Blockages and Breakthroughs: Cultural Diplomacy and North Korea

by Adam Cathcart

Why Bother Analyzing It? Rodong Sinmun Front Page, Feb. 13, 2012

The present general consensus about cultural diplomacy and North Korea appears to rest upon the following assumptions:

a. North Korea’s blockade against Western culture has gone from near-total (under Kim Il Sung) to endangered but still vigorous under Kim Jong Un;

b. North Koreans, especially youth, are desperately in need of alternate modes of culture (essentially, ours if not precisely James Turnbull’s South Korea);

c. North Korean musical and performance culture has been stunted rather than stimulated by the cult of Kim family leadership;

d. North Korea’s relatively massive state expenditures on the arts are essentially about ideology, and building a core of loyal elites in Pyongyang;

e. Performances by Western or South Korean groups in North Korea are acts of “soft power” subversion which can serve to undermine the state;

f. Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un are essentially musical dilettantes whose primary purpose for attending any performance is to amplify applause and reveal the political stock of whatever generals are in the retinue;

g. the themes and message of North Korean music, and the musical bureaucracy, are not necessary to analyze, because they prevaricate against the very notion of individual expression.

Rodong Sinmun, February 17, 2012

Notice also what is completely absent from the above litany:

a. North Korean culture is exportable;

b. North Korea has one of the most comprehensive systems for musical education in the world;

c. the North Korean cultural bureaucracies, in terms of goals, budgets, and politics are completely comprehensible to their allied Chinese counterparts;

d. the North Korean bureaucracy is studying, but not imitating, how China is slowly privatizing its own socialist cultural industry ownership;

e. North Korea has a state Symphony Orchestra and a contemporary music ensemble capable of playing at the international level.

Very rarely does anyone challege any element of the consensus described, and rarer still does anyone have the temerity to argue for the unspoken elements laid out above.  Perhaps this is why the appearance of a certain Norweigian on the scene (covered with utmost delicacy by Evan Ramstad) has been so unsettling; with his accordions and flip-books, the artist appears to believe in actual cultural exchange.

The festival makes several discomfiting assertions; and not once do they mention the concentration camps! (But must the camps stalk the edge of every conversation of North Korea?  As Simone de Beauvoir complained about paramters on postwar French and American discussions of Stalinist gulags, such obligatory caveats become awfully wearisome; everybody knows the camps exist.) In any event, to the Norwegian publicist-summary:

Morten Traavik calls on both locals and visitors to Barents Spektakel [a festival in northern Norway] to take part in a pioneering record attempt and a test of our ability to act together as one: with the help of North Korean mass games instructors we will try to create Norway’s biggest living picture, hopefully with several hundred participants.

Following the signals of the North Korean instructors, every participant turns over pages of a colorful flip-book, becoming one of the hundreds of living pixels forming huge, shifting mosaic pictures of well-known motives from the High North. ME/WE also puts our communal spirit to the test: Are we western individualists able to subordinate ourselves to the collective discipline necessary to act together as one, if only just for some hours? Join the project and find out! [...]

ME/WE is Part 1 of a bigger project THE PROMISED LAND (along with Gold Stars and Norway on Norway) by Morten Traavik, that he has developed in North Korea through years of travels to the world’s most secluded country. This unique collaboration has resulted, for the first time ever, in a larger group ofNorth-Korean artists coming to Norway and Northern Europe, as participants in Traavik’s project. THE PROMISED LAND opens our minds for a possibility of dialogue, overcoming mutual suspicion.

According to Liberation.fr, the accordion players were invited to the festival, but Traavik was not sure if they would come or not. Meanwhile, elsewhere in Scandanavia, a Finnish ice skater has to apologize for entertaining North Korean kids at a recent competition in Pyongyang.

Sports as cultural exchange: There is a poignant scene in Robert Egan’s brashly carnivorous book, Eating with the Enemy, in which a team of North Korean female soccer players travels to the US for the Atlanta Olympics.  After a wild shopping trip to WalMart near an interstate highway, the team returns to the hotel, whereupon the team goalie goes to each room to collect the television cords so as to prevent the women from watching cable television. Perhaps this is a horrifiying moment; the replication on American territory of the DPRK’s information monopoly. It is the extension of a North Korean state cultural quirk into a new realm.  In a text that opens up a number of apertures, sometimes painfully so, this anecdote brings forward the notion of a refutation of the principles of cultural exchange even as one is engaged in it.

This is a point that could be similarly made when it comes to Chinese-language education in the DPRK: One could point to the growth of Confucius Institutes in Pyongyang as a sign of change.  The North Koreans seemed comfortable enough with the idea to allow Vice Premier Li Keqiang to visit Chinese language students at Kim Il Sung University.

Li Keqiang, Vice-Premier of the PRC, Speaks to North Korean Students of Mandarin at Kim Il Sung University, October 25, 2011; image courtesy Xinhua

By the same token, should China have any hopes for their language at a university named for a man who, in spite of being fluent himself, famously said “Why should we speak Chinese in our own country?” Perhaps we should be skeptical of the notion that Chinese language education in North Korea will aid in opening the DPRK up to further foreign influence. Chinese-fluent North Koreans, if their ideology remains solid, would just as soon join the online comment wars in defense of their system than supinely listen to their endless supply of would-be Chinese pedagogues.

And why should the North Koreans trust either the Scandanavians or the Chinese?  After all, when the Danish Embassy in the PRC decided to have a film festival entitled NORDOX in three major Chinese cities last December (as I discovered to my total shock that month, via pamphlet, in a small art gallery in Shanghai), the Chinese Cultural Ministry approved the screening in Beijing and Guangzhou of the film “Yoduk Stories [耀道故事].”  Do you suppose the North Korean Embassy noticed?

The meaning of cultural exchange in the North Korean context remains in flux.

Not only is it in flux, but the Unhasu Orchestra now occupies the center of the debate.  KCNA absolutely seethed earlier this month at a Chosun Ilbo critique of the orchestra’s recent work.  The North Korean article, most of which is reproduced below, is itself worthy of much, much more attention than it has heretofore received (emphasis added, my commentary in brackets):

KCNA Dismisses Rubbish in S. Korean Paper

Pyongyang, February 11 (KCNA) — The south Korean reptile paper Chosun Ilbo recently let loose a spate of invectives about the local performance tour made by the Unhasu Orchestra, the DPRK’s renowned art troupe.

Having no elementary understanding of the mass-based art, this paper echoed what was aired by Radio Free Asia engaged in the anti-DPRK smear propaganda. It claimed that “the performance was not received well by audience” and “it brought them burden rather than pleasure”.

This was wicked elements’ trumpeting aimed at doing harm to the single-minded unity of the party and people.

How can such human scum understand the people of the DPRK and its arts?

Inspired by songs, the Korean people’s 80 odd year-long just revolutionary struggle started, advanced and won victories.

The Korean revolution and people held aloft the banner of “Let’s always be cheerful although our path is thorny!”, the banner of confidence and optimism, during the Arduous March, the forced march.

In this glorious course, songs and arts in the DPRK have served as valuable ideological and moral pabulum [e.g., sustenance] for the people making revolution that a large quantity of food can hardly substitute.

Even after the loss of the father whom the Korean people deeply trusted and followed, they drew a thousand-fold strength and courage from the songs presented by the orchestra [which comes to personify the leader in the style of snow] after the start of the advance in the new year. It is setting the hearts of people afire with reverence for the leader in various parts of the country [including Wonson and Huichon]. Its performances evoked a lively response among audience as they helped consolidate the unity between the leader and the people [as per Kim Jong Il's theories, which have their roots in Germanic throught (see Acta Koreana article, cited below)] and aroused among them ardent longing for him.

The service personnel and people of the DPRK joined the orchestra in singing songs in tears and rose up, inspired by them. What the above-said media asserted is nothing but a shriek of despair made by those taken aback by the might of the arts, the hot wind raised by the orchestra more powerful than a nuclear bomb. [Mock KCNA all you like; this is easily the best sentence written by anyone in 2012, Rushdie and Keillor included.]

