
FOCUS ON AMBASSADOR LIU HONGCAI

CHINA-NORTH KOREA DOSSIER #4

NICK MILLER
Contact Between China and the DPRK: 2010 – 2012
Focus on Ambassador Liu Hongcai

Nick Miller

April 2013
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAIFC</td>
<td>China Association for International Friendly Contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee of either the WPK or CCP</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea AKA North Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALSG</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILD</td>
<td>International Liaison Department (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCNA</td>
<td>Korean Central News Agency</td>
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<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>Leading Small Groups (China)</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Defense Commission (North Korea)</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Korean People’s Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Politburo Standing Committee (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>Supreme People’s Assembly (North Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPK</td>
<td>Worker’s Party of Korea</td>
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Introduction

My goal when I undertook this project over the summer in 2012, while I was interning at the Korea Economic Institute (KEI), was to improve my own understanding of elite power politics between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK North Korea). I wanted to see how much data could be collected through open-sources and a thorough reading of the English language North Korean and Chinese party papers regarding the movements of Chinese and North Korean elites from 2010 to 2012. As this project grew the primary focus became understanding the chief players in both Chinese and North Korean foreign policy, how often did they meet, and how many delegations did each country send between 2010 and 2012?

This dossier was written to serve as a guide for Northeast Asian experts to help them keep tabs on the major movements and events that transpired between China and North Korea from 2010-2012. I also wanted to make sure that this reader would also be useful and accessible to those who have a general interest in the subject matter.

There is an inherent risk when attempting to analyse closed states like North Korea and China through reading state media reports as analysts at times do not have access to outside sources to confirm the state media reports. The methodology that I utilized for this dossier was kremlinology or also known as ‘reading the tea leaves’ which is an imperfect science that North Korean and China watchers have to utilize in order to ascertain what could be going on within North Korea. As I did not have any independent sources that can be used to verify what is occurring in North Korea one has to look through public appearances, seating charts in important state events, and state media and propaganda reports to gain a possible insight into what could be occurring within the North Korean leadership.

I did my best to fact-check the meetings when either country publicly announced a meeting had occurred with the other country’s state media and independent news sources. The one advantage I found in reading North Korean media, mainly Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK (KCNA), is that their articles would often provide me with a full list of government officials and at times speeches given while the Chinese media – Xinhua, China Daily, among others would not provide as much detail regarding their meetings. During my research, I found state media reports
were frequently vague as to what was discussed or the purpose of the delegation. My research was inherently limited in scope to public sources of state media reports and thus could have, and very likely did, missed secret trips during the three years I surveyed.

This dossier has been broken down into the three main sections. Section I examines the role China’s embassy in Pyongyang plays as well as the challenges the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs faces in changing China’s policy towards North Korea. Section II examines the role of China’s Ambassador to North Korea, currently Liu Hongcai, providing critical background information, political connections, and the role he plays in implementing China’s policies towards the North Korean government. Section III is a breakdown of the meetings that occurred between 2010 and 2012 and highlight all major international and domestic events that occurred that had an impact on Chinese-DPRK relations.

While China shares the international community’s goal of having a denuclearized Korean peninsula, its objectives and certainly implementation of those goals within the region still remain at odds with the United States regarding the Kim Jong-un regime.¹ For the Chinese leadership these are some of the most pressing issues regarding how to handle North Korea:

- **Stability:** Chinese leaders’ decisions focus on this key fear. China is facing mounting domestic problems and the potential fallout of the North Korean government collapsing is too much for the Chinese government to risk. As North Korea’s last major ally the Chinese government would be obligated to support it as it would risk losing face if the government collapsed. China cannot have South Korea gain access to North Korean nuclear capabilities, the North’s nuclear materials going loose, or the United States moving past the 38th parallel to gain a foothold.

- **Geo-politics/Buffer:** North Korea serves as a critical buffer zone for China. Without North Korea China see itself as being surrounded by its enemies. If the North Korean government were to collapse


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and unify under South Korea this leads to the fear that unified Korea will move against China and further cement its alliance with the United States. China do not want US troops above the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel towards China’s border and threatening Beijing with more than the U.S. Forces Korea currently in the southern half of the Peninsula.

- **Refugees**: A massive influx of millions of refugees entering Northeast China is of grave concern to the Chinese government. Even though the refugee flow would represent a statistically insignificant increase in China’s population the refugees would nevertheless still likely number in the hundreds of thousands. There would also be the problem of how to train and educate the refugees in order for them to thrive in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. China does not want the border provinces Jilin and Liaoning to become new areas of ethnic conflict like Tibet or Xinjiang. Nor does China want to deal with even a whiff of irredentist issues, which could be a possible problem as in those border provinces houses a large number of ethnic Koreans live in the Jilin and Liaoning border region, so any major the influx of North Korean refugees would cause the Chinese leadership to worry that the Koreans could seek further autonomy from the Chinese government and create further ethnic revolts within China.

- **Sphere of Influence**: One of China’s fears is that it could lose its influence over North Korea to the United States. If the relationship between the United States and North Korea does improve that would lead to a loss of North Korean dependence on China for oil, food supplies, etc. The economic support that China continues to provide North Korea has led some analysts to believe this increases Chinese leverage over affecting change within the North Korean leadership, but there is little credible evidence of China’s successful utilizing this leverage. China has reportedly and only temporarily cut off oil exports to North Korea to show its displeasure with past North Korean
actions but this has not stopped the North Korean government from continuing their nuclear tests.²

- **Korean War Redux:** Having North Korea start another major conflict would be a disaster for the region as China would have to either support North Korea under its treaty obligations or side with the international community thus sacrificing decades of support.

The two chief camps shaping Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea have been characterized as the **strategists** and the **traditionalists.**³

**Strategists** believe that China needs to reshape its policies towards North Korea, as its policies have not worked in preventing North Korea’s nuclear program or brought economic reforms to the country. They tend to be Western educated elites and scholars who want China to reassess its policies regarding North Korea and work more with the United States.

