North Korea’s Reform Straitjacket: Impossible Choices for Kim Jong-un & Co.
Malevolent Shades of a Would-Be Savior from Songun: Kim Jong Un on the Cover of Southern Weekly Magazine in the PRC, April 23, 2012.
In a country where the level of surveillance, coercion, and control is enough to make Foucault blush, the implications of North Korea’s social structure on the behavior of its people go largely uncovered in the literature. In an effort to buck this trend, London School of Economics graduate Alexander James employs the theoretical approach of sociologist and LSE’s former director Anthony Giddens to explore the relationship between the order of society and the actions of individuals in North Korea. His tripartite dissection of North Korea society highlights the restrictions it places on the agency of both elites and common folk. Implications abound for the prospects of reform. — Steven Denney, Managing Editor
North Korea’s Reform Straitjacket: Impossible Choices for Kim Jong-un & Co.
by Alexander James
Since Kim Jong-un came to power, the longstanding dichotomy in North Korean analyst circles between collapsists and reformists has seemingly swung in favor of the reformists. From amnesties and the “6.28 Measures” to short skirts and indigenous iPads, suggestions of change have not gone unnoticed by the more optimistic observer. But what if Kim Jong-un and North Korea’s ruling elite at-large are not free to choose a different path for their country? What if they are as constrained by its myths, its identity, and its conventions as the North Korean populace? Prevailing physical conditions still matter as prophylactics to change in North Korea but more fundamental still is an element that few have held aloft to scrutiny: North Korea’s social structure.
Easily misunderstood, North Korea’s social structure has failed to garner much air-time or column inches in mass media. Admittedly, sanctions, skinny jeans, and increased tourism are far more fun to read (and write) about. But their existence, and their analysis, rarely prompts the key question: have any of these elements, either individually or collectively, fundamentally rebalanced North Korea’s state or society in the last decade? An objective evaluation would indicate not. As Christopher Green and Steven Denney recently put it, “any over-reading [of ‘reforms’ in North Korea] that has gone on reflects wishful thinking and optimistic expectation overwhelming reality.” These are things that Peter Hayes might call “epiphenomenal.”
Toward a Structural View of the DPRK | Rather than getting caught up with microscopic indications of reform, we need instead to look at particular social structures. So what do we mean by social structures? Anthony Giddens, former Director of the London School of Economics (and he of “The Third Way” fame), theorized that our everyday human actions gradually embed a certain framework within society’s consciousness of how we should act, resulting in the formation of particular institutions, language, traditions, and established ways of doing things. Over time these structures create expectations within society and ultimately enforce restrictions on human agency.
The Clinton adminstration’s Agreed Framework would certainly have had an effect on North Korea’s social structure | Photo via Wikipedia
A break with these structures is possible, but for a regime dependent on the continuation of the status-quo this is no easy task. Still, a regime cannot rule by fear and hunger alone and the “performance” of everyday actions — for example, schoolchildren reciting the feats of Kim Il-sung or citizens taking the almost ritualistic (and often tedious) trip to the office — normalizes North Korea’s unique way of life for its citizens without an overt need for forcible coercion. For those who question why North Koreans have yet to rise up and rebel, the embedded routine, continuity, and normality of life (as James Pearson excellently highlights) is a good place to look.
North Korea’s social norms are not simply confined to the masses: the ruling elite, Kim Jong-un included, must also be seen to adhere to a set of expectations so as to maintain the social capital of the regime and the legitimacy of the institutions that prop it up. Specifically, Kim Jong-un & Co. rely upon three main social structures:
Ideology
Regardless of the guiding hand of the regime, North Korea’s ideology and ideological propaganda have now become almost self-perpetuating. From its Juche and Songun philosophies to its cult of personality and anti-Americanism, ideology is a tide that cannot be stemmed. As Lord David Alton, Chairman of the United Kingdom’s North Korea All-Party Parliamentary Group, put it, North Koreans have become “victims of an ideology that has become [a] prisoner of its own rhetoric”.
A central tenet of North Korean ideology, Juche has been defined by Kenneth Quinones, Professor of Korean Studies at Akita International University, as the “essence of self-determination” (from the Chinese character ju, meaning ‘rule’, and che, meaning ‘essence’). Whether this is attributed to the Confucian logics of self-defense and sovereignty, Korea’s struggles with Japan, Marxism-Leninism, race-based nationalism, or even Kim Il-sung’s understanding of Woodrow Wilson’s concept of colonial self-rule, is debatable. One certainty, however, is that Juche allows many of the current elite to remain stakeholders in a regime that must retain control to survive.
In Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig’s North Korea: Through the Looking Glass, the authors ask:
Do the elite believe in Juche? Probably they believe in the attainability of socialism, the virtues of nationalism, and the heroic qualities of the late Kim Il Sung. Yet even while believing, they realize something has gone badly wrong…. If the truth is ever revealed, the Kim regime will collapse…Thus the elite and the masses are bound by fifty years of ideology and myth… In a larger sense, the content of Juche is not its most constricting feature; rather, it is ideology. (emphasis added)
The persistence of Juche in the daily lives of North Koreans has created an overarching social structure which all must live under — for better or worse. Where all and sundry were originally compelled to obey Juche’s wisdom, Juche ideology is mostly learned for the average North Korean today, leading Brian Myers to claim that the “people are kind of working with the regime.” For the regime’s elite, Juche remains an idealized Weltanschauung used to buttress the existing political culture and legitimize their decision-making. Writing on his return from North Korea in April 2012, Ruediger Frank noted:
I am not alone in arguing that what makes North Korea’s system so sustainable is its ideology…Once accepted, it becomes unchallengeable…To be sure, such a status is difficult to achieve and therefore highly valuable. It takes a long time to be built and for its sustainability needs symbols and rituals that are replicated and performed again and again. Importantly, there is little room for flexibility: in order to turn a process into a ritual and an image into an icon, stability and consistency are key strategies.
For Kim Jong-un and the ruling elite to be seen to break with the central tenets of this ideology would be akin to suicide. Just one sign of acquiescence to its enemies, a loosening of its efforts to blockade information from the masses, or even one Starbucks opening in downtown Pyongyang, would shatter the illusion that the regime has strived so hard to preserve. To protect regime legitimacy, North Korea’s ideology obliges Kim Jong-un to believe the hype.
Insecurity
Whether imagined or real, the idea of insecurity is a powerful political tool — particularly for a totalitarian state. Reactions to threats can easily be taken out of the “normal” political realm and presented to a public as requiring extraordinary countermeasures, e.g. imperial aggressors require nuclear deterrence. The North Korean regime has managed the transition from the very real threat of the Cold War to the largely imagined notion of insecurity today by simply continuing to build its institutions upon militarism, fear, ethnic purity, victimization, and struggle.
The absence of overtly physical threats is largely unimportant. Instead, the articulation of threat through institutions (schools, workplaces, national holidays, media outlets, language) and society’s reactions to these threats are more significant. Hostility towards Japan, the United States, and South Korea’s ruling elite are not just vitriol; they are essential components within a social narrative that physically manifests itself in nuclear weaponry, brinksmanship, and internal violence. Accordingly, the regime’s trick of converting invisible threats into tangible resistance maintains a climate of fear in a society that has largely accepted its leadership as a necessity.
Class
Best highlighting the relationship between human agency and the power of North Korea’s invisible social structures is the institution of class. As deterministic for every North Korean’s life-chances as any other structure, the idea of class and its myriad of unwritten rules reign supreme across the northern half of the Korean peninsula. An unspoken but explicitly understood tripartite system of “core,” “wavering,” and “hostile” divisions presents a set of expectations for citizens where only those who conform wholeheartedly to social norms can hope to prosper.
Money and power can largely exclude one from society’s confines, but even corrupt or powerful elites must bow to certain expectations. Andrei Lankov rightly notes a gradual erosion of the material rewards and pitfalls associated with class in North Korea. Giddens, however, warns that social structures will remain in the memories of individuals who make up a society. One point is assured though: for as long as class dictates the make-up of Pyongyang’s residents, the look of the ruling elite, and even those who may prosper abroad, the social influence of class will remain.