The reptile paper, a mixture of the American style and Japanese way of life, can never understand the true character and value of the DPRK’s arts.

They were so displeased with its local performance tour that they claimed it was unprofitable, the absurd assertion of a merchant. This suffices to guess their level of knowledge about arts. [The whole point being that profitability and market principles are an up-side-down way of looking at the arts; the whole point is that they are not profitable; rather, the point is that the state, understanding the need for Bildung, makes the outlays anyway for the spiritual health of the populace.]

In related news, a huge new Kim Jong Il cantata functions as the latest refinement of the ever-growing Gesamtkunstwerk cultural apparatus in the DPRK:

The Korean unification which seems destined to happen in our lifetimes (should we live to be as old as de Maiziere, the ex-East German Prime Minister who now dines for free amid the musical chairs of Unification Ministers in Seoul) is going to be absolutely ghastly when it comes to the question of culture and cultural integration.  Is North Korean culture completely destined for the rubbish bin of history?  Are North Korea’s cultural bureaucrats and musicians all going down with the regime, being tied so closely to it? Can the North Korean vision of art and culture be separated from the glorification of a man and a family who absorbed the lessons of Stalinism and left the rebel-turned-dictator in the dust? Or does North Korea have a distinct and viable future precisely because of its mode of culture, its “games”, its music, its sport, and its willingness to thrust the supremely faithful outward, where they shall perform, bathe in applause, collect the agreed-upon currencies and headlines and then pivot, homeward, where the great pedal tone of the revolution awaits, the Urthema, the body and Gestalt of the leader upon whose brow every anonymous worry has been cast, and from whose hand every benefit flows?

Further Reading:

Adam Cathcart, “North Korean Hip-Hop? Reflections on Musical Diplomacy and the DPRK,” Acta Koreana Vol. 12, No. 2 (December 2009): 1-19. (Full text as pdf. here.)

Adam Cathcart, “Inside North Korea: French Edition,” Sinologistical Violoncellist, September 5, 2011. (Includes footage of a hip-hop kid in Pyongyang.)

Isaac Stone Fish, “Pyongyang Rock City,“ Foreign Policy, October 21, 2011. (In which the author is quoted.)

Darren Foreman, “North Korean hip-hop,” World of DarrenF, June 7, 2010. (In which the notion of KCNA-rap is spawned in London.)

Jaeyeon Woo, “NK Portrait: From Gulag to Toy Robot,” WSJ Korea Real Time, April 1, 2011. (Rap, Ryanggang-do kids, and “Yoduk Story” stories).

- Foreign Affairs asks Elizabeth Economy about China & North Korea’s Future:

- Scott Snyder and See-won Byun’s “China-Korea Relations: New Challenges in the Post-Kim Jong Il Era,” Comparative Connections (December 2011) is a comprehensive review of China’s relations with both Koreas in the last months of 2011.  This is a subject about which we at SinoNK.com are naturally quite interested — What, after all, was going on in Sino-North Korean relations prior to the death of Kim Jong Il?  Is there a “new normal” taking hold in the bilateral relationship, or, having gotten through some soul-searching, will  the Pyongyang elite revert things back approximately to where they were last fall?  What exactly was on the table (in addition to refugee issues, which the Global Times admitted) when the PRC’s Vice-Premier Li Keqiang swung though Pyongyang for three days last October?  Was China really starting to tilt more clearly towards its far-more-lucrative relationship with South Korea, or was the CCP buttressing ideological and literal defenses along with North Korean allies?  These are significant questions, and Snyder and Byun lay out the related themes and interactions with consummate clarity; it is a cluttered chessboard in Northeast Asia but no one navigates it like Snyder and Byun.  Their article, originally linked at Council on Foreign Relations, is available in pdf. here.  Indicative of our desire at SinoNK.com to remain innovative, flexible, and responsive to the various way that our readers approach and absorb information, the article is read aloud on Soundcloud here, clocking in at 22 minutes.

- Last night at the University of Michigan, Chung-In Moon of Yonsei University gave a lecture entitled “China’s Rise and the Future of the Korean Peninsula.” No video is presently available, but Dr. Moon, along with his frequent co-author John Delury, discusses North Korean contingencies in a cogent essay on East Asia Forum and has those ideas further analyzed on Leonid Petrov’s excellent Korea Vision website.

- As a coda — feeding more meat to the Wolverines, as it were — readers may enjoy this 50-minute lecture given by Bruce Cumings on September 28, 2011 at the University of Michigan, entitled “History & Memory in the Korean War: Apocalypse, Absence, Amnesia–& Kim Jong Il.”  Partisans of B.R. Myers will further note the April UM lecture entitled “Sappho in Red: Proletarian Literature, Gender, and Colonial Korea.”

“Friendship Prices”: Understanding Chinese-North Korean Energy Trade

by Scott Bruce

While China is a key donor of fuel, along with food and fertilizer, to North Korea, there is also an established energy trade between the two countries. The best study of this trade is “North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: 1995-2009 Energy and Minerals Trends and Implications” by Nathaniel Aden. The report found that North Korean electricity exports were being sold at discount “friendship prices” to the PRC. North Korea, however, paid a premium for crude oil imports from China, paying between 8 and 12 percent more for crude oil than the average cost of Chinese exports elsewhere.

Representatives from the Korea Resource Group (KORES) in the ROK have expressed concern that China is taking advantage of its role as North Korea’s biggest trading partner to buy up DPRK energy and minerals resources on the cheap. Their fear is that the South is “losing” resources that could be used to fund reunification and/or the redevelopment of North Korea’s infrastructure to the Chinese.

A substation in North Korea. Image courtesy of Choi Kyung-soo/The Nautilus Institute

To some degree these assessments are correct. North Korea is selling resources with the potential to fund the long-term development of the country due to an urgent, short-term need for foreign currency. In December, for example, North Korea suspended anthracite coal exports to China to ensure there was an adequate domestic supply. This shows the fine line that North Korea walks between selling energy resources for much needed foreign currency, and the need to maintain enough of a domestic supply to keep factories operational during the cold winters.

On the other hand, when we consider the business environment, “friendship prices” probably reflect the real cost of trading in North Korea. As Drew Thompson notes in his study of Chinese-North Korean joint business ventures, although China is uniquely poised to do business in North Korea, trade and investment in the DPRK are by no means easy. North Korea’s decrepit infrastructure, high corruption, and dysfunctional legal system make investment and trade difficult. These challenges limit the ability of the Chinese to do business in North Korea and merit a higher return on investment.

The difference in the price of these commodities is likely more attributable to the poor infrastructure available to ship energy into and out of North Korea, the need to rehabilitate coal mines to secure production, and the high risk of doing business in the DPRK, than predatory trade practices. To return to Nathaniel Aden’s detailed survey, North Korea sold anthracite coal to China at a premium, possibly due to the close proximity and high demand to Chinese markets.  The lesson here is that this is a market driven trade between two ostensibly communist states, not a story of neo-colonial exploitation on the part of the Chinese.

Transportation in North Korea. Image courtesy of Choi Kyung-soo/The Nautilus Institute

Sources:

• North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: 1995-2009 Energy and Minerals Trends and Implications, Nathanial Aden, Nautilus Institute Special Report, June 7, 2011.
• South losing race for the North’s resources, Suh Kyung-Ho, Joong-Ang Ilbo, January 18, 2011.
• Anthracite Export to China Suspended Temporarily, IFES NK Brief, November 24, 2011.
• Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea, Drew Thompson, US-Korea Institute, February 2011.
• The Mining Industry in North Korea, Choi Kyung-soo, Nautilus Institute Special Report, August 4, 2011.

Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop—Recent Activity on the Sino-DPRK Border, January 19, 2012 – February 17, 2012

by Jende Huang

Food security in the DPRK is an issue which cannot be separated from the broader security architecture in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. As food shortages push North Koreans to cross into China, it is unsurprising that Beijing resorts to negotiations for food aid to the DPRK which, presumably, will staunch (or prevent an increase in) the flow of refugees. At the beginning of February, a Japanese newspaper reported that China was sending 500,000 tons of food aid and 250,000 tons of crude oil to the DPRK. If true, this amount of aid would have been slightly greater than the immense 414,000-ton food deficit in North Korea reported by the World Food Programme for 2012. Such food aid, if properly distributed to those who need it most, would almost certainly reduce the numbers of Koreans needing to cross into China. However, Stephan Haggard at the Witness to Transformation blog casts some doubt on the reports, and posits an alternative theory that the food being shipped across the border was simply the result of a bottleneck of supplies following the death of Kim Jong-Il.

Border controls have also been tightened through reported consultations between the North Korean National Security Agency (NSA) and their Chinese counterparts, negotiations which may have resulted in NSA agents gaining the authority to cross the border in pursuit of defectors and smugglers. Though the Chinese government hardly appears sympathetic to the plight of these so-called illegal economic migrants, it is one thing for Chinese soldiers, security operatives, and police to capture and send North Koreans back to the DPRK, as they apparently did to a group of 19 North Korean defectors captured in Shenyang on February 9, and entirely another for North Koreans to take this responsibility. (Regarding the regular stream of assertions that North Korean agents have free rein in the Chinese Northeast, Adam Cathcart runs down a list of relevant open sources here.)  Another group of 22 North Koreans were supposedly captured by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) on February 12 in various locations near Shenyang and Changchun. The plight of these defectors, many who reportedly have family in South Korea, led to a protest at the Chinese embassy in Seoul (an event covered and photographed by Dan Bielefeld, who notes that South Korean celebrities are lending their efforts to the protest).

Is it possible that the DPRK’s NSA and China’s MPS are forming a real “lips and teeth” relationship? Even if true, there’s an important distinction between the two security agencies working closely together in large population centers to capture defectors and for the Chinese to allow North Koreans on the borderlands to be dragged back by DPRK security agents. What happens if an NSA agent mistakenly kills a Chinese national? Or, what should Chinese border guards do if they come upon a group of North Koreans who are fighting each other? Leave? Wait to see who emerges victorious and arrest them if they appear to be defectors? The situation on the border is already precarious, and granting NSA agents permission to to cross the frontier would add an additional level of unneeded messiness.

Taking the notion of cross-border troop movements to a new level, recent Japanese newspaper reports asserted that the Chinese PLA has made contingency plans if there was ever a need for the Chinese to enter into the DPRK, and would supposedly be able to reach Pyongyang (likely from the Shenyang Military Region) in “a little more than two hours if necessary.” The North Koreans disputed the Japanese article, quoting extensively from the Chinese Ministry of Defense, which stated that it was “impossible” for the Chinese to have planned for needing to enter the DPRK.

Far more to the liking of officials from both sides is the news on the economic side of the ledger.  In terms of trade, there is apparently no objection from the DPRK on the 10,000 tons of fruit that has reportedly been exported from Dandong during the past year, which is worth approximately 16 million USD. According to the same report, this has led the local Dandong government to set up an agency specifically responsible for the shipment of fruit into the DPRK. The fruit story goes along with a reported increase of Sino-DPRK trade, up to 5 billion USD, which is triple the 2005 trading levels between the two nations. Reports also noted that the China National Tourism Administration reported 152,300 North Koreans entered China in 2012. This number, of course, does not represent any of the so-called illegal economic migrants, which the government surely tracks the number of, but is unlikely to publicly release.

Between North Korea and China: The Tumen River -- Photo by Charles Kraus

Timeline of Recent Events:

19 Jan 2012 / The Korea JoongAng Daily reports that Beijing was thinking of providing “hundreds of thousands of tons of food aid” to the DPRK before March or April, to ensure the stability of Kim Jong-Un’s government.

23 Jan 2012 / An article in the Asahi Shimbun quotes a unnamed Chinese military source, speaking on PLA contingency plans regarding the DPRK, as saying that “We will be able to enter Pyongyang in a little more than two hours if necessary.”

31 Jan 2012 / The Daily NK claims that the DPRK’s National Security Agency would be discussing with the Chinese the possibility of allowing NSA agents to cross the border in pursuit of defectors and smugglers.

1 Feb 2012 / The Daily NK and Korea Times both report on an article in the Tokyo Shinbun (in Japanese), claiming that China was giving the DPRK 500,000 tons of food aid and 250,000 tons of crude oil.

1 Feb 2012 / KCNA takes umbrage at the 23 January Asahi Shimbun article, and quotes from Chinese defense officials to refute the idea that Chinese troops would ever need to enter the DPRK.

6 Feb 2012 / The Dong-A Ilbo reports that during the past year, 10,000 tons of fruit have been exported from Dandong into the DPRK. Worth approximately 16 million USD, this has led the local government to set up an agency specifically focused on the fruit shipments.

9 Feb 2012 / The Chosun Ilbo reports that Sino-DPRK trade levels have reached 5 billion USD,  tripling the amount since 2005.

10 Feb 2012 / Reports appear that the China National Tourism Administration released the figure of 152,300 as the number of North Koreans visiting China in 2011. This does not include the number of “illegal economic migrants” who also cross the border.

14 Feb 2012 / Arirang TV reports that 10 North Korean defectors captured in China have appealed to South Korean authorities to prevent possibly repatriation to the DPRK. There are also angry protests at the Chinese embassy in Seoul, to protest China’s willingness to return any North Korean defectors to the DPRK.

17 Feb 2012 / The Daily NK reports that 22 North Korean defectors were captured in Shenyang, by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, which was working with the DPRK’s National Security Agency. This is in addition to the 19 defectors supposedly rounded up on 9 February, in Changchun and Shenyang.

References:

• FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations World Food Programme. 25 November 2011.

The Pibada (Sea of Blood) Opera Troupe Goes to China

by Jimin Lee

The Pibada (Sea of Blood) Opera Troupe of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) performed “Butterfly Lovers” in China from October 2011 through January 2012. The opera was staged some 30 times in twelve different cities in China, including Beijing, Daqing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Qingdao. Not simply the itinerary, but the scale of the production was vast, featuring 180 members of the Pibada Opera Troupe, the invited guests of the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism. At least according to KCNA, the opera was a rousing success, proving that performance groups, particularly those associated with Kim Jong Il, play important roles in Chinese-Korean diplomatic affairs.  As KCNA described:

The opera, created under the wise leadership of Kim Jong Il, is a precious cultural treasure demonstrating the developed Juche-oriented arts and contributing to strengthening the DPRK-China friendship in the new century…

Chinese people, enjoying the opera, said that it was an excellent work truthfully representing their feelings. They also praised the creative talents of Korean artistes.

They expressed deep reverence for leader Kim Jong Il, saying that they learnt about his greatness through the wonderful performance.

The Pibada Opera Troupe is North Korea’s most important and widely represented  artistic organization. The Troupe was allegedly created by the late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in 1936, and was later rechristened as the Pibada Opera Trope following the first performance of the “Sea of Blood” in 1971. Pyongyang hails “Pibada” as the best of DPRK’s five official “operas of revolution.” The others include include “Flower Selling Girl,” “Pibada (Sea of Blood),” “Genuine Daughter of the Workers’ Party,” “Song of Mount Kumgang,” and “Tell Story, Forest.”

The Troupe’s trip to China was intended to strengthen cooperation between China and North Korea, and “Butterfly Lovers” was chosen specifically because it is considered a symbol of friendly ties between Beijing and Pyongyang. The opera, a Chinese classic based on Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai’s thousand-year love story, received praise from at least one ranking Chinese official. The Secretary of the Qingdao City Party Committee told KCNA that “the performances successfully given by Korean artistes till their last one made a great contribution to deepening the friendship between the two countries.”