Some of the Chinese scholars that could be put into this camp are: Sun Zhe from Tsinghua University, Ren Xiao from Fudan University, and Zhang Liangui from the Central Party School believes that China needs to put the Chinese-U.S. relationship over North Korea.⁴

They take a more realistic perspective on China’s situation believing that the past methods China has utilized are not making China or the region safer and need to be changed in order to realize the peaceful East Asia China needs in order to focus on its domestic economy and stability. As North Korea continues to ignore and become a strategic and economic liability to China’s

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⁴ “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,” p. 3.
national interest despite the food and oil assistance China has given them over the years.\(^5\)

Zhu Feng, Deputy Director at the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, wrote that China has become hostage to North Korean’s actions and constrained by the fear that if they acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear power it could spurn nuclear arms races throughout Asia. The Chinese leadership would have to re-evaluate its relations with North Korea after it conducted its third nuclear test.\(^6\) North Korea conducted its third test on February 12, 2013.\(^7\) Professor Zhu has also proposed a more nuanced spectrum for assessing Chinese attitudes towards North Korea, listing nationalists, realists, internationalists, and liberalists.\(^8\)

**Traditionalists** are a more conservative camp within Chinese politics that view the West’s intentions within the region with distrust and that the Korean peninsula as a zero-sum game.\(^9\) Those within this faction range from scholars, policy analysts, and diplomats. They see the United States as the reason for why there is no progress or bilateral engagement between the United States and North Korea.\(^10\)

Yang Bojiang, a professor of Japanese studies at the University of International Relations in Beijing, viewed that the North Korean satellite launches in April 2012 were done because of the North Korean fears of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The sanctions that have been put on North Korea over the years only increase the

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\(^10\) “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,” p. 7.
levels of insecurity within North Korea and lead to more extreme actions that will ensure survival.\textsuperscript{11}

For those within the traditionalist camp the bonds between China and North Korea were sealed when the Chinese entered to save North Korea in the Korean War and that was not to be forgotten. The only way for China to ensure that stability was maintained in North Korea was through Chinese aid. North Korea served as a strategic asset to China because it protects China from the U.S. military presence stationed in South Korea.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12} “Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea,” p. 7.
Section I
China’s Embassy in DPRK and China's North Korea diplomacy

The Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang

Introduction

This section serves as a primer on the stated and presumed roles of China’s embassy in the DPRK. It also provides some background on the sources of China’s DPRK policy-making apparatus. Some may be surprised to learn how little impact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has on North Korea policy and the difficulties in balancing competing interests as the Chinese Party elders decide on the direction they believe is the best course of action to deal with North Korea.

Themes

One of the overarching themes with China’s embassy in North Korea is the fact that while it serves as a cultural center for Chinese influence and common meeting place for Chinese and North Korean officials within the DPRK the MFA plays a secondary role to the real power player in China’s management of relations with the DPRK and that is the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On the website for China’s embassy in Pyongyang states that the embassy
role is to assist in the coordinating exchanges between the DPRK and China as well as carrying out the day-to-day channels between the two countries, coordinating visits between the top leaderships as well as between two nations, and promoting exchanges and interactions between government, NGO, and academic institutions.\textsuperscript{13} The embassy’s website extols the long history of political cooperation, technological, cultural, and economic exchanges between the PRC and DPRK.\textsuperscript{14} This is done to assure North Korea and keep up with the government propaganda that relations between the two countries is as strong as ever while in reality the Chinese leaders are frustrated with North Korea’s actions and its unwillingness to reform its domestic economy to the Chinese model.

China in the past has had to manage North Korean fears that China would forget about the country as China normalized relations with the United States in the 1970s in order to assuage those fears Mao provided North Korea with technological and economic aid and propaganda campaigns that extolled the solidarity between the two nations.\textsuperscript{15} To North Korea China committed one of its worst betrayals by normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992. North Korea’s political philosophy of juche, or self-reliance/independence at times puts itself at odds with the extensive aid that North Korea needs from China and there is still hostility from North Koreans towards the Chinese because of how dependent they on aid in order to survive.\textsuperscript{16}

Officially, the website, states that the embassy role is to assist in the coordinating exchanges between the DPRK and China as well as carrying out the day-to-day channels between the two countries, coordinating visits between the top leaderships as well as between

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} “Political Section,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Embassy for the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” http://kp.chineseembassy.org/eng/.
\item \textsuperscript{14} China’s website for its embassy can be found here- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Embassy for the People’s Republic of China in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” http://kp.chineseembassy.org/eng/.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Hong Yung Lee, “Korea’s Future: Peking’s Perspective,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 11, 1977, pp. 1089-1090.
\end{itemize}

\textit{SinoNK.com}
two nations, and promoting exchanges and interactions between government, NGO, and academic institutions.\textsuperscript{17}

**Bureaucracies and North Korea**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)**

The MFA is directly responsible for carrying out foreign policy for the CCP and managing China’s diplomatic relations abroad.\textsuperscript{18} China’s embassies serve as the visible face of China and to act as a vehicle to influence China’s relations with local elites. The MFA influence in affecting foreign policy has declined over the years. As China’s international role expanded, the MFA lost its monopoly over the decision-making process regarding pressing global issues. The MFA also had to compete with People’s Liberation Army (PLA), state-owned enterprises (SOE), and banks, among other Chinese government actors, for influence over North Korea policy.

This has left the MFA rather ineffectual in its ability to affect foreign policy and delegated to a role of implementing the directives of the Politburo Security Council (PSC), who are the ultimate arbiters of China’s political direction. The MFA has also had to contend with the conflicting duties have been spread throughout various departments. It also has to compete with the Office of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and the National Security Leading Small Group, which review foreign policy issues and recommendations to the PSC to get its voice heard.\textsuperscript{19}

**Party-Party Relations**

Maintaining Party-Party relations is done through the ILD. The ILD manages the long-standing Party-Party relationship and China’s embassy in Pyongyang serves as a frequent meeting place for visiting party officials. The ILD acts as a policy advisory group


for the government and implements foreign policy through its relationship. Wang Jiarui, the Director of the International Liaison Department, characterized the ILD’s role in North Korea as one of active participation and strong initiative towards the critical issues at hand.\textsuperscript{20} In Bates Gill’s analysis on the Party-Party contact he saw that the ILD and other government agencies are working to strengthen relations through increased party talks and fostering further long term economic relations, investment opportunities, and development aid.\textsuperscript{21}

The ILD has a long history of interaction and exchanges with the WPK. The ILD manages visits of Chinese leadership to North Korea and arranges for access to the Chinese leadership when the WPK sends delegations to China, which is handled by the MFA for all other countries. Many in the PRC’s top leadership positions that have a hand in managing Sino-DPRK relations are not career MFA officials: Wang Jiarui, Zhang Zhijun, and current ambassador to North Korea Liu Hongcai all spent their careers with the ILD. One of the ways the ILD interacts with the WPK is through various front organizations. The China Association for International Friendly Contacts (CAIFC) is one such organization that sends delegations to and receives from North Korea. Through these contacts, they monitor party relations and act as a back channel for the CCP elites to pass messages onto North Korean leadership.\textsuperscript{22}

**Bureaucratic Battles**

With the PLA claiming dominance over security concerns regarding North Korea and ILD managing Party-Party relations how does the MFA manage joint activities between other government agencies regarding North Korea? The answer is not very well. Many of other actors (like the PLA) do not feel compelled to coordinate their activities with the MFA or inform them of their activities within North Korea.\textsuperscript{23}

As for the relationship between the ILD and MFA the ILD is clearly ascendant and dictates the direction of the bilateral relationship. It is not uncommon for the ILD to sidestep the MFA entirely regarding North Korean issues and more common to have officials like (State Councillor and former ILD director) Dai Bingguo and Wang Jiarui to visit the DPRK more often than Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.\(^\text{24}\) Dai and Wang also outrank Yang in the CCP’s hierarchy.