The Show Must Go On | It is clear that the continuation of North Korea’s unique social structure is not a given. Instead, it is an outcome of the active involvement of North Korean society, from top to bottom. The internalization of social rules over sixty years has seen institutions and conventions prosper, meaning that the mutually reinforcing circles of human agency and structure will now be difficult to break. Even if Kim Jong-un’s Western education, love of basketball, and desire for greater foreign capital is as significant to reform as many commentators would have us believe, North Korea’s social structures will continue to confine his ostensibly reformist desires. North Korea’s elite, that is the most powerful first-generation players in its military, economic, and political institutions (termed as “system guardians” by Nicolas Levi) continue to reinforce institutional stability. Whether the capitalist-leanings of North Korea’s growing technocratic class or third-generation elites can reform these powerful institutions in the long-run is open to debate, but for now, the watchword remains “status-quo.” Beliefs and values may not be set in stone, but they do not change quickly, and we would be wise to ease our expectations of change in North Korea for the year ahead.
The North Koreans are certainly being accommodating in “toeing Alexander James’ line”. If recent reports from North Korea are to be believed, the increased military alert status, vitriolic press and march to a third nuclear test along with reports of, not only a pull back from the 6-28 reforms but an attack on personal farm plots (which keep North Korea from starving), as well as local markets, certainly fit in with his hypothesis. The Chinese are the only ones who can “upset this apple cart” in a hurry — but they are deathly afraid to do so. The recent report of a “tightening of the spigot” of trade across their border alludes to the only thing that might wake Kim Jong-un. How hollow North Korean “Juche” really is would quickly be revealed if Chinese oil, other aid and goods (luxury as well as commercial) were cut off, even for a short time. Kim Jung-un is counting on China not being able to risk the possible catastrophic consequences of a North Korean collapse.
However, the world is changing. The desperate Chinese requirement for energy to sustain their economic engine (and keep the Communist Party in power) has led to increasing confrontations with all their neighbors from Vietnam to Japan. Increasing social strife and corruption are also taking more of the new governments time and energy.
If I were Kim Jung-un, my biggest worry might be the willingness and patience of the new Chinese government to continue the “status quo”. I have seen nothing to indicate that Kim Jung-un is making it any easier for the Chinese to do so.
Thank you for the excellent, thought provoking article.
Richard ONeil Key Largo, Florida
Sent from my iPad
Richard, thanks for the comment. You’re quite right about “juche” being finally and truly at play if and when the Chinese leaders decide to close of the spigot to Pyongyang. Our analysis of the dynamics in the border region (where there are lots of players to consider) indicates that the spigot isn’t going to close anytime soon, but one never knows.
“But their existence, and their analysis, rarely prompts the key question: have any of these elements, either individually or collectively, fundamentally rebalanced North Korea’s state or society in the last decade?”
Wonderful piece, I agree that this ‘straitjacket’ needs more coverage. “Beyond Charismatic Politics” is great evidence too of your argument – that what holds the country together is sustained at a much deeper level than most people give it credit for.
As much you, I do not read any signs of structural change through the mini-evidences of reform you mention. Yet I would like to point out that the famine and the ensuing collapse of the Public Distribution System, which then led to the rise of the black markets, have done considerable erosion to the people’s trust (if not ideologically, then socially) in the regime’s ability to provide for them. This is especially true in the provinces. And in this regard, the ‘skinny jean’ should be seen as separate from touristic excursions, which I agree do not affect the bigger picture. Outside trends such as fashion items are part of a larger phenomenon in which the regime is slowly losing micro-control over the daily economic choices of its people.
Would like to stress again that the ‘status quo’ emphasis in your argument is very heartening to read – we need more sensible thinking like this! (not only because it is also my view, but because provides sound evidence against those who think the the leadership is the key to instigating change in North Korea. In fact, evidence points to the leadership being the greatest opponent to change that is being instigated organically by forces such as market laws.)
Have any of you people ever been to the DPRK? The speculation would be laughable if it didn’t actually influence perception and policy.
While we’re on the topic of trips, I was kind of hoping you could tell me which North Korean officials Bill Richardson and Eric Schmidt met with, and what they learned from those interactions. So far what I’ve learned from the publicly-available discussion of Gov. Richardson’s trip is that (in his words) he took a “semi-spontaneous ride on the Pyongyang subway.” This isn’t to say that people working in international aid organizations like Hanns Siedel Stiftung don’t have meaningful interactions while in the DPRK and learn much more than might be gathered from reading the rather repetitive travelogues of various folks who move in and out of the DPRK at any given time, but the notion that “you have to be there” in order to write intelligently about North Korea seems to be a debatable one. Speaking for myself, I find it easier to research and write about China _once one is out of the country_, but that there is indeed value of being _in situ_. I don’t know if the same is true about North Korea. Again speaking for myself, it’s simply not possible for me to go where I want to go in DPRK, at least for the time being — Sinuiju, Hoeryong, Musan, and Chongjin, although supposedly Hamhung opens up every so often. Anyway, I do appreciate the comment, as it suggests a debate about perception and “boots on the ground” as a value in North Korea analysis. We at SinoNK (now speaking more generally on behalf of the group of analysts who write here) do make efforts to represent the view from Seoul, where we have some great writers, and make regular jaunts into Beijing and along the border zone between China and DPRK. So much of the standard journalism about North Korea is written from Beijing and Seoul that we find that the trips into the Northeast can serve the purpose of expanding the frontiers of what might be called “the documentary battlefield” beyond where they would be otherwise.