Most recently, the performance of the troupe upon its return to Pyongyang in January 2012 served as the first public conduit between the Chinese Ambassador and the top crust of the Korean Workers’ Party since the death of Kim Jong Il (see photo).

Chinese Ambassador Liu Hongcai (3rd on the left) enjoys "Butterfly Lovers" in Pyongyang with a handful of top North Korean leaders. Image courtesy Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, via NK Leadership Watch, whose excellent round-up of the event can be accessed by clicking on the image.

In the meantime, the performance has been used as a propaganda tool for DPRK conveying the cultural philosophy of “juche (self-reliance)” of Kim Il Sung. China, which considered films and theatre as the ultimate propagandistic tools during the Cultural Revolution, now emphasizes artistic and commercial value after its market opening led by the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. For North Korea, marketization of the cultural sphere is presently unthinkable.

The periodical People’s Korea characterizes the Sino-North Korean exchange as follows:

The China visit of the DPRK delegation made a great contribution to further developing of the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the two parties, two countries and two peoples of the DPRK and China and had a great influence on the development of the situation northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula and the world as a whole.

It further emphasizes that the “traditional DPRK-China friendship is unbreakable.”

Not only operas but other art forms in DPRK stays at the level of framing aimed at justifying the rule of North Korean leaders. DPRK’s cultural and artistic forms are used for propaganda and to highlight the economic benefits of the system for elites. Moreover, the arts ensure that the Workers’ Party  is able to inform the people of policy directions and, then, utilize the medium to activate Party members and convey the message through visualization. The performing arts in DPRK, rather than placing significant value on history, are used as a means to achieve the goal of placing greater emphasis on the Juche ideology of the regime.

Despite national condolence over Kim Jung Il’s recent death the performance was continued. During the serious flood in 1997 DPRK’s Arirang Performance was continuously run. According to its critics, this aggressive and pushy performance diplomacy escalates severe economic recession, famine and violations in DPRK. In 2007, the Daily NK asserted that the performance violated the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The cost of such large-scale performances, including food and power consumption is clearly very high. Considering the country’s deprived economic situation, the DPRK’s push to perform in China, while it provides a window to the outside by the 180 members of the troupe, may only strengthen the will of other people who simply want to leave the country.

Additional Videos:

1. Video1 : Pibada Opera Troupe’ performance, via KBS 1TV News

2. Video 2: Pibada Opera Troupe’s performance report, via YTN

Capturing the Cacophony of Construction on Mansudae, Pyongyang - Rodong Sinmun, February 20, 2012

1. Twitter activity was accelerated.  The SinoNK Twitter feed allows you to have a more dynamic reading experience.

A sample, if you can handle the truth, of some of the action from this afternoon:

@Sino_NK : Extensive #Rodong Sinmun analysis of Sino-Japanese tensions over Diaoyu Islands (in Korean) ow.ly/9a98n

@Sino_NK : #Rodong article cites “Chinese internet poll” wherein 75% of respondants see Japan’s steps as “acts of aggression”

@Sino_NK : In denouncing a Japanese academic for saying it, #Rodong Sinmun today also embeds phrase “China threat [《중국위협론》/ “中国威胁论”]

Is this type of “online publication” framentary? Absolutely, but it also represents something like real-time analysis. (In the above case, analysis of the February 20 Rodong Sinmun, which hits the digital newsstands at about 2 p.m. Pacific Standard Time on February 19, allowing you to “get ahead” on your news reading, particularly if based in North America, and gives you a sense how North Koreans are encouraged to see the world, and China’s place within that world.)

On the same Twitter feed, there is also a healthy dose of North Korea-China news from other parts of the Korean peninsula, Beijing, and around the world, making it a recommended experience:

 Follow SinoNK.com on Twitter @Sino_NK 

2. Stephan Haggard, co-author of the Witness to Transformation book and blog, profiles SinoNK’s Document Dossier #2:

Entitled China’s “Measure of Reserve” to Succession: Sino-North Korean Relations 1983-5, the dossier not only offers up insightful commentary but uses simple technology that is transforming historical studies; authors can now not only cite documents but provide direct links to them as Cathcart and Kraus do here. A recurrent theme, though, is that the documents should not be taken at face value; the CIA analysis itself is a major part of the story as agency analysts fretted about Soviet intentions in Northeast Asia.

The dossier begins with a CIA assessment of Kim Jong Il’s first official trip to China in 1983 and the dilemmas it posed for the Chinese. Not wild about the dynastic succession they nonetheless wanted to size up Kim Jong Il. For his part, Kim Jr. sought status and foreign policy credentials through endorsement by Beijing. Sound familiar?

3. SinoNK’s Analyst for Technology David Matthew’s essay on the alleged cell phone ban in North Korea added to the velocity of critiques of the original Daily Telegraph story, and was consequently picked up by North Korea Tech, the well-regarded site maintained by Martyn Williams, who wrote:

The Daily Telegraph report was attributed to Good Friends, a South Korean NGO, and came days before OTMT Chairman Naguib Sawiris arrived in Pyongyang to meet with senior government officials. During the visit the company announced Koryolink had signed up its millionth customer.

Several red flags associated with the Daily Telegraph’s report were outlined earlier this week by David Matthew on the SinoNK blog. He points out that the network is already tightly controlled, any ban would cut into a lucrative source of foreign exchange for the government (Koryolink bills users in euros), and might sour relationships with Orascom, which is also completing construction of the iconic Ryugyong Hotel.

Add to that the simple fact that if the government wants people off mobile phones it could just order the network to be shut down. That would be much more effective than threatening subscribers.

4. Jende Huang, SinoNK’s Border Security Analyst, opened the gates for a powerful website in 2012 (to coin a phrase) with his post “Spreading Meth Across the North Korean-Chinese Border.”  Huang’s analysis was feasted upon by a whole host of listservs, analyzed further by Kenneth Tan’s essential Shanghaiist, cited by a number of drug policy websites, and picked up by Global Voices Online editor Oiwan Lam in, among other languages, Spanish.  Huang’s post also sparked a more in-depth look by Claude Levy, who writes for one of France’s best China-Korea sites, Aujourd’hui en Chine in a post entitled “China Lives with its Dealer: North Korea“:

Les Chinois l’appelle le « bingdu », elle est connu ailleurs sous le nom de « Crystal meth » ou « Ice ». Cette drogue puissante et addictive serait répandu « à un niveau épidémique » en Corée du Nord, et les producteurs du pays exporteraient en masse vers la Chine voisine, explique Jengde Huang pour le blog Sino-NK.  [...]

Dandong parano

Le marché et la production y sont en tout cas assez développés pour permettre une exportation croissante vers les provinces frontalières chinoises, le Lianoning, Jilin et le Heilongjiang. Alors que la frontière sud de la Corée du Nord et sa Zone Démilitarisée est très imperméable, la Chine entretient quelques échanges avec le « pays le plus fermé du monde », et cette frontière longue de 1400 kilomètres est réputée poreuse.

Difficile de savoir pourquoi le régime du juche reste si immobile face à la situation. Si aucune information n’indique que Pyongyang est impliqué dans la production ou le trafic, il est possible que les autorités trouvent un intérêt à ne pas s’y attaquer. Les observateurs s’interrogent : le bingdu est-il considéré comme un facteur de stabilité ? Des officiels de hauts-niveau sont-ils impliqués dans le trafic ?

Le silence de Pékin soulève encore plus de questions. Des officiels auraient déjà reconnu le trafic de drogue à la frontière Nord-coréenne, en prenant soin de préciser qu’il était largement minoritaire face aux importations en provenance du triangle d’or ou du Japon.

5. Adam Cathcart’s essay on The Diplomat about Kim Jong Un’s “Twitter assassination” was quoted in a write-up about the issue by Emily Lodish, the East Asia editor of the Global Post. View the original essay by Cathcart on the-diplomat.com.