Power conflicts between the government and Party organizations plague the decision-making process at all levels. The conflicts are only exacerbated by opacity within the Chinese political system where influence is determined through patronage and guanxi.\(^\text{25}\) The gulf of power between those who decide and those who implement is wide. The top elites within the PSC decide the direction Chinese foreign policy should take, and the various government agencies, such as the MFA, to carry out the decisions of the PSC.

It appears likely, with the conservative leadership that has been named at the 18th Party Congress, that the trend of China supporting the North Korean government will continue. In Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga’s analysis on Sino-North Korean relations, he believes that cause for China’s support to North Korea stems from “bureaucratic inertia.”\(^\text{26}\) While there has been debate amongst Chinese academics over the direction Beijing should go with North Korea, Beijing’s policies did not see any major policy shifts occur during the reign of Hu Jintao.\(^\text{27}\)

As for how Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will handle North Korea during their tenure as General Secretary and Premier, during the commemoration for the 60th anniversary of the Korean War in 2010 Xi heralded the common brotherhood between the two


countries and denounced the United States for its interference in the Korean War.\footnote{28} During Li Keqiang’s visit in October 2011, he urged the North to improve their relations with United States and South Korea.\footnote{29}

As for shifts within China’s use of food aid, Zhang Dejiang’s promotion at the 18\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress to lead the National People’s Congress suggests he may be point man on future decisions. As one of the most experienced North Korean hands, Zhang will likely wield strong influence over the direction of future policy towards North Korea. Zhang will likely continue the stance of food aid to prevent a refugee crisis and further investment of Chinese companies into North Korea.\footnote{30} Another sign that showed that there will likely not be any shifts within China’s policies was that no reformist candidates were promoted: Li Yuanchao, who was head of the Organization Department and Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang both were sidelined. Though, Mr. Beauchamp-Mustafaga contends that as five members on the PSC reach the 70 year-old retirement age, that there will be a possible chance that more reformist leaning officials could be elected in 2017.\footnote{31}

Another Chinese officials that should be watched for his ability to affect change on North Korean policy is Meng Jianzhu, as Minister of Public Security and membership in the CCP CC as the head of the Central Political and Legislative Committee.\footnote{32} Meng has been a critical person for China’s management of North Korea and is directly responsible with conveying China’s support to Kim Jong-un. Meng also provided the first official Chinese comments in February 2011 heralding China’s support for Kim Jong-un’s

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{31} Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “The 18\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress Crosses the Yalu: Implications for China’s North Korea Policy,” ibid.
\end{itemize}}
succession.\(^{33}\) The MPS has a strong working relationship with its North Korean counterpart and Meng stressed that there would be strengthening of the communication and cooperation regarding law enforcement between the two party organizations.\(^{34}\) The MPS also works in close cooperation with the PLA to assist in border security via the civilian-military State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense, which is under the direction of the MPS as it works to prevent illegal border activity and watch for any signs of growing instability within North Korea. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga believes that with its critical role along the border regions that it may be restrained in support for economic reforms as it could lead to a increase in illegal activities.\(^{35}\)

It is expected that Yang Jiechi will succeed Dai Bingguo as the Director of FALSG. With Dai’s position within the FALSG has given him strong sway over the direction of Chinese foreign policy, which in turn gave his protégé Wang Jiarui and the ILD access to Hu Jintao. While the MFA’s clout under Yang’s leadership clout diminished, Yang’s promotion this could allow him to increase the MFA influence regarding North Korea. The future role of the MFA will have to be watched over the next few years to see if Yang has been successful, though doubts persist due to Yang’s widely known weakness in the Chinese bureaucracy and lack of personal power.

There was a rumour that after the second nuclear test in 2009 the PSC voted 5-4 in favour of supporting North Korea.\(^{36}\) While it is not known if more reformist minded candidates on the PSC would create the shift that Western powers have wanted, it seems likely that with the conservative leadership in place the West should not expect China to budge from their past policies of support to Kim Jong-un leadership, no matter how exasperated they were privately with the North’s actions.


Section II
Beijing’s Man in Pyongyang:
Ambassador Liu Hongcai

“General Secretary Kim Jong-il and DPRK diplomats to ride out the Chinese lantern festival” February 18, 2011 | Image via PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Introduction: An Ambassador is the senior representative from another country. How is he received in his appointed country is closely related to how close he is perceived to be the most senior leadership in the sending country.

Ambassador Liu Hongcai comes from the Party side of the government where the Party is the supreme organ of power. The previous ambassador was Liu Xiaoming (2006-2010), who previously was the assistant governor of Gansu Province. He never had any experience on North Korean or Korean policy issues. While he did not have experience in handling Korea he did have experience in U.S. affairs and studied at Tufts University and a career within the MFA where he served as the Chinese ambassador to Egypt. The Hong Kong newspaper, Wen Wei Po Daily, interpreted his appointment as a shift within China’s policy
towards North Korea. Liu Xiaoming was reported to not be well liked by the North Korean leaders and could have further hurt the MFA role in the region which further cemented the influence of the ILD in managing the North Korean situation.

In Chinese politics, ambassadors must carefully balance the roles bureaucratic power and the Party play. While Liu technically works under MFA aegis, he must contend with the ILD’s role in shaping the direction of North Korean policy. This section aims to explore his own professional background and the impact of the 18th Party Congress may have on Liu Hongcai.

As for as the influence ambassadors can have on shaping foreign policy this depends on the individual ambassadors patronage network, his personal connections, and whether his or her views on changes came at the right time.

**Ambassadorial Responsibilities**

As Ambassador to the DPRK, Liu normally interacts with organization a day-to-day basis. His direct interlocutor in the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Pak Ui-chun and his direct interlocutor in the Party-to-Party relationship is Kim Yong-il.

**Professional Background**

According to his official biography Liu Hongcai was born in June 1955 in Liaoning Province so the border region has been part of his worldview from his earlier days. His later professional career was with the International Liaison Department rather than the MFA. His professional achievements are as follows:

- 1972-1975 Beijing International Studies University
- 1975-1978 International Department of Central Committee of CCP
- 1985-1986 Staff at the Teaching Mission of CCP and National Governments to Anhui Province

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40 Liu Hongcai was one of the first to graduate after China’s education system was closed during the Cultural Revolution.
• 1986-1989 Director of the Second Department of the International Department of Central Committee of the CCP
• 1989-1992 First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Japan
• 1992-1994 Deputy Executive Chief, Central District, Jining City, Shandong Province
• 1994-2000 Vice Director General, Director General, Second Department of the International Department of Central Committee of the CCP
• 2000-2001 Director General of Second Department/Deputy Chief of Secretariat, International Department of Central Committee of CCP
• 2001-2003 Deputy Chief of Secretariat/Chief of Administration Department, International Department of Central Committee of CCP.
• 2003-2010 Vice-Minister, International Department of Central Committee of CPC
• 2010-Present Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK

Professional Connections

Examining Liu Hongcai’s professional connections his standing amongst the North Korean elites appears strong. During the funeral procession of Kim Jong-il, Liu was the only foreign dignitary (but not the only foreign guest) who was invited to the funeral.41 He has been in frequent contact with the DPRK leadership (see graphs for his contacts with various actors from 2010-2012 on pages 55, 61, 67, and 69). However, we do not know the degree to which he has maintained or nurtured these relationships.