Due in part to the physical restrictions Adam mentions, and in part to psychological restrictions, DPRK visits are not de facto *superior* to other kinds of experience of North Korea and North Koreans. To believe so is folly.
That said, speaking for New Focus Intl, my colleagues talk to North Koreans IN the country daily as well as having close relationships with North Koreans who make regular trips abroad. Moreover, with the exception of myself, most of my colleages have actually lived and worked (and some continue to do so) in North Korea.
It’s quite absurd when you consider that the majority of the internet’s North Korea commentators are predominantly white, don’t speak Korean, and have only ever been south of the DMZ (*if at all!*)
From what I’ve read, the few “watchers” that have been to the North tend only to have gone to the most obvious tourist attractions and made little effort to check out some of the more far-flung destinations. Or they’ve been stuck in track two dialogue that results in them spending their 3 day visit locked away in a conference room in the depths of Pyongyang.
I get the impression that many people think they’re banned too, when they’re not.
The fact people like Ruediger Frank and Jim Hoare have been in recent years not just as visitors, but as guides, suggests unless you’re a hardcore manic who wants the DPRK bombed, then you might actually have quite a good chance of being accepted. Even polemicist number one Chris Hitchens went there!
While it is understandable that few astronomers have got to visit the particular area they study, the same is not true for North Korea. I don’t know of any other country in the world where so many people feel they can have privileged opinions without even having tried to visit. Its as absurd to me as being a tea total wine expert!
Obviously with North Korea tourism there is a chance you could go on a tourist visit and not pick up much that’s considered “new” by the North Korea community. However, going definitely adds something – arguably quite a lot from my own humble opinion. I’ve been three times and always absorb a lot when I go. It pays to see first-hand what you’re writing about.
My main concern now is learning the language, something which is slow progress, but worthwhile.
I’m not trying to pick a fight with anyone here, but just imagine how it would feel if you lived in Northern Ireland and a significant bunch of Asian men spent their lives procrastinating on your divided country without ever having bothered to visit or learn the language. Yet the opposite is considered quite normal with the DPRK!
Rant over.
Good points here by Tad, especially as regards language and travel experience.
I think we can safely set aside the point about the race of North Korea experts. Last time I checked no one was busting US Ambassador to China Gary Locke for being a Chinese-American who spoke next to zero Chinese in comparison to his (white) predecessor Jon Huntsman. France’s minister for technology is an adopted Korean who doesn’t speak Korean. I honestly don’t know anything about Victor Cha’s ethnicity or family/cultural background (unless “Georgetown” is an ethnic group) and I don’t know if it really matters. In fact, I don’t know Tad Farrell’s ethnic background. Growing up in a predominantly white cultural context in the US or UK, or a predominantly Chinese cultural context, shouldn’t hamper one’s ability to analyze North Korea any more than it hampers one’s ability to, say, learn to play Soviet cello music at a level equal to a student at the Moscow Conservatory.
As for gender, absolutely, there do need to be more women writing about North Korea and I think SinoNK has done a fair amount there, but could do a great deal more, to remedy that particular imbalance.
There was some conversation on Twitter (impossible to link to the whole thing, but it happened!) not long ago about a group who might be considered analogous in terms of linguistic struggles to the group of North Korea hands you mentioned: the PRC’s “America experts.” Years of study? Yes. Reading in a broad but still limiting body of data not in the target language? Yes. Linguistic fluency? Maybe. Brief travel experiences? Probably. Long periods of time spent living in the country under examination? Not so often.