SinoNK.com makes the leap to radio, thanks to Mike Weisbart of TBS eFM's "This Morning" in Seoul

6. Writing for the Daily Kos, Wu Ming picked up on Cathcart’s Dossier No. 1, “China and the North Korean Succession,” and praised the collection for piercing through the “tiresome” pledges of mutual support between China and North Korea. Read Wu Ming’s article, and a handful of comments from Daily Kos readers about the dossier’s take on China’s role in the Kim-Kim power transition: “Some Grist for the Mill on North Korea.”

7. SinoNK.com has been linked several times by Bill Bishop’s Sinocism, a great source for China links and analysis, by Gusts of Popular Feeling, an excellent guide to the South Korean press and issues confronting foreigners in the ROK, and in North Korea News Links, new site whose “Weekly News Brief” is a fine agglomerative resource.

8. Adam Cathcart appeared on TBS eFM’s program “This Morning with Mike Weisbart” in Seoul on February 14 to discuss Chinese media buzz around the situation in Syria and its possible “contaigion effect” (to use the phrase of Dartmouth College professor Jennifer Lind) in North Korea. A podcast of the broadcast can be accessed here (reference episode 107 or Part 1 of the morning broadcast for Feb. 14).

9. Applications for writers and analysts for SinoNK.com closed on February 8. Our present Staff is extremely strong, representing an array of linguistic and disciplinary fluencies and high levels of both accomplishments and potential.  Since February 8, we have added four more analysts, bringing SinoNK.com to a full strength of sixteen staff members headed up by two editors (ourselves) who also double as analysts.

Sports metaphors are never perfect, but, having experienced the “Linsanity” of an early string of wins, we and the Staff are now digging in for the long haul, which is to say, until about the NBA Finals start in June.  Will Jeremy Lin and Kim Jong Un, having shared a Time magazine cover, still be standing then?  We know we will be, and striding forward, because the “Footsteps” are uptempo these days, and there are more posts to edit, more dossiers to write, and more manuscripts — the paper kind — to carve into.  Thanks for reading.

Follow SinoNK.com on Twitter: @Sino_NK

Opportunity for Engagement and Reform: An Interview with Dr. Park Young-jun

by Steven Denney

In a recent interview about the political conditions in North Korea and the future of North-South Korea relations, Professor Park Young-jun (朴榮濬/박영준 교수) of Korea National Defense University (國防大學校/국방대학교, KNDU, Korea National Defense University), referring to arguments he originally made in a JoongAng Daily (중앙일보) op-ed (English version; Korean version), claims that chances for further provocative action by North Korea are likely in the absence of military and diplomatic engagement from South Korea and other major powers with a stake in peninsular stability.

"Destination Pyongyang": Image courtesy AP, via JoongAng Ilbo

As the discussion got underway, Professor Park made an effort to point out, first and foremost, that Kim Jong-un has yet to consolidate his control of power.  From a bureaucratic perspective, he has yet to be granted the positions his father and grandfather had occupied.  At present, Kim Jong-un has yet to be posted as National Defense Commissioner or elevated to the level of General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).  There is still a delicate leadership and power transition taking place in the North.   This situation, according to Park, has set the stage for a possible show of military force in the form of another nuclear test or military provocation, a move Kim Jong-un and his closest aides could use to boost the legitimacy of the new regime – but not yet.

The Lull in Preparation for Celebration

In April, celebrations are set to take place marking the centennial birthday of the “Eternal President” Kim Il-sung (April 15, 2012).  Because of celebration preparations “the military has no extra resources at the moment, because a large amount of resources are being devoted to the commemoration event.” Given this pragmatic understanding of the material constraints of KPA units, Park believes that North Korea “will restrain itself from any form of military provocation” in order to celebrate the birthday of the founder of North Korea without complication.

For Park, the period leading up to and following the commemoration ceremony provides South Korea with an opportunity to engage the new Kim regime.  Failing to do so would, as he explained, “means failing to capitalize on a chance at achieving stability on the Korean peninsula.”  Park thus advocates a two-pronged South Korean engagement strategy, pairing military and diplomatic moves.  This requires South Korea – specifically the current Lee Myung-bak administration – to coordinate with three of the major regional powers:  the United States, China and Russia.  The type of coordination between South Korea and the three major powers advocated by Park highlights the unique role each country fills regarding peninsular affairs.

The United States:  Guns and Some Butter, but Mainly Just Guns

Certain constants hold true regarding peninsular issues, and the primacy of American military power is no exception.  Although bi-lateral talks between the US and North Korea, the likes of which are to re-start next week in Beijing, are important insofar as they “serve to pacify a volatile North Korea and induce an otherwise international recluse into dealing with other countries, but they don’t reflect America’s primary role on the peninsula,” Park believes.  He believes “the role of the United States is for purposes of deterrence.”  Thus, Park supports the use of joint US-Korea military cooperation, like the Key Resolve Foal-Eagle exercise, with full support from the US 7^th fleet of the Pacific Command.  “Robust military drills will,” Parks deems, “help prevent military provocations from North Korea.”  If the effectiveness to at least grab the attention of North Korea is any indication of its effectiveness, then the belligerent and apocalyptic response from North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun to plans for the joint US-South Korea exercise indicates it is achieving its intended effect.

Despite its history of involvement in dialogue and negotiations with North Korea, Park does not believe the US should be Korea’s main diplomatic partners.  “The US’s diplomatic reach is far too limited; however, China and Russia, as traditional allies of North Korea, are ideal candidates to serve as diplomatic interlocutors.”

China:  The Sugar-Coated Bullets of Economic Reform

When the conversation moved to China, the professor reminded the interviewer, again, how popular English is to Koreans.  To describe the dynamic of the paternalistic relationship that has developed between China and North Korea, Park recalled a well-known English proverb: “You can lead a horse to water; but you can’t make him drink.”  In other words, although China may have the ear of the North Korean leadership, including, presumably, Kim Jong-un, it does not necessarily follow that China has the sort of influence over the domestic political structure of North Korea to compel it to undergo economic reforms.  Despite reports that suggest North Korea will implement market reforms a la Deng Xiaoping, the verdict is still out on how, exactly, Kim Jong-un would “liberate his nation’s economy.”

Nevertheless, Park believes that Kim Jong-un is too pragmatic not to seek Chinese-style economic reforms.  He uses an interesting parallel to illustrate his position.  Park compares Kim Jong-un to former South Korean President Park Chung-hee.

Park Chung Hee, right, with JFK -- Image links to the extensive new Harvard University Press volume re: President Park

“In the 1960s, despite ill feelings towards Japan because of Japan’s colonization of Korea, President Park Chung-hee normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in order to secure economic aid,” Park recalled.  As those familiar with modern Korean history know, following the normalization of relations with Japan and the subsequent influx of economic assistance, Park Chung-hee oversaw a host of state-led economic development projects like the Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) highway and the construction of the steel company POSCO.  This was all done as part of a pragmatic approach to economic reform paired with tight social controls and harsh penalties for dissenters (see: Yushin Regime).[1]  For Professor Park, the same applies to North Korea.

If the Park Chung-hee parallel is to hold true, Kim Jong-un would logically utilize North Korea’s special relationship with China in order to implement pragmatic economic reforms.  The notion of a strong foreign patron overseeing political controls in the name of economic growth is hardly a unique phenomenon in the recent history of the Korean peninsula.  Granted Kim Jong-un is able and willing, China’s current level of economic integration positions it to be the country best-suited to invest in economic growth in North Korea.

Russia:  Why Not A Round of Diplomatic-Roulette at APEC?

The last part of Park’s argument revolves around the issue of Russia.  A member of the faltered Six Party Talks and North Korea’s de facto second major power ally, Russia is positioned to play a vital role in Northeast Asia.

The economic opportunity given to Russia due to its unique geopolitical position is not lost on its leaders.  Discussions for a Russian gas pipeline running from north to south on the Korean peninsula started in earnest in 2008.  Economic opportunity begets channels for diplomatic engagement; the relations between the two are not lost on Professor Park.  “Russia’s plan to develop eastern Siberia … by extending the Siberian railroad system further east, perhaps even to the Korean peninsula,” as indicated in a meeting transportation officials last year in Odessa, “is one of many reasons why South Korea must involve Russia in its efforts to engage the new regime in Pyongyang.”