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Section III
Timeline of Crises and Interactions since 2010-2012

“Chinese president meets with uncle of North Korea’s Kim Jong-un,”
August 17, 2012 | Image via Christian Science Monitor

Introduction: This section is meant to provide background documentation and context for the various interactions that occurred during this brief timeframe. We highly recommend our previous dossiers as well as our KCNA compilations for those desiring even more information and willing to comb through more extensive reference material. Most of this information has come straight from the KCNA news release.

2010

January 7, 2010

Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Xiaoming gave a reception in Pyongyang to the Ministry of the People’s Security. Officials present: Minister Ju Sang-song and other ministry officials, Kim Ki-ryong, editor-in-chief of Rodong Sinmun, Ri Hae-ryong, Deputy Director General of KCNA, Kang Chang-rim, Vice-
Chairman of the Central Broadcasting Committee of Korea, and other DPRK media officials.\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{Hosting Chinese Participants:} Liu Xiaoming

\textit{Visiting North Korean Participants:} Minister Ju Sang-song and other ministry officials, Kim Ki-ryong, editor-in-chief of \textit{Rodong Sinmun}, Ri Hae-ryong, Deputy Director General of \textit{KCNA}, Kang Chang-rim, Vice-Chairman of the Central Broadcasting Committee of Korea, and other DPRK media officials.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Discussed:} The speeches were not published within the article or any subsequent articles. More then likely the speeches were kept to the familiar platitudes of thanking Liu Xiaoming for his service and the brotherhood shared between the two countries. Liu Xiaoming was apparently not well liked by the North Korean leaders, which was why he was replaced with Liu Honcai later that year, who with his background with the ILD would have better handle on managing Chinese-North Korean relations.

\textbf{January 26, 2010}

Choe Thae-bok and Kim Ki-nam, Secretaries of the CC of the KWP met with Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Xiaoming in Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{44}

\textit{Hosting Chinese Participants:} Liu Xiaoming

\textit{Visiting North Korean Participants:} Choe Tae-bok, Secretary of the CC of the KWP and Kim Ki-nam, Secretary of the CC of the KWP

\textit{Discussed:} The full discussion was not disclosed but it was said to be a farewell meeting.


\textit{SinoNK.com}
January 28, 2010

The DPRK held a reception for the Chinese embassy staff in Pyongyang. Liu Xiaoming China’s Ambassador to the DPRK and staff members was present at the affair along with Pak Ui-chun, DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs.45

Hosting North Korean Participant: Pak Ui-chun, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Visiting Chinese Participants: Liu Xiaoming and Chinese embassy staff

Discussed: This was event put on by the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the Chinese embassy staff for the New Year. Speeches focused on how 2009 was deemed the year of “DPRK-China Friendship” and that the North Koreans would be working to increase friendly and strong bilateral relations between the two nations.

Notes: On May 25, 2009 North Korea initiated another nuclear test in response to the test the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1874 that enacted further arms embargo and financial restrictions on North Korea. One of China’s responses to mark its displeasure with Pyongyang was cancelling a scheduled visit by Chen Zhili, the NPC Vice-chair and planned visits from DPRK officials to China.46 2009 was not a year for friendship between the two countries rather one of frustration on the part of Chinese policymakers.

February 3, 2010

Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the SPA of the DPRK awards a medal to Liu Xiaoming, outgoing Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK.47

Hosting North Korean Participant: Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the SPA of the DPRK

Visiting Chinese Participant: Liu Xiaoming, Chinese ambassador to North Korea

Comment: This is a probably de rigeur had the DPRK not presented some kind of award, it would have likely caused a short-term negative impact in their bi-lateral relationship.

February 6-9, 2010

Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD led a delegation to the DPRK. They met with Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of WPK, Kim Yong-il, Director of the International Affairs Department of the CC of the WKP, and Choe Thae-bok, Secretary of the CC of the WKP.48

Hosting North Korean Participant: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the WPK, Kim Yong-il, Director of the International Affairs Department of the CC of the KWP, and Choe Thae-bok, Secretary of the CC of the WKP

Visiting Chinese Participants: Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD, Liu Xiaoming, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK

Discussed: The news report mentioned that Wang conveyed a verbal personal message to Kim Jong-il and presented a gift from the delegation. The discussion was said to be cordial and friendly and the dinner had an amicable atmosphere.

Comments: While we do not know what the verbal message was to Kim Jong-il more then likely it could have been a message stressing their disapproval of North Korea’s past nuclear test and a desire for Pyongyang limit the disturbances this coming year.

February 10, 2010

Wu Dawei is appointed China’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs.49

Comments: Wu previously served as China’s chief negotiator within the Six-Party Talks handling the Korean nuclear issue. His movement to Special Representative makes sense given his experience on this issue.

February 23-24, 2010

Kim Yong-il, Director of the International Affairs Department of the CC of the WKP visited China and met with Hu Jintao as well as Head of the International Liaison Department of the CC Wang Jiarui, as well as DPRK Ambassador to China Choe Jin-su.50

Hosting Chinese Participant: Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Wang Jiarui, Head of the ILD
Visiting North Korean Participants: Kim Yong-il, Director of the International Affairs Department of the CC of the WKP, Choe Jin-su, DPRK Ambassador to China

Discussed: Kim Yong-il gave his regards and thanks from Kim Jong-il and remarked about how 2009 served as 60th anniversary of ties between the two countries and that the relations between the countries would be successful throughout the coming years.

Comments: More then likely the discussions between Hu and Kim were not amicable and given the frustrations China has had with North Korea in the last year that he likely read the riot act towards Kim Yong-il regarding North Korea’s actions.

March 8, 2010

New Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai meets Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the DPRK SPA.51

Comments: The appointment of Liu Hongcai, a career member within the ILD, marks a further strengthening of control over North Korean policy in the hands of the ILD rather than the MFA. As Liu Hongcai is ambassador he would have likely knew how to effectively managed ILD resources better and not encounter

perhaps as much problem as Liu Xiaoming may have while he was ambassador.

**March 16, 2010**

Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai met with Kim Yong-Il, Premier of the DPRK and Vice-Premier Ro Tu-chol in Pyongyang.  

*Hosting North Korean Participant: Kim Yong-il, Premier of the DPRK, Ru Tu Chol, Vice-Premier of the DPRK*

*Visiting Chinese Participant: Liu Hongcai, Chinese Ambassador to North Korea*

**March 26, 2010**

ROKS Cheonan sinks in an unexplained explosion 46 sailor went missing. North Korea blame denied involvement in the sinking.