A short tour to a foreign country certainly has its benefits. But — and I’ll spare you the hours of joyful discussion I’ve had on the topic as part of various university committees and study abroad programs — if you want to get into the studies on travel and what can be learned from it, there’s an absolutely massive difference between a week or two-week long tour, and actually living in the country for a semester, a year or more. It’s fine to smash on people who haven’t been to North Korea, as long as you can acknowledge the very serious limitations inherent in being in any country, not just the DPRK, for a short time. I went to Tibet for a nine-day trip a few years ago and it changed a lot of things about how I look at the region/submerged state, but from a hard-data standpoint I would probably learn a lot more from nine days or nine months in Dharamsala. Now there is no Dalai Lama in Yanbian, but I would rather have my freedom of movement there, and be able to spend my weeks each year without a leash.
Fortunately as regards to long trips, it is actually possible today for a person such as myself (a university lecturer with a Ph.D.) to take a semester-long appointment as a visiting professor of English at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Unfortunately, that opportunity is unpaid and generally speaking it’s hard to get a sabbatical to do such a thing, and it could be next to impossible to do actual research that drives academic careers while being there. But it would be an amazing experience. Word has it that the one existing burger shop near the campus, frequented by the foreign staff, is actually a little capitalist-style venture owned by none other than Kim Kyong-hui. (Please note that I learned this information in London, not in the burger joint in question.) I don’t know about long-term stays in North Korea for people at other stages of life, apart from “flailing journalist,” in which case a person could try to make a documentary for Current TV and get arrested after walking across the frozen Tumen river — not recommended.
Sticker shock is also not to be underestimated when it comes to travel to North Korea. Personally, I’m in China with relative regularity, but even without having to pay for airfare to Beijing, prices still seem to run about 1000euros for a week in North Korea. You can spend practically the whole summer in Yanji for that amount of money, and buy a hell of a lot more interesting texts while you’re there. (Printed texts, which one then reads, and makes opinions based upon? Yes! And then one is burdened with the externally-levied label of “North Korea expert” simply because one has the idea of reading a dozen volumes or so, in English, of the Eternal President’s Works or spending a few weeks in the captured North Korean files in the archives in College Park, Maryland, or does a few studies of North Korean-Chinese interactions in the 1940s and 50s. Is that fair? It’s “expertise” by default.)
Or, for your 1000euros, you could fly to Mongolia to look around, or go to the million places in China you have yet to, and yet need to, see. A “contemporary China expert” who has not been to Yanan? That’s like a “North Korea expert” who has not been to Mount Paektu! Ah, but I’ve only been to the Chinese side, leaving the North Korean side to be mediated through “A State of Mind” — it doesn’t count because the state-based narrative of history says it doesn’t! One could fly to Japan from Beijing and get a good look at the Chongryon schools. One could buy the private papers of a dead Chinese soldier in the Korean War or pick up most of the Chinese books about Korea and its various wars published in the last five years or so. There are lots of ways to spend 1000euros in the service of expanding one’s understanding of North Korea or Northeast Asia.
Of course none of this refutes or diminishes your original point: there is not always a barrier to North Korea per se to travelling to North Korea, other than a time and financial barrier. In spite of having been politely declined by one prominent Western travel agency, I was told in Yanji last year — long live Chinese backdoors into the DPRK, long may they be stamped into ice and dirt! — that they could get me in, but would need a week with my passport first. How wish I had had the time then to test that particular “looks like a yes.”
Just to bring this closer to our own present company, if not to serve as a complete self-audit for SinoNK in its totality: Chris Green is a Korea expert because he’s fluent in the language and has years of experience of using that language (along with his native English) to document North Korea. I don’t think anyone is arguing that Chris doesn’t know what he’s talking about because he’s been to the DPRK once rather than three times, nor should anyone argue that since Steven Denney hasn’t been to Mangyongdae that his readings of the South Korean press or review of debates over North Korean reforms are somehow less valuable. I’m not sure what Chris would say about the deep insights that he himself has taken from his journey North, but I would hope consumed less alcohol there than Christopher Hitchens surely did on his sojourn. (Hitchens and North Korea; there’s a subject for another day! Or we could get rather more practically into a discussion of the best DPRK travelogue I’ve ever read, which is Cumings’ “War and Television,” which is largely about how to interpret reality there.)