To help foster better relations between the major powers involved, Park suggests that the “new” Russian leaders, who will be elected in the upcoming March elections, work with South Korean leaders to bring Kim Jong-un to the upcoming APEC summit, which is slated for this September in Vladivostok.

Park admonishes the Lee Myung-bak administration to seek coordinated policies between Seoul, Washington and Moscow in order to take advantage of a time of relative quiet in North Korea.  Effective military and diplomatic moves will, according to Park, “mitigate the provocative tendency of North Korea” at least until “South Korea gets a new president.”

Not a Trivial Matter

As the interview came to a close, Professor Park looked out through the checker-framed windows out onto the busy Hongdae (홍대) street filled with college-age Koreans and others who enjoy the youthful energy characteristic of this area of Seoul.  As a professor at the National Defense University, Park’s students are different from most:  they’re all young military officers.  This doesn’t stop them from enjoying Korea’s bustling student culture, though.  He smiled a bit when he said, “Hongdae is an important cultural appendage of Seoul.  My students enjoy coming here to learn about the latest in fashion, club music and other aspects of a burgeoning social culture.”

He didn’t say so explicitly, but his long gaze, following this comment, at the line forming outside what appeared to be a sort of club-café-restaurant fusion – “fusing” things is popular in South Korea – suggested the greater importance of the topic of our interview.  The topic of engaging North Korea isn’t about debating abstract theory or historical counterfactuals.  A failure to find the best method to engage North Korea and maintain stability on the peninsula has serious consequences for its neighbor to the south.

Weekly Digest 2.17.2012

by Steven Denney

This week marked the passing of Kim Jong-il’s birthday.  Although many of the headlines, and a plethora of pictures, clogged many Google Readers, there was no shortage of interesting stories, analyst and reports released discussing issues not directly related to the birthday celebration.

Power Transition and Stability

Steven Kim argues that, among other obstacles (nuclear conflict; outside exposure), one of the biggest threats to the future of North Korea is the “deep-rooted economic problems.”  Interestingly enough, Kim makes no mention of China’s role in bringing about the necessary economic reforms North Korea needs to stay afloat.

Professor Lee Young Haw, from Kansai University in Japan, writes in a recent article at the Daily NK about the collective leadership system in North Korea – called by Lee the “guardianship rule.”  The professor questions the “character and strength of [the] collective leadership system.”  Other reports (see here and here) have raised similar, if less pessimistic concerns, about what many scholars interpret to be a power sharing system currently in place.

Jack Pritchard, in a recent Korea Times interview, believes there’s nothing strange about the apparent composedness, since it is “in the interest of all the power base now in North Korea to ensure that the public face of North Korea under the new young leader looks stable,” but agrees with Professor Lee that this probably will not last.

The ‘calm’ period will hold through April 15, the centenary anniversary of Kim Il-sung … Then, we will begin to see perhaps some signs of conflict among those behind the throne there, even though that may not be immediately perceptible to the outside world.

Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and the Underwood International College at Yonsei University, Chung Min Lee, adds to the theme of collective rule and the notion significant changes are coming in North Korea in the near future.  He uses analysis from his latest chapter “Coping with Giants:  South Korea’s Responses to China’s and India’s Rise,” where he argues that “Seoul’s foreign policy has been driven principally by deterrence and defense requirements vis-à-vis North Korea.”

Via NKeconWatch is a good article written by James Pearson at The Diplomat about the ranking of North Korean in the Failed States Index (FSI).  He questions the FSI’s methodology, especially the use of “human flight” as a measurement and the ability to obtain accurate information about the DPRK.  Pearson writes:

Rearranging the FSI in descending order according to social indicators produces dramatically different results. By reorganizing the list by ‘human flight’ (the term used to describe, among other things, the ‘growth of exile communities’), North Korea drops more than 90 places, landing only two places ahead of South Korea. It should go without saying why “human flight” is a fundamentally flawed method of measuring to what degree North Korea has ‘failed.’

Indeed, how the FSI managed to obtain any clear and reliable information from North Korea is a mystery.

Scott Synder’s latest post at CFR deals with the issue of the apparent difficulties of power consolidation following the transition of power to Kim Jong-un.   Synder calls special attention to the “ironic” situation of a Kim family member criticizing dynasty rule from Beijing.

Synder was also part of an interview with America Abroad about a whole host of issues arising on the peninsula following Kim Jong-il’s death.

Economics

The WSJ reports that Daewoo Shipbuilding will ‘not’ be investing in the DPRK’s Hwanggumphyong SEZ contrary to earlier reports.

The Joong Ang Ilbo (중앙일보) did an interview (in Korean) with Peter Institute for International Economics senior fellow Marcus Noland.  In the interview, Noland notes, among other things, that with China’s compliance, any international efforts at sanctions will have little effect given the level of dependence North Korea has on China’s market.

In what could be seen as a response to North Korea’s growing economic dependence on China, the Dong-a Ilbo (동아일보) reports on the interests of some of South Korea’s biggest companies to invest in North Korea.  Despite the sanctions imposed after the Pyongyang incident, “major South Korean conglomerates, however, are known to be reviewing a wide range of inter-Korean economic projects.”  The report above by the WSJ contradicts the Dong-a Ilbo report.  What is Daewoo really going to do?  Perhaps SK companies don’t like it known publicly that profit motive may mean moving some production north?

Negotiations and Defectors

The United States and North Korea have agreed to meet for a third round of a bilateral dialogue that started before Kim Jong-il’s death, revolving around nuclear issue and re-starting the Six Party Talks.  Given that the recent transition of power to Kim Jong-un, Victor Cha and others see very little, if anything, coming out of the third round of talks.

Reported in the Donga Ilbo, China is working in cooperation with North Korea to hamper communication between North Korea and the outside as well as locate defectors who temporarily re-visit the North.  Human Rights Activists have responded to reports of joint China-North Korea efforts to track down defectors by protesting outside the Chinese embassy in Seoul.

“Nuclear Peekaboo, the “Qadaffi Rules” and the De Geer Report

At the IHT Rendevous, Mark McDonald posts a lively piece with several points worthy of more in-depth discussion regarding the DPRK’s “nuclear peekaboo.”  Definitely worth a read and further analysis.  Here are a few noteworthy quotes:

The Beijing meeting [between the US and the DPRK next week], lest we get ahead of ourselves, will be talks about talks. That is, they will aim to perhaps revive the so-called six-party talks, a prospect that the Chinese Foreign Ministry endorsed on Tuesday. (The participants are the United States, Japan, Russia, China and the two Koreas.)

The six-nation negotiations, which began in 2002 and have been in suspended animation since 2008, focused on shutting down the North’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and increased shipments of fuel and food aid.

…

Most analysts are convinced that North Korea will never surrender its nuclear ambitions, especially given a new paradigm that might be called the Qaddafi Rules.

Pyongyang has drawn a sobering lesson from what happened to the Soviet Union, Iraq and Libya when they acceded to the West’s surrender-your-weapons demands.

‘To put it bluntly, in the eyes of the North Korean leadership all three countries took the economic bait, foolishly disarmed themselves, and once they were defenseless, were mercilessly punished by the West,’ Mr. Frank said in a commentary on 38 North. He also suggested that anyone in North Korea who favored denuclearization ‘will now be silent.’

And the money quote:

We know more about distant galaxies than we do about North Korea,” a Western diplomat said.

A new study by a Swedish scientist, Lars-Erik De Geer, suggests that North Korea may have conducted two heretofore-unknown nuclear weapons tests in 2010 – a report that first appeared in the Rodong Sinmun.  The original KCNA report can be read HERE.