**April 8, 2010**

Kim Yong-il, Director of the International Affairs Department of the CC of the WKP met with Liu Hongcai, China’s Ambassador to the DPRK.

*Hosting North Korean Participant: Kim Yong-il, Premier of the DPRK*

*Visiting Chinese Participant: Liu Hongcai, Chinese Ambassador to North Korea*

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April 30, 2010

Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the DPRK SPA headed a delegation to China for the 2010 Shanghai World Exposition and met with Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP. 55

Hosting Chinese Participant: Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Yu Zhengsheng, Politburo member of the Central Committee of the CCP and secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, Ling Jihua, member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee (who was demoted in the 18th Party Congress) and Director of its General Office, Wang Huning, member of the Secretariat and Director of the Policy Research Office of the CC of the CCP, Dai Bingguo, State Councillor, Yang Jiechi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chen Shiju, director of the Office of President Hu Jintao, and Wu Hailong, assistant to the PRC Foreign Minister

Visiting North Korean Present: Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium, O Su-yong, Vice-Premier, Kim Song-gi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Choe Pyong-gwan, DPRK ambassador to China

Notes: The event that DPRK delegation visited for was the 2010 Shanghai Expo. The delegation visit was also done to highlight Sino-DPRK friendship.

Comments: Chinese leaders have shown visiting North Korean officials expos like the Shanghai expo before and use to show case how far China has come economically in the attempt to get North Korea to modernize. This method has not been successful in persuading North Korean officials to adopt such reforms. It is more then likely that during the Shanghai Expo visit that the North Korean officials discussed the upcoming visit from Kim Jong-il. It is also likely that during this meeting Hu Jintao asked for an explanation as to what occurred with the Cheonan and whether North Korea was involved in the sinking.

May 3-7, 2010

Kim Jong-il visited China with a large delegation of powerful figures, including by Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Yong-chun who is vice-chairman of the NDC of the DPRK, Secretaries of the WPK Central Committee Choe Thae-bok and Kim Ki-nam, and Jang Song-taek. Reflecting interest in cross-border ties, the Chief Secretary of the North Phyong’-an Provincial Committee of the WPK, Kim Pyong-hae, also came on the trip.

On the Chinese side he was met by Hu Jintao and a number of other significant participants, including heir apparent Xi Jinping.56

Host Chinese Participant: Hu Jintao, Genereal Secretary of the CCP, Jiang Qinglin, standing member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Liu Qi, member of the Political Bureau of the CC, CPC and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and Dai Bingguo, State Councillor, Xi Jinping, standing member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Liu Qi, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CCP and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and Dai Bingguo, State Councillor.

Visiting North Korean Participant: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the KWP, Kim Yong-chun who is vice-chairman of the NDC of the DPRK and Minister of the Armed Forces, Secretaries of the WPK Central Committee Choe Thae-bok and Kim Ki-nam, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju, Department Directors Jang Song-taek, Kim Yong-il and Kim Yang-gon and First Vice Department Director Ju Kyu-chang of the WPK Central Committee, Department Directors of the NDC of the DPRK Hyon Chol-hae and Ri Myong-su, Chief Secretary of the South Hamgyong Provincial Committee of the WPK Thae Jong-su and Chief Secretary of the North Phyong’an Provincial Committee of the WPK Kim Pyong-hae


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Notes: At this top-level visit both leaders had “frank” exchanges on a variety of issues and building a strong relationship between the two countries.

Comments: Media reports discussed the video clips of Kim Jong-il in Beijing had still not recovered fully from the stroke he suffered in 2008 as he was dragging his left foot and lost weight. It was believed that he went China for more food aid and likely to discuss support the eventual succession process in case his health further deteriorates.57

June 15, 2010

Ri Thae-nam, Vice-Premier of the DPRK, met with the delegation of the Jilin Provincial People's Government of China headed by its Vice-Governor Chen Weigen and visited Mansudae Assembly Hall.58

Hosting Chinese Participant: Ri Thae-nam, Vice-Premier of the DPRK Chen Weigen, Vice-Governor of Jilin Province

Visiting North Korean Participant: Ri Thae-nam, Vice-Premier of the DPRK

June 23, 2010

A Shandong provincial friendship delegation of China headed by Wang Min, Secretary-General of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the CCP arrived in the DPRK.59

Comment: Shandong province has several direct ferry services from Shadong peninsula to South Korea, and has been a traditional site for Korean businesses.

**July 6, 2010**

North Korean Premier Choe Yong-rim meets with Chinese ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai in Pyongyang.  

*Hosting Chinese Participant:* Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to North Korea  

*Visiting North Korean Participant:* Choe Yong-rim, Premier of the DPRK  

*Comment:* Choe is nominally a point person for the DPRK economy, and his discussions with Liu would appear to be a prelude to the economic and tech agreements signed later in the month.

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**July 29, 2010**

Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK met DPRK Minister of Foreign Trade Ri Yong-nam to sign economic and technical cooperation agreement in Pyongyang.  

*Host North Korean Participant:* Ri Yong-nam, DPRK Minister of Foreign Trade  

*Visiting Chinese Participant:* Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to North Korea  

*Notes:* North Korea because of its isolation and sanctions is in desperate need of technological and economic help. It is likely with this agreement the hope would be to spur on further Chinese investment within North Korea. Little specific data was available as to the specific content of the agreement.

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**August 8, 2010**

Liu Jing, Deputy Public Security Minister visits the DPRK to affirm China’s assistance on tackling cross-border crime.  

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**Comment:** Border instability is of critical importance to China and North Korea. Over the summer of 2010 there was a border incident involving North Korean soldiers and Chinese smugglers. It was also reported that military equipment was given to North Korea to assist the Ministry of Public Security manage the border. The drug trade coming out of North Korea continues to be a major problem for China.  

**August 25, 2010**

A delegation of the Shenyang Military Area of the PLA headed by Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia visited the DPRK and met with Kim Yong-nam.  

*Hosting Chinese Participant:* Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia of the Shenyang Military Region  

*Visiting North Korean Participant:* Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the SPA of the DPRK  

*Notes:* The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) views North Korea as a critical area and a necessary buffer zone to protect against the U.S. and South Korean military. During this visit, it was said that the two parties discussed ways to further strengthen the relationship between the two countries and more bi-lateral military exchanges. Probably in the discussions between the two officials there was further talks of military investment and training, as North Korea needs both to maintain their army. The PLA also serves as one of the primary intelligence arms for China as a way to keep tabs on what is occurring within North Korea.

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August 26-30, 2010

Kim Jong-il visits China and meets with Hu Jintao.

Hosting Chinese Participant: Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Ling Jihua, member of the Secretariat of the CCP CC and director of the General Office of the CCP CC, Dai Bingguo, State Councillor, Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD of the CCP CC, Yang Jiechi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Ping, Minister in charge of the National Development and Reform Commission, Chen Deming, Minister of Commerce, Liu Jieyi, deputy head of the ILD of the CCP CC, and Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK.