Since that covers half of our core team, I’ll simply mention for myself and for Roger Cavazos that our linguistic chops are Chinese, not Korean. We both branch into Korean in very limited ways and are very fortunate to have colleagues whose expertise we can lean on in a translation pinch. One of the major points we try to address at SinoNK is to fill in the Chinese side of the equation when it comes to understanding North Korea. That means my own travel itinerary focuses much more intently on the Chinese border regions with DPRK, along with doing the standard reading and translating of the Chinese press with regard to North Korea. Pointing out that something like 90% of the North Korea experts in the world have no clue what is going on in the Chinese press as regards North Korea doesn’t mean that those experts are going to stop making confident pronouncements about what China should or shouldn’t do with its North Korea policy, so we will keep charging ahead and hope that more folks can read our translations.
In perfect candor, the thing that bothers me the most in terms of data-, travel- and expertise-black holes is that I can’t get the sheet music to the Moranbong Band’s performances. And it’s extremely hard to get invited to one of their shows, unless one works for the Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang or has some central connections in Pyongyang. Last time I checked Koryo Tours has not anything resembling an inside track to a Moranbong Band performance. So until then it’s YouTube and KCTV for me and the rest of the uninvited television watchers in the DPRK. Is that ideal? Of course not. Is it rational that Kim Jong-un would rather fill the seats with the next generation of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League, even the ones who had parents who “betrayed the nation”? It is.
Incidentally if there were more Asian men debating the fate of Northern Ireland in the Chinese language, the world might be better off. For our purposes, I think the main point is not to focus so much on the deficiencies of the North Korea-watching and -analyzing community, but to try to find ways that we can help each other maximize our respective strengths and ameliorate our various blind spots and weak points.
Interesting piece on travel to DPRK, via an extended interview with Joseph Ferris III, here.
Incidentally, I hope all this travel and authenticity talk has not straitjacketed more discussion of the very fine post above! I’ve cordially invited the author to make a few follow-up remarks and I hope he will, without feeling the need to write another two pages.
Hi Adam,
Thanks for the thoughtful response – lots of good points.
On the race point, the reason I raise it is because I find it quite bizarre that the majority of people writing on NK in English are predominantly white men. Do we see this phenomena in the Middle East or Africa? No, in those regions there seem to be a far more diverse palate of people writing and broadcasting their views and opinions – even when talking about just in the English language. And in those regions it is *usually* the norm that the “watechers” at least speak the language of the target country.
I know I’m guilty of being both white and very poor at Korean, so perhaps I sound hypocritical here. Maybe I am, but I’m just airing some long standing observations that I’ve noticed from aggregating opinion and analysis articles for three years now via nknews. Perhaps I see this phenomena a bit closer than others.
None of this is a pop at SinoNK by the way, either. I readily acknowledge at NK NEWS there are people speaking on the issue who’ve never been to the country, don’t speak the language, and are white and male.
Regarding living in the DPRK for a long time – yes this would be preferable to any short stint. I agree with this 100%. I’ve been keeping an eye out for opportunities for nearly three years, and alas, there just aren’t many (if any) options for people who write on the country publicly in the way many people in this “community” do.
Relief work, UN agency work, tourism, language tuition and PUST – they seem the main areas that it is possible to goto the DPRK for an extended period. But as someone trained in communication there are regrettably no comms roles in the DPRK and likely never will be for the considerable future. And as for UN work, I don’t have the technical background for a lot of this – things like procurement, agrarian aid, etc (or PUST – for science and technology were never my main selling points).
Re Chris being an expert, I’m afraid I’d disagree here (no offence Chris). I’m firmly of the mind there really are no true foreign experts when it comes to NK. I think the only way one could become a true expert is to spend some very serious time in the country, working in the particular field one then hopes to claim to be an expert in (as aside to being a general “country expert”).
Speaking Korean and working on the issue X amount of years; these are all very helpful and should be encouraged, but from the outside will only ever give a narrow glimpse… John Everard described in his recent book how he went to his post in Pyongyang believing he had become a bit of an expert through reading deeply and learning the language in advance…Then he came out of the country after two years he had even more questions than when he went in. I certainly felt that way as a French language student ending my year in Bordeaux in 2005!
I guess what I’m getting at is that it would be nice to see some more North Korean’s speaking on the issue, really. They’re the people whose country we’re all talking about. They’re the ones who lived there the longest. They’re the true “general” experts. Obviously there are barriers and problems, I’m aware of that..