Jeffery Lewis provides his (mainly) methodological critique of De Geer’s paper in a post at Arms Control Wonk blog.  Joshua Pollack commented, in June of last year, following a Chosun Ilbo (조선일보) report on the detection of xenon, “whose radioactive isotopes are the products of nuclear fission.”

Weibo Rumors, or How I Learned to Stop Fearing and Use Twitter, er… Weibo

A quote from a recent North Korea Tech post about the rumors circulating trough Weibo and Twitter about the possibility that Kim Jong-un might have been assassinated says it best:

It’s not often the North Korean authorities have a global Internet rumor to deal with, but that’s what officials in Beijing will be waking up to on Saturday morning. The Chinese and global micro-blogging sphere is alight with rumors that Kim Jong Un was assassinated while visiting his country’s Beijing embassy.

The source of the initial rumors is unclear and the only “proof” being offered is a bad cell phone image of cars – supposedly parked in the embassy car park, and supposedly more than usual.

Sino-NK’s own Adam Cathcart addressed the alleged assassination of the Brilliant Leader at the beginning of the week.  His article in The Diplomat discusses it further.

Reading Rodong Sinmun in Pyongyang, January 20, 2012

North Korean Elites: Implications for Commercial Activities with China

by Nicolas Levi

Over the past several years, and especially following Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2008, China has substantially increased economic ties with North Korea, expanding its role as the economic lifeline of the North Korean regime and state.  As Daniel Gearin showed in his extensive report for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea (20th October 2010), China is far and away the main foreign investor in North Korea. Accordingly, China has intensified its involvement with various elements of the North Korean elite structure, seeking to enlarge its base of relations and support within the regime. And, as anecdotal evidence, the last place visited by Kim Jong Il was the first Chinese supermarket in Pyongyang.

Senior and junior politicians in North Korea (politicians from the second and the third generation of elites) are actively trying to bring foreign direct investments to North Korea. The most important elites connected with Chinese businesses are directly connected to the National Defense Commission, the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ of military matters in North Korea. These elites are responsible for the management of huge North Korean investment groups (similar to South Korean chaebols) such as the Daepung Investment Group. These types of holdings are coordinating huge investment and commercial projects between North Korea and foreign partners (especially China). At the head of this organization are Jang Song Thaek, the uncle of Kim Jong Un Ri Kwang Nam, a former North Korean businessman who worked previously in Germany, Paek Sae Bong, an advisor to Jang Song Thaek and other people directly connected to Kim Jong Un’s family.

Artist Pete Kirill, in Miami, plays with notions of North Korean capitalism; click picture for link to his evocation of Kim Jong Il's funeral

Another sign of a shift towards focusing on economic relations with China is the increase of official visits of North Korean prominent figures who are reform-minded. When Kim Jong Il was alive, he used to travel to China always with the same people who were keen on the Chinese economy. Among them we can quote O Su Yong (a North Korean technocrat), Kim Pyong Phae (a former advisor to Kim Jong Il), and Jon Sung Hun. Jon Sung Hun is one of the most important businessmen of North Korea. He’s the CEO of the Korea Pugang Corporation, a North Korean chaebol (a company with around $20 million in capital and an income of $150 million). Jon Sung Hun studied in Tanzania and has excellent English skills. Another important figure of exchanges between North Korea and China is the previously mentioned Ri Kwang Gun.

Ri Kwang Gun has recently been appointed as chief of the Committee of Investment and Joint Venture designed to draw foreign investments to the country. Ri Kwang Gun studied the German language, persevered and worked in the former East Germany as a commercial attaché at the North Korean embassy in Berlin. He’s now also an executive of the Daepung International Investment Group, a manager at the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Area, a director of the State Development Bank, director of the Daepung International Investment Group and director of the Daesong International Group. We should also mention Korean-Chinese businessmen (like for example Park Chol Su) who are participating to the development of North Korean Special Economic Zones

Many members of the North Korean elite were born, lived, and worked in China (O Kuk Ryol was born in Jilin, China),  especially in the regions of Shanghai and Beijing. Some of them are still managing branches of North Korean restaurants and of North Korean companies. Many high-ranking North Koreans are also buying properties in China. Some of them studied in China or were educated in economics in Chinese universities. This group of elites is on the central economic stage in Pyongyang and are managing the actual reforms of the North Korean economic system. These elites have to overcome, however, a number of internal constraints related especially to raw materials. This is why they favor the development of projects related to energy and infrastructure. Lifelong ties between North Korea and China still have a bright future.

Kim Jong Il Under the Red Arches of the "Little Forbidden City" in Shenyang (directly adjacent to the city's smashing new market for luxury goods), Liaoning province, 2010; photo courtesy Naenara, via Spelunker

by Adam Cathcart

As expected, today’s 70th birthday commemorations for Kim Jong Il find the deceased leader at the burning revolutionary center of North Korean media.  And his son, having teased foreign observers (and, presumably, tickled the curiosity if not the speculation of people in Pyongyang who keep track of such things) by having been out of sight since February 7, reappears:

Kim Jong Un at the center, merging Workers' Party and Korean People's Army; image courtesy Rodong Sinmun, February 16, 2012

According to the Huanqiu Shibao report on this morning’s events in Pyongyang, Kim Yong Nam gave a speech (unsuprisingly) heartily endorsing Kim Jong Un’s leadership and (somewhat more audaciously) proclaiming that the young Kim would lead North Korea forward into “富强繁荣的主体强盛大国 [roughly rendered as Rich, Prosperous, and Powerful Juche Nation].” Rodong Sinmun‘s summary of events, linked via the photo above, has Kim Yong Nam speaking in rather more orthodox platitudes after Kim Ki Nam, and the words quoted by the Chinese do not appear in the Korean version.  Perhaps the comrades at People’s Daily (the parent paper of Huanqiu) gathered the quote from a television feed or other source, thin gruel though it may be for strengthening the desired narrative of a Workers’ Party leadership focused intently on living standards to the minimization of military development. According to Daily NK, foreign currency earners in China are hanging on the locution.

Time Compression on Mangyongdae: Kim Il Song and Kim Jong Il, both looking roughly 40 years old, emerge on February 15, 2012. The large flower pot in the center is from Kim Jong Un. Photo: Rodong Sinmun

The prior day, the North Korean state apparatus made good on its rather strong hints that a statue would be constructed of Kim Jong Il.  (Chosun Ilbo has an interesting visual angle on the above piece.)  What really matters in some ways is the extent to which this particular constructive feat needs to be replicated around the country.  The English version of KCNA seemed to indicate that with the above statue, Kim Jong Un had essentially discharged his duty to heed the purported calls of the people to enshrine their leader in bronze.  Even the Daily NK has not reported on efforts in the provinces to move in a similar direction, but one may have to wait to get more information about what would surely be a rather expensive (though far from unprecedented) use of resources.

I recall a couple of hours I spent near a particular Youth Mine on the DPRK-China border in July 2009, when, in the middle of a “150-day battle campaign” and in plain sight of a bridge which had completely washed out below the factory, an “immortality tower” was being built. Surely similar construction — or assertions of an influx of barbed wire — could be easily checked in places like Hyesan which are visible to the naked eye from over the border, but China has been keeping even its own rather pliable native-English journalistic staff away from such places.

In any event, the sculptors appear to have made a kind of compromise with Kim Jong Il’s own dicta from Hyesan in 1968.  That year, Kim Jong Il was busily gesticulating, having his utterances scribbled down by mermidions, and undercutting any rivals who so much as suggested that memorialization of Kim Il Song’s anti-Japanese legacy was anywhere close to complete in 1968, and doing so in service of the argument that statues of his father depict must depict Kim Il Song in the period of anti-Japanese struggle.  Had his successors followed Jong-Il’s advice literally, making the statues historically accurate, Kim Jong Il would have had to have to have been about four (his age at the Liberation of Korea in autumn 1945) in the present statute to match up appropriately with his father.  Apparently for a precocious family, even this seemed a little much.   Thus, the creative aging, and coming full circle on the creative liberty lent to Kim family members in rendering family origins and revolutionary experience.

