Moreover, most of North Korea’s energy is supplied by China.  So, the overall trend shows an increase level of support of Chinese support for North Korea.

It is true that China perceives North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a source of instability in the region.  However, a scenario that could lead to the collapse of North Korea would certainly bring about a much higher level of instability.  Thus, China is more interested in providing the necessary level of support the continuation of North Korea as a political and ideological entity.

In 1950, Mao Zedong decided to intervene in the Korean War not because he feared US forces would cross the Yalu River and damage the hydroelectric industry along the Sino-NK border or any other threat to China.  More than anything else, Mao was afraid that North Korea as a political and ideological entity would cease to exist; that is why he intervened.  He was fearful that a unified Korean peninsula led by the government in Seoul, under the wing of the US, would project American soft power onto China.  North Korea is China’s northern gate.  Back then, China suffered from many centrifugal forces that threatened its integration following its civil war.  Mao was focused on rebuilding the Chinese economy and avoiding any social schisms that could have resulted from social or religious fragmentations.  In this regard, North Korea was a very important ideological and psychological “outpost” that China would not allow the US to extend its influence all throughout.

In the second decade of the new millennium, these same centrifugal forces which threatened China’s integrity remain the same, or perhaps are even stronger.  In addition to the social tension caused by unrest amongst China’s many religious and ethnic minorities, the economic disparities and exposure to Western ideas through the internet pose a subtle but palpable threat to stability.  In today’s socio-political atmosphere, China’s top brass still see North Korea as a buffer zone.  This was clearly evinced in a People’s Daily 2010 publication, where the idea of a reunified Korea under the government in Seoul’s control was opposed.  The very same notion was revealed in 1994 in a pro-Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong.[2]  At this time in 1994, it was at the height of the crisis on the peninsula that lead to the Agreed Framework.  In the1994 publication, China warned against any attempt by South Korea and the US to see the unification of North and South Korea under a Seoul-controlled government.

PRC Ambassador Liu Hongcai holds forth to Gye Yong Sam (桂永三) on March 7, 2012, at a Cooperative Farm in South Pyong'an | Image via PRC Embassy in Pyongyang

Q:  Recent trade statistics show that North Korea is extremely dependent on China for trade and economic growth.  What sort of effect does this have for Sino-NK-ROK relations?

Look at it this way:  If South Korea decided to implement an economic embargo on goods to North Korea, China could simply fill in the void.  As I have said, China does not want to see the collapse of the Kim regime in North Korea.  However, China’s interest in the continuation of the North Korean regime is well known by Pyongyang.  This affects the amount of leverage China exercises over North Korea.  Leaders in North Korea know it is in the best interest of China that [the Workers’ Party] stay in power.  This, in turn, gives North Korea a certain amount of leverage over China.  It may be an asymmetric relationship but China’s leverage over North Korea is not absolute.

North Korea uses a similar logic in its efforts to reach out to the international community.  One of the reasons North Korea wants to develop a better relationship with the US is to decrease its dependency on China.

Q:  It is a well-known geopolitical fact that economic power begets political power.  Given North Korea’s high level of dependency on China, and the very little economic activity that takes place between North Korea and the US, where does it leave the US in terms of leverage over North Korea?  

The US has virtually zero tangible leverage over North Korea.  However, it has substantial potential leverage, because the North Koreans are interested in the improvement in their relations, diplomatic and economic, with the US.  North Korea does not want to depend entirely on China for economic growth and stability.  North Korea will continue to choose self-isolation, as far as the acceptance of Western ideas goes.  However, from an economic perspective, North Korea will seek to selectively and carefully open its economy.  No country wants to be under international sanctions or shut out from the international economy.

Special thanks to Brian Gleason (Yonsei University), for editing and transcription assistance. 

Further Reading

  • History of Negotiations from the IISS (until 2003) see:  “Disarmament Diplomacy with North Korea, An IISS Strategic Dossier,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/history.
  • For recent analysis from the IISS see:  “North Korean Security Challenges:  A Net Assessment,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-security-challenges-a-net-assessment/contents/
  • For a history of North Korea’s nuclear program, see:  Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb:  A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1995), Chapter 2, “The Origins,” 15-34; and Robert Manning, “The United States in North Korean Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post Cold War Era (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 140-162.
  • For a nuanced look at negotiating tactics, goals and expectations, see:  Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Negotiating Behavior,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post Cold War Era (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 54-72.
  • For an excellent, contemporary debate about the history of negotiations with North Korea, see:  “Debating History—and Bolton—with Josh Stanton,” Stephan Haggard and Marcus Nolan, North Korea:  Witness to Transformation, February 29, 2012, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=5090

[1] Steven Lee Myers hun and Sang- Choe, ‘North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work; U.S. to Give Aid,’ The New York Times, 29 February 2012, accessed 1 March 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/world/asia/us-says-north-korea-agrees-to-curb-nuclear-work.html.

[2] Samuel S. Kim, ‘China and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,’ in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., The Future of North Korea (London: Routledge, 2002), 118; ‘”First Year” Set to Brace for Unification Poses Grave Erroneous Signal,’ People’s Daily Online, 30 December 2010, accessed 4 January 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7247134.html.

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