Even when it comes to South Korean opinion – I know a lot is said in Korean that I can’t read, but either no where near enough is being translated, or there is a serious lack of stuff and all us westerners feel a need to make up for it!
Where for example are the Korean language equivalent of all these North korea sites and blogs? Where are the *young* South Koreans actively discussing issues in the granular detail seen on websites like this and 38 north? Perhaps I’m just ignorant, but from my conversations with South Koreans, the English language Korean watching blog scene seems a lot bigger, more influential and diverse.
Bottom line – I’m not trying to argue anyone’s analysis is flawed in any way based on a lack of visits to the country, I just think it would be nice at least for people to give travel a go. Given the lack of opportunity of staying for an extended period, for me is the next best thing (as minor as it is).
Cheers!
I should also add before I upset anyone – while I might not think there are very many true foreign experts on DPRK, that doesn’t mean to say I don’t think there many intelligent and knowledgeable people writing on the country, culture, leadership, military, etc
However, its just important to remember how little information even the niche experts have sometimes!
Thanks Tad. And maybe the lifting of the cell phone ban for foreigners in Pyongyang is indicative that it is going to get easier in the years to come for foreigners to work in North Korea. Felix Abt has some unique views on this and I’m glad you mentioned UK Ambassador John E. as well, plenty of food for thought in those two books alone!
There is plenty of material out there in Korean. A lot of it is junk, but that’s another issue altogether. The more serious problem is that it is not entering the English language. There are more than a hundred books by individual refugees in the Korean language. How many have been translated? Five? KINU runs a behemoth of a state-funded research institute in Seoul, and how many translators are attached to it? I actually don’t know the answer to that, but I’ve only ever met one, and even she inquired whether I wanted her job.
Ergo, it is scarcely surprising that non-Korean speaking men and women of all ethnic extractions feel that the field is skewed. I don’t hear the same arguments from Korean speakers. I do, however, hear them bemoaning the fact that some genuinely creative solutions such as Curtis’ Google Earth project are not available in Korean or were not created by Koreans, who they think really ought to be at the forefront of such activities. More kudos to Curtis for crossing that divide, for doing so is both rare and laudable.
Ultimately, anyone who doesn’t speak Korean or Chinese is definitely getting short-changed, but until either the North Korean government has an epiphany and starts letting people in to do serious anthropological, environmental, economic and social studies of the place, or someone puts up the money to quadruple or more the amount of stuff getting translated out of South Korean/south Chosunese, people will have to keep relying on the small number of people who are actively trying to bridge the gap.
Hey that’s interesting re: the books. But is it correct to say that this online blog type arena seems to be mainly English speakers? Are there websites like nknews, sinonk, nkeconwatch, nktech, etc in Korean?
In response to this and Tad’s comment on hearing the Koreans’ point of view: this debate all really seems positive and wonderful. Because the general feeling I have had from the field is that foreigners (especially those who have spent time in the country) dismiss the N (maybe even S) Koreans’ views outright and do not wish to engage with them.
There seem to be two interesting strands of discussion here and I’d have to agree with most that’s been said.
On the first issue raised – that of the embeddedness of Juche and ideology in general – I would agree with Richard that the exogenous factor (China) certainly adds support to the viability and credibility of North Korea’s ideology in 2013. As Adam noted, Beijing is unlikely to be withdrawing its role on the peninsula. However, if Pyongyang continues to drag its heels on the various economic initiatives that Beijing has been pushing for it may temporarily incur China’s anger (in the form of reduced oil or food), but, paradoxically, this could actually lead to a reaffirmation of ideology/nationalistic fervour to counter society’s discontents.
As per the points raised by New Focus Int. – agreed, the example of the PDS does highlight the gradual loosing of the regime’s hold and its inability to stage-manage all inputs into society. I do wonder if the regime’s hold on society could even have been upheld in an era of technology that allows imposed structures to be so easily circumvented. Whilst the impact of modern technology on socio-political phenomena (as in Iran’s failed Green uprising or the Arab Spring) is, in my opinion, vastly overstated, the ability of technology to fundamentally (albeit gradually) alter social relations cannot be underestimated. This is not a new development – the introduction of new technology in Britain’s industrial revolution completely altered society (with China acting as the most recent equivalent).
