Sino-NK

How do we know what we know about North Korea? Are eruptions of external violence and massive demonstrations signs of a desire for war, or negotiation? In the wake of the Cheonan sinking in spring 2010, former British Chargé d’affaires in Pyongyang James Hoare took to the pages of the Guardian, writing: “killing 46 sailors does not seem the obvious way to effect a change of heart in Seoul.” Things are not always what they seem, especially with regard to the actions of the Korean People’s Army.  No less on the economic front where Aidan Foster-Carter warns against interpreting news of economic zones as premature liscence to declare that “Pyongyang’s equivalents of Deng Xiaoping have vanquished the old guard once and for all.” In his first essay for SinoNK, the Swedish analyst Filip Ek (Lund University) considers the entwining of the military and economic themes to positive effect.  — Editor-in-Chief

The Demise of Military Hegemony in the DPRK

by Filip Ek

A common mistake made in analyzing North Korea is to think that the military is holding all political power via the implementation of the military-first (songun) doctrine. In fact, although it still wields significant political power, the North Korean military is far from its heyday in the 1990s. Simply because the DPRK declares itself a military-first state and follows the statements with the appropriate parades and leaderly site visits, it does not therefore follow that the military always has the upper hand in internal bureaucratic struggles. Its hegemonic days are over. This essay investigates the demise of the political power of the military in North Korea through the co-authored works of Jinwook Choi and Meredith Shaw, as well as of Hyeong Jung Park.

Rodong Sinmun, 5 March 2012

Lucrative Competition |  In examining cleavages between Party and Army, the events of the past six or seven years are instructive. Park (2010) describes events in 2005, painting a power struggle between the conservative groups in the central party versus the security agencies and the military.  Party members, Park asserts,  were keen on taking control of the economy and revising the impetus toward market reforms. The military, meanwhile, with its many trading companies and commercial activities, had an interest in the market expansion and thus supported the market reforms (Park, p. 2). With the initiation of an anti-reformist counteroffensive led by the party and backed by Kim Jong Il, reformist policies and ministers were purged to consolidate the conservative group. The SME businesses run by the military were the main targets in the anti-reform action (p. 3), which culminated with the currency reform in 2009.

The military-controlled trading companies have contributed foreign currency to the regime. In this practice, Chang Song Thaek is allegedly competing with Oh Kuk Ryul. The companies have brought wealth to military high-level officers whose status in society has increased along with the financial dividends (Choi, Shaw; 2010:179, 192). And with the funds gained from its trading companies, the military high-level officials have the opportunity to buy loyalty within the society to increase their political power.

Thus the aim of the currency reform of 2009 was not simply to regain state control over the economy, but also to crack down on military commercial activities. In Park’s words: “It must have been thought that reducing military units’ engagement in commercial activities was the only way to hold back their social and political influence”. The military chose to retaliate against the anti-reform policy; by obstructing the release of its rice stocks they created a rapid inflation to occur in the backwash of the currency reform. When economic chaos materialized, they held Pak Nam Ki (the person in charge of the anti- reform policies) responsible and helped send him into exile (Park, 2010:5).

Jang Song Taek, left, with Kim Jong Il, c. 2010 | Image via Chosun Ilbo

The Role of Personalities | With the downgrading of the military’s economic clout, Chang Song Thaek and the Workers’ Party have gained in political power, reshuffling organization to bring in his own people to various important positions. An example is the ousting of the old military group in a generational change where people under Chang’s patronage are moved up at the expense of Oh Kuk Ryol. Speculations are that Chang is removing this group to rid opposition to his “overwhelming grip on power”, with the official reason being protection of Kim Jong Eun’s transition and consolidation (Choi, Shaw; 2010:192).

With the rise of Chang and the party, and Kim Jong Eun’s consolidation being reliant upon the conservative group and the security organizations, the possibilities of a grand comeback for the DPRK’s previous military hegemony seems to be slim. Without Kim Jong Il to balance out the event and Kim Jong Eun being too weak, the only thing that is stopping any further loss in power is the fact that the party needs the military for protection.

References:

Choi, Jinwook; Shaw, Meredith “The Rise of Kim Jong Eun and the Return of the Party”. International Journal of Korea Unification Studies, 19:2 (Seoul:KINU, 2010), pp. 175-202.

Park, Hyeong Jung “Kim Jong Il, the Military and the Party, and Kim Jong Un – The Power Politics Behind Market Expansion and Market Crackdown”. Korea Institute of National Unification, Online Series (Seoul:KINU, 2010), 10-12.