Somewhere in Pusan, B.R. Myers is surely generating pages of acidic commentary, perhaps planning to again bring to light the Hirohito metaphors.  (As Owen Miller in London points out, though, even the Japanese iconography of dictatorship had European roots.  Why not a Napoleon reference for this would-be Francophile regime?)

Perhaps, then, a quote from one treatment of the statuesque theme will suffice from a top Korea site:

Le leader décédé, promu “généralissime” aurait eu 70 ans aujourd’hui. KCNA tourne à plein régime pour présenter les festivités, défilés de fleurs, statues géantes et autres réunions des élites de la nation…La Corée du Nord célèbre le 70ème anniversaire de la naissance de Kim Jong-il. Le dirigeant décédé en décembre serait né en haut du mont sacré Baektu dans la nuit très étoilée du 16 février 1942, d’après l’histoire officielle. Cette date a récemment été proclamée jour férié, et baptisée “Jour de l’Etoile brillante”.

The leader has died, and is promoted to “Generalissimo” on his 70th birthday today.  KCNA has turned completely to a program of presenting the festivities, the rows of flowers, the giant statues and other gatherings of the national elites…North Korea is celebrating the 70th anniverary of the birth of Kim Jong-il.  The dictator, who died in December, was said in official histories to be born on sacred Mount Paektu on a star-drenched night on 16 February 1942. This date has recently been proclaimed a festival day, baptised as “Day of the Brilliant Star.”  – Claude Lely, “70 ans de Kim Jong-Il, le ‘Jour de Etoile qui brille’ en Coree du Nord,” Aujourd’hui en Coree, Feburary 16, 2012.

New Kim Jong Il Inscription in South Pyong'an Province, Feb. 12 Ceremony Attended by the Great Orchestrator, Kim Ki Nam. Photo: Rodong Sinmun

Beyond Feeding WKP Egos: Prospects for European Food Aid | After the deluge of propaganda, it shouldn’t take long for the haggling over food aid to resume, if indeed such negotiating ever ceases at all.  Pyongyang’s man in Paris, Yun Yong-il, just completed a three-day swing through Dijon, where he has been having dinners and discussing prospects for further cultural cooperation, meeting with folks who will make the case in various local French papers that North Korea needs more food aid from the E.U.

Nordkorea-info, easily Germany’s top blog for DPRK analysis, posted the following entry on February 7, which I’m translating somewhat roughly.  (No safety net was used, so do double check with your own dictionary.)

Here is the brunt of the February 7 essay on Nordkorea-info on the DPRK’s dance with one German parliamentarian and then the EU:

Themes which had been submerged through the entire tide of events surrounding the recent death of Kim Jong Il are now coming back into focus.  And so it was with this case: at the beginning of November, a North Korean parlimentary delegation lead by Ri Jong-hyok was in Europe [Anfang November eine Delegation nordkoreanischer Parlamentarier um Ri Jong-hyok] and, among other things, went to Berlin and Brussels.  At the time, apart from a few photos, there was not much by way of actual information.

So I wrote an e-mail to Hermann Otto Solms (pictured above), and asked him what he talked about with Mr. Ri.  And so it seems he (or someone on his staff) wrote back to me.  No one spoke with any surprise or shock over the actual economic situation in North Korea which Mr. Ri (himself not surprisingly) discussed, and it can be gathered that North Korea needs to improve its aid situation. Apart from that, Solms and Ri talked about the Euro crisis, and what the underlying role of the national parliaments were in the crisis (perhaps Mr. Ri asked if, like his own, the European Parliament was beset by a combination of crisis mechanisms and ‘lack of alternatives’?).  Later on, Mr. Solms got into the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Then, as a quality conclusion, another theme which would cause some conflict, namely, the possibilities of a Korean reunification.  Mr. Ri threw before the Germans all the various Korean situations, and it was not astounding to see that for North Korean functionaries, a German-style reunification is a worst-case situation. Finally, Mr. Solms brought one more case forward which had become known to him (quite opposed to “power politics”) and upon which Mr. Ri might bring his influence to bear.  It was the case of a daughter, born in North Korea, whose mother had gone missing since her last visit. In such cases the North Korean dialogue partners can be very helpful throughout, as seen in the case of Claudia Roth.  Already, from these “small” humanitarian face-to-face talks, some meaning is gained and more contacts had with North Korean side.

As regards Ri’s visit to Strasbourg, I also found some relevant and interesting information.  On the website of the Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula [Delegation für die Beziehungen zu der Koreanischen Halbinsel], there were two protocols for meetings with delegations at the end of last year which were completely interesting.  One was from Ri’s trip..(discussion of nuclear issues)….ECHO has begun an aid program which:

can not really be seen generally as emergency aid, but rather addressing a systemic problem.

This I find interesting.  Would there be another program for aid, or self-aid, set up?  I mean to say that in the realm of short-term famine relief that tend to go on for a few months, there can be few systemic results.

Even more interesting was the other point:

Last but not least, Members were also briefed about the wish of North Korean Authorities to open an embassy in Brussels. It was noted that there is no majority in Council for such a move at the moment, which would also depend on further developments.

[...]

As can be gathered from Nordkorea-info’s post, clearly the outlook for aid from EU countries is something to watch in the months and weeks ahead.  One might further speculate that the Eurozone crisis — clearly noted by Ri on his junket — only strengths North Korean tendency to look to China as a more reliable partner, albeit one that needs significant hedging against.

Soprano State Seeks Aspiring Regional Hegemon for Expressions of Mutual Respect | Finally, a few words about the Chinese role — or, more correctly, lack thereof — in the Kim adulation-fest.  Stephan Haggard, with an ear to sources in the NGO community that deal regularly with grain shipments to the DPRK, indicates that the Chinese aid package to North Korea in the direct aftermath of Kim Jong-il’s death may have been far less than previously indicated.

There are a few other data points out there, minor media skermishes really, that indicate that China is not real happy with the DPRK or at least more prone to give them pressure at the moment.

Seemingly lost in the somewhat self-indulgent kerfuffle over the “Kim Jong Un is dead” trope which overtook Weibo on February 9 were the ideas that the whole thing could have been relatively easily nipped in the bud by Chinese authorities — it was not — and that its narrative so clearly ran counter to last October’s not entirely inconsequential KCNA-Xinhua meetings in Beijing.

On Feburary 12, as if to confirm China’s willingness to sacrifice the DPRK on the rocks of great-power politics, China’s English-language media published this rather strongly-worded editorial on the idea that North Korea was disrespecting China, and that Kim Jong Un had yet to acknowledge China’s centrality.  The Korea Times amplified significantly on the story here (h/t Richard Horgan @liberatelaura).

The original Chinese version of the story is from a second-tier semi-official blog, a typical outlet for Chinese venting about North Korea which can then be harvested and held up (or translated in English, how convenient!) by Xinhua when useful.  As tends to happen, the original text in Chinese is even more critical of the DPRK; the author complains about China’s refugee fatigue and the possibility of a regime collapse. Along with holding up Kim Jong Nam as a possible reformer, the Chinese media discussion of regime collapse in North Korea is a subject that moved in a rapid manner from taboo (during Kim Jong Il’s funeral) to quite possibly encouraged.

No wonder the North Koreans appear to be following precisely the script for stiff-arming the Chinese that they followed in the mid-1980s, an episode which Charles Kraus and I documented in China-North Korea Document Dossier #2 : cozy up to the Russian Ambassador (on February 14, a high-level visit this year) and demand a little respect for the young successor.

Further Reading:

Kim Jong-il, “Let Us Develop Ryanggang Province into a Firm Base for Education in Revolutionary Traditions: A Talk to Senior Officials of Ryanggang Province and Anti-Japanese Revolutionary Fighters,” July 21, 1968, Kim Jong Il Selected Works, Volume 1, 1964-1969 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Press, 1992), 364-379.