I think that this also links to your second point – that of the likelihood of bottom-up change in North Korea. Institutional reform seems to fly in the face of all available evidence, as you say. Ignoring the polemic of statesmen/women who demand immediate changes in North Korea’s human rights/nuclear ambitions (not that the two are often linked by states or diplomats), I wonder if, in reality, the U.S./ROK/EU etc. do view North Korea as a long-term ‘game’? Bottom-up change may not sound as grandiose as yet another envoy trotting off to dictate (and fail) on the erroneousness of Pyongyang’s nuclear plants and weaponry, but it would assuredly reap greater rewards if resources were focused on subversive methods of undermining the North Korean regime.
Moving on to the second strand of comments – that of the ‘expertise’ of those who comment on North Korea – I’d add a few points.
Firstly, like Tad, I’d like to see far more written about North Korea by North Koreans. Barring the obvious obstacles faced by those inside the DPRK, the growing North Korean diaspora in the UK, U.S., Canada and, most importantly, South Korea should be granted a louder mouthpiece to voice their opinions and experiences on the matter. Of course, this assumes that North Koreans or North Korean refugees wish to act as political dissidents/commentators, which may not be the case for some (hardships/prison camps/and many refugees coming from the north-east mean that few will have first-hand knowledge of the internal machinations of the regime or may wish to openly talk about their experiences). This seems to be an important avenue for the North Korea watcher ‘community’ to follow.
Secondly, the points raised about experts not speaking Korean and the paucity of non-Korean language sources are equally valid and part of a much larger dilemma. One of the key issues seems to be the cyclicality of discourse on North Korea and institutions/experts. Where have most experts on the DPRK resided or built their careers from? Mostly Western universities – and this may be a problem.
Since Said’s ‘Orientalism’ and the rise of post-colonial and post-modern studies, issues surrounding the prominence and limitations of the English language and ‘Western’ forms of analysis have been attributed to the existing power structures of the social (and academic) world. In the landscape of political studies this debate has struggled to find many takers and has come to the party relatively late. As with other disciplines, the debate covers the academic hegemony of ‘the West’ and its language (English) in universities across the world, its epistemological underpinnings, its failure to integrate non-Western, indigenous disciplines and theories, and the continuing hegemony of U.S/UK universities that mould students and tutors. For example, if any budding student signed up to a political science course in a top university, they would almost certainly read Hobbes, Kant, Machiavelli, Rousseau and study Western notions of power and sovereignty. If they studied East Asian international relations, it’s unlikely that they’d cover Confucianism, Korean dynasties etc (the works of Dave Kang, Amitav Acharya etc. are exceptions to this rule). As Giddens would surely argue, this is a problem of both structure and agency. Indeed, one could argue that my use of Giddens’ theory, rather than that of a Korean philosopher or an East Asian theory, is further proof of Westerncentrism in the writing on North Korea.
None of this is to say, however, that those from the Western canon cannot write with authority on Korean matters. I certainly believe that a lot of what is written is of high quality. But, as Adam and Chris point out, due to the nature of North Korea, many of us have to rely upon secondary sources when forming opinions. This may not be preferential but it is not necessarily unmanageable as existing opinions generally differ and are interpreted through a commentator’s background/expertise, which is a cause for celebration rather than concern. The absence of any consensus on how, for instance, the outside world should deal with North Korea or its internal power structures, is surely proof of this.
Finally, regarding travel to the DPRK, I would imagine that many readers of this site, NKNews, etc. would like to visit North Korea given the chance, but due to time/money constraints find that they cannot. Others may simply echo Brian Myers’ point that until he can travel the country more freely he’s “not particularly intent on spending five or six thousand dollars every year to take a trip to Pyongyang to see the same sights that I’ve seen [in books] so often and to hear the same speeches that I’ve read about so often.” There is also the ethical/moral argument about putting cash in the regime’s coffers. Ultimately, I think many would agree that until the DPRK is more open to scholars/commentators it is likely that the pool of resources will continue to be less than we’d all hope for.
I hardly leave a response, however i did a few searching and wound up
here North Koreaâs Reform Straitjacket: Impossible Choices for Kim
Jong-un & Co. « SINO-NK. And I do have a few questions for you if it’s allright. Is it simply me or does it look like a few of the comments come across as if they are written by brain dead individuals? 😛 And, if you are writing at additional social sites, I would like to follow anything fresh you have to post. Could you list of the complete urls of your communal pages like your linkedin profile, Facebook page or twitter feed?