Visiting North Korean Participant: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the DPRK, Kim Yong-chun, Vice-Chairman of the NDC and Minister of the People's Armed forces of the DPRK, Kim Ki-nam, secretary of the CC, the WPK, Thae Jong-su, department director of the CC, the WPK, Kang Sok-ju, first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Jang Song-taek, Hong Sok-hyong, Kim Yong-il and Kim Yang-gon who are department directors of the CC, the WPK, Choe Ryong-hae, chief secretary of the North Hwanghae Provincial Committee of the WPK, Kim Phyong-hae, chief secretary of the North Phyongan Provincial Committee of the WPK, and Pak To-chun, chief secretary of the Jagang Provincial Committee of the WPK.

Notes: Western analysts believed that at this trip he brought Kim Jong-un to gain support from the Chinese leadership as his successor as the trip came to China occurred before the WPK was set for a rare meeting. He also went to China to secure more economic and food aid from China as North Korea suffered from bad flooding that summer. In the official speeches from both

head of states discussed the joint brotherhood between both nations and congratulations for the 65th anniversary of the WPK and state reports there was no mention that elder Kim brought his son. However, the inclusion of North Korean officials from the border provinces of China indicated that some conversation was likely centering upon cross-border economic cooperation.

September 30- October 2, 2010

Choe Thae-bok, member of the North Korean Politburo and Secretary of the WPK CC led a delegation to China where he joined up with Choe Pyong-gwan, DPRK ambassador to China, and met with Hu Jintao and other Chinese officials.68

Hosting Chinese Participant: Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Liu Yunshan, member of the Politburo, Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD of the CC of the CCP, Liu Jieyi, deputy head of the ILD of the CC of the CCP

Visiting North Korean Participant: Choe Thae-bok, member of the North Korean Politburo and Secretary of the WPK CC

Notes: With the news reports it discussed the importance of strengthening the relations between the two parties, which falls under the parameter of the ILD, and the Chinese people were “rejoiced” that North Korea was building a “thriving” country. However, Chinese netizens were also venting their views, sometimes furiously, on North Korea that this not the case.69 Chae Tae-bok occasionally appears as a more foreign-friendly North Korean leader, having hosted a Chinese book fair in Pyongyang in 2012 and even collaborating once with the Western North Korean-business organization Chosun Exchange.

October 8, 2010

DPRK embassy in Beijing held a reception to mark the 65th anniversary of the founding of the WPK. Xi Jinping attended and gave a speech.  

Notes: Xi’s remarks at the function focused on how China should work to continue to build friendly ties with North Korea and that Kim Jong-il has build a strong independent country. In the speech he discussed how under new leadership within the WPK the DPRK should see more prosperity. This is obviously referring to Kim Jong-il’s successor Kim Jong-un and China realizes that it needs to offers its support to the new leadership to assist in a smooth transition. For Xi, this was the more practical flip side to the speech he would give later in the month about China's involvement in the Korean War and its justification -- which did not include the protection of socialism with North Korean characteristics.

October 9-11, 2010

Zhou Yongkang, member of the PSC of the CC of the CCP led a delegation to the DPRK to attend 65th anniversary of the WPK creation and meets Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un.  

Hosting North Korean Participant: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the KWP, Kim Yong-il, alternate member of the Politiburo and Secretary of the CC, Kim Yang Gon, alternate member of the Politiburo and Secretary of the CC, Kim Jong-un. 

Visiting Chinese Participant: Zhou Yongkang, member of the PSC of the CC of the CCP.  

Notes: Officially it was stated that the visit was to assist in developing further ties between the two nations and to celebrate

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the founding of the WPK. Zhou likely broached the areas of concern for the Chinese leadership: the North’s nuclear program, food scarcity, and economic reform. In the most lasting "optic" from the trip, Zhou Yongkang met Kim Jong-un, who had finally appeared in public on September 30, and was photographed with him during a massive parade.

October 12, 2010

Kim Gye-gwan First Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK meet in Beijing with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, and Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei.

October 12-16, 2010

Ri Yong-chol, First Secretary of the DPRK led a youth delegation to Beijing and Jinlin province and meets with Wang Zhaoguo, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s NPC in Beijing.

October 14, 2010

Pyon In-son, Vice-Minister of the DPRK People’s Armed Forces, led a military delegation to Beijing and Ynunan province and meet with Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie.

Hosting Chinese Participant: Defense Minister Colonel and State Councilor General Liang Guanglie

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Visiting North Korean Participant: Pyon In-son, Vice-Minister of the DPRK People’s Armed Forces

Notes: Officially the North Korean reports that the discussions focused on the friendly relations between the two and building a strong and cooperative relationship between the two nations. As military relations are critical between the two nations more then likely military issues facing the PLA were concerned about regarding North Korea.

October 18-22, 2010

Ma Li, Deputy Editor-In-Chief of the People’s Daily (China’s Official Voice of the Party) led a delegation to the DPRK and met with Kim Ki-nam, Secretary of the WPK CC

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Ki-nam, Secretary of the WPK CC

Visiting Chinese Present: Ma Li, Deputy Editor-In-Chief of the People’s Daily

Notes: This event focused on the further cementing of what might generously be called "cultural relations" between the countries, but in fact is a Party-Party exchange to strengthen coordination in propaganda.

Oct 19-26, 2010

Kim Yong-chun, Vice Chairman of the DPRK NDC and Minister of the People's Armed Forces, met with the delegation of veteran fighters of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) (those who fought for China in the Korean War) led by Wang Hai.

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Yong-chun, Vice Chairman of the DPRK NDC and Minister of the People's Armed Forces

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Visiting Chinese Present: Wang Hai, former commander of the Air Force of the PLA

Comment: This series of visits marked the 60th anniversary of the entry of the CPV into the Korean War. 60th anniversaries in Asian cultures are the most festive, as 60 years represent a complete zodiac cycle and marked a remarkably long life. As a whole, the event was meant to demonstrate the strong blood ties between the two countries. However, these celebrations were not commemorated with any “friendship jumps” or the other kinds of joint military activities like those that occurred in South Korea. The Chinese would expect a person of the rank of Kim Yong-chun to receive this delegation.

October 23-26, 2010

General Guo Boxiong, 1st Vice Chairman of the CMC, along with a delegation of senior military officers went to the DPRK to commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the CPV entry into the Korean War.80

DPRK embassy in China hosts a reception to mark the 60th anniversary of the CPV entry into the Korean War. Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie (who is outranked by both 1st Vice-Chair General Guo Boxiong and 2nd Vice Chair General Xu Caihou) attended the reception.81

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the SPA

Visiting Chinese Present: General Guo Boxiong, 1st Vice Chairman of the CMC, Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie and 2nd Vice Chair General Xu Caihou

Notes: This was a military visit to further cement the historic relations between the two countries, but it is worth noting that Guo Boxiong would be an important conduit and friend for the DPRK in the event that it needed to purchase arms or jet fuel. In this way,

the rituals of the China-North Korea relationship create opportunities to iron out these and similar issues behind the scenes.

**October 26, 2010**

Ji Jae-ryong was named the new DPRK ambassador to China and sent to China.  

**November 23, 2010**

North Korea initiates shelling of the Yeonpyeong islands, killing four and injuring nineteen.

*Notes:* At the time of the shelling speculation was rampant as to the motives for why North Korea attacked; one of the theories put forth was that it was Kim Jong-un’s attempt to secure hardline military support, using the attack to gain concessions for more food aid, or humiliate South Korea as it hosted the G20. Later on, Japanese media revealed that the PRC had been pressuring North Korea heavily behind the scenes to hold back from further such attacks.

**November 23, 2010**

Vice-Premier of the North Korean Cabinet Kang Sok-ju met with the Chinese economic and trade delegation headed by Vice-Minister of Commerce Wang Hemin in Pyongyang.

*Hosting North Korean Present:* Kang Sok-ju, Vice-premier of the North Korean cabinet

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*SinoNK.com*
Visiting Chinese Present: Wang Hemin, Vice-Minister of Commerce

Notes: While it is not known what occurred in this meeting Wang Hemin could have implored North Korean officials for the opening of more SEZs and trade opportunities.

November 26, 2010

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with new DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae-ryong.85

Hosting Chinese Present: Yang Jieche, Foreign Minister of the MFA

Visiting North Korean Present: Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK Ambassador to China

Notes: At this time of the talk the U.S. and South Korea were engaged in military exercises that were planned and not meant to coincide after the North Korean shelling of the islands of Yeonpyeong. Yang Jiechi urged restraint to the North Koreans and as the MFA often serves as the heavy hand in Chinese diplomacy read a riot act towards the North Korean ambassador. This was not an auspicious beginning for Ambassador Ji Jae-ryong’s tenure in Beijing.

November 30-December 4, 2010

Choe Tae-bok, Chairman of the DPRK SPA visited Beijing and met with Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and Chen Zhili, Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.86

Hosting Chinese Present: Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Chen Zhili, Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee

Visiting North Korean Present: Choe Tae-bok, Chairman of the DPRK SPA

Notes: In the Chinese state media that they would further cement legislative ties from Kim Jong-il’s visits in 2010. Choe also visited Jilin province where he was likely shown further examples of China’s economic reforms.

December 8-9, 2010

State Councillor Dai Bingguo visits the DPRK and met with Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the WPK, and Vice Premier Kang Sok-ju.  

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the WPK, Kang Sok-ju, Vice-Premier, Kim Yang Gon, alternate member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC and the WPK

Visiting Chinese Present: Dai Bingguo, State Councillor, Zhang Zhijun, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, Ai Ping, deputy head of the ILD of the CC, the CCP, Qiu Yuanping, deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the CC, the CCP, Wu Dawei, special representative of the Chinese government for the Korean Peninsula issue, and others.

Notes: The North Korean state media reported that the talks were friendly. It is possible that Dai brought up China’s concern over the shelling of Yeonpyeong, North Korea’s nuclear program and a desire that North would ease tensions in the region.

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January 17, 2011

Chinese government denies reports from the South Korean newspaper, The Chosun Ilbo, was sending troops to Rason, North Korea.\(^{89}\)

*Notes:* While Western analysts do not want China’s military plans for North Korea and whether the Chinese would participate in an invasion of North Korea. South Korean spy Park Cha-seo that the Chinese plan for North Korea was called “chick plan”.\(^{90}\)

February 13-14, 2011

PRC State Councillor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu visited Pyongyang to sign a bilateral security agreement. He met with Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the WKP, Kim Yong-nam, member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the WKP CC and Chief of the KPA General Staff Ri Yong-ho (who was purged in the summer of 2012), Ju Sang-song, Minister of People’s Security and member of the WKP CC Politburo.\(^{91}\)

*Hosting North Koreans Present:* Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the WKP, Kim Yong-nam, member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the WKP CC and Chief of the KPA General Staff Ri Yong-ho (who was purged in the summer of 2012), Ju Sang-song, Minister of People’s Security and member of the WKP CC Politburo

*Visiting Chinese present:* Meng Jianzhu, Minister of Public Security

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\(^{90}\) A further discussion of Chinese war plans for Pyongyang can be found here – Nick Miller, “China’s War Plans for Pyongyang,” *Sino-NK (online)*, 03/10/2012, http://sinonk.com/2012/03/10/pla-plans-for-pyongyang/.

Notes: Border security is of critical importance to both countries. Bilateral security agreement is another necessary step to stop illegal border crossings and better communication between the two countries. The MPS also serves an important role in creating strong ties with North Korea, assist the North Korean government in managing its law enforcement needs, and monitor illegal activities along the border.92

February 20, 2011

Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun visited Pyongyang and met with Kim Yong-nam, President of the DPRK Presidium of the SPA.93

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Yong-nam, President of the DPRK Presidium of the SPA

Visiting Chinese Present: Zhang Zhijun, Vice-Foreign Minister

Notes: The Chinese state media remarked that the discussions focused on consolidating a friendly relationship and ways to protect regional stability. The discussed wide variety of issues facing the two countries – Kim Jong-il’s succession, the North’s nuclear program, border security, and aid in attempt to find common ground.

April 12, 2011

Kim Kye-gwan, First Vice Foreign Minister of the DPRK visited China and met with Foreign Ministry officials and Wu Dawei.94


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Hosting Chinese Present: Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, Foreign Minister Yang, and Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei

Visiting North Korean Present: Kim Kye-gwan, First Vice Foreign Minister of the DPRK

Notes: The Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the discussions revolved around restarting the Six-Party talks, how stability can be maintained in region, and encourage better cooperation between the DPRK and South Korea. The spokesperson stated that while the talks were still stalled there is hopes that favourable conditions for the talks to begin again.
May 17, 2011- May 20, 2011

Vice-Chairman Chen Zongxing and the delegation from the CPCC met with Kim Wan-su, director of the Secretariat of the CC, the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea, Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK SPA officials concerned and Li Qingjiang, charge d'affaires, and staff members of the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang.95 96

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Wan-su, director of the Secretariat of the CC, the Democratic Front for the Reunification of Korea, Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK SPA

Visiting Chinese Present: Vice-Chairman Chen Zongxing of the CPCC, Li Qingjiang, charge d'affaires, and staff members of the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang

Notes: The CPCC serves as one of the front organizations to the ILD to help manage Party-Party relations.

May 20-26, 2011

Kim Jong-il visited Beijing, and sites in the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Jiangsu. He saw various industrial and technological development areas and met with Hu Jintao.97

Hosting Chinese Present: Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, member of the PSC of the CC of the CCP and vice-president of the PRC; Ling Jihua, member of the Secretariat of the CC of the CCP and director of the General Office of the CC of the CCP; Dai Bingguo, State Councillor; Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD of the CC of the CCP; Yang Jiechi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Zhang Ping, head of the National Development and Reform Committee; Chen Deming, Minister of Commerce; Liu Jieyi, deputy head of the ILD of the CC of the CCP; and Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK


**Visiting North Korean Present:** Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the KWP, Kim Ki-nam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the WPK, Choe Thae-bok, members of the Political Bureau and secretaries of the CC of the WPK; Kang Sok-ju, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the WPK and vice-premier of the Cabinet; Jang Song-taek, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the WPK and vice-chairman of the NDC; Kim Yong-il, alternate members of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the WPK, Pak To-chun, alternate members of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the WPK and Thae Jong-su, alternate members of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the WPK; Mun Kyong-tok, alternate member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the WPK and chief secretary of the Pyongyang City Committee of the WPK; Ju Kyu-chang, alternate member of the Political Bureau and department director of the CC of the WPK; Kim Kye-gwan, first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs; and Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK ambassador to China.

**Notes:** It is believed that while Kim Jong-il was in China Kim Jong-un was managing affairs back in Pyongyang and that Kim’s visit was done to ensure further support from the Chinese leadership to his succession plan. Kim also needed further economic support from China in developing the Rason Economic Trade Zone and the Hwanggumpyong Economic Zone. As for easing tensions in the region and denuclearization North Korea has used its nuclear program to bring the United States to negotiate an ending to the Korean War.98

**June 7-9, 2011**

Officials from the DPRK and China at the Development Cooperation and Joint Steering Committee met in Liaoning and Jilin province in China to develop Rason Economic and Trade Zone and Hwanggumphyong and Wihwa Islands Economic Zone.99

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98 Further analysis on Kim Jong-il’s visit can be found here – Haksoon Paik, “Kim Jong-il’s Visit to China: Implications for East Asia and the United States,” 38 North, 06/05/2011, http://38north.org/2011/06/paik060511/.

Hosting Chinese Present: Chen Deming, Chinese Minister of Commerce

Visiting North Korean Present: Jang Song Taek, the administrative director of the WKP

Notes: North Korea needs more international investment to survive and China has been the main ally to develop these SEZs in hope that this will move North Korea into further domestic reform.100

June 10-14, 2011

Li Yuanchao, head of the CPC Organization Department, visited the DPRK and met with Kim Jong-il, among others.101

Hosting North Korean Present: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the KWP, Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the SPA and Choe Thae-bok, Chairman of the SPA, Kim Jong-un, vice-chairman of the CMC of the WPK, Ri Yong-ho, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the CC, the WPK and chief of the General Staff of the KPA, Kim Ki-nam, Kang Sok-ju, member of the Politburo of the CC, the WPK and vice-premier of the Cabinet, Jang Song-Taek, alternate member of the Politburo of the CC, the WPK and vice-chairman of the NDC

Visiting Chinese Present: Li Yuanchao, head of the Organization Department, Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD of the CCP Central Committee, Sun Zhengcai, secretary of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the CCP, Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, Pan Ligang, director of a bureau of the Organization Department of the CCP CC, Li Xi, head of the Organization Department of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CCP, Shi Taifeng, head of the Organization Department of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the CCP, Yang Yanyi, assistant to the head of the ILD of the CCP CC, and other suite members

Notes: It is rare to have the head of the Organization Department visit another communist nation. The Organization Department handles the promotion manages the personnel of the CCP and manages the promotions of the Party members. KCNA described that the meetings focused on building further ‘strategic dialogue’ between the KWP and the CCP. During Li Yuanchao tenure as the head of the Organization Department (he was replaced by Zhao Leji at the 18th Party Congress) his focus was on curbing corruption. Perhaps he was offering advice and plans to help KWP curb corruption within their ranks?

June 27, 2011

DPRK Premier Choe Yong-rim met with the Liaoning provincial party and government delegation led by Chen Zhenggao, Deputy Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the CCP and Governor of the Liaoning Provincial People's Government, along with several significant DPRK officials and Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Hongcai.102

Host North Korean Participants: Choe Yong-rim, DPRK Premier, Kim Hyong-jun, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hong Kil-nam, Vice-Chairman of the North Phyong’an Provincial People's Committee, and officials concerned.

Visiting Chinese Participants: Chen Zhenggao, Deputy Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the CCP and Governor of the Liaoning Provincial People's Government, Liu Hongcai, Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK.

Notes: Liaoning Province has the Liaoning Shenyang Export Processing Zone that focuses on electronics, machinery, new energy, materials, and chemical industry. These are all critical areas that North Korea needs as a lot of its materials and machines are based of old Soviet technology. North Korea has also needs new energy sources as the sanctions place on North Korea hurts its ability to achieve greater energy independence from China.103

July 10-13, 2011

Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang leads a delegation to the DPRK to attend the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the DPRK-Chinese friendship treaty.  

*Hosting North Korean Participants:* Choe Thae-bok, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the CC of the WPK, Ro Tu-chol, vice-premier of the Cabinet, Kim Jong-suk, chairwoman of the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Ri Yong-chol, vice department director of the WPK CC, Kim Hyong-jun, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Ku Pon-thae, vice-minister of Foreign Trade, and officials concerned.

*Visiting Chinese Participants:* Zhang Dejiang, member of the Politburo CC, and vice-premier of the State Council, a delegation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the China-Korea Friendship Association headed by Wu Donghe, chairman of the China-Korea Friendship Association, Ambassador Liu Hongcai and staff members of the Chinese embassy here and Chinese guests staying in the DPRK.

*Notes:* The 50th Anniversary is an important cultural event that marks the relationship between the two nations and while the speeches dealt in attempting to paint a rose-colored relationship the realities was far from the political speeches given that night. In Choi Myeong-hae’s analysis on the Chinese delegation sent to mark the occasion that it was a downgraded event by sending Zhang Dejiang instead of a member of the PSC.

July 11, 2011

State Councillor Dai Bingguo attended a reception hosted by Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK ambassador to China with Yang Hyong-sop, Vice President of the Presidium of the DPRK’s SPA and a delegation from the DPRK.

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Hosting North Korean Participants: Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK ambassador to China with Yang Hyong-sop, Vice President of the Presidium of the DPRK’s SPA

Visiting Chinese Participants: Dai Binguo, State Councillor

Notes: This event was done in honor of the 50th anniversary of the friendship treaty signed between the countries. There is still uncertainty as to whether the ‘mutual assurance’ clause whether China will follow through with military defense of North Korea. Shi Yinhong, a North Korean expert at Renmin University, that China would not support anyone side over aggressive actions regarding the Korean peninsula and that treaty is a symbolic one not a military alliance.107

July 13, 2011

An information department delegation of the Chinese Foreign Ministry led by Deputy Department Director Ma Jisheng arrived in the DPRK.108

July 23, 2011

At the ministerial meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum in Bali Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Yong-ho (not to be confused with the General Ri Yong-ho), DPRK Ambassador to Indonesia Ri Jong-ryul and members of the DPRK delegation met with the Assistant to the Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia and members of the Chinese delegation and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexei Borodapkin and members of the Russian delegation.109

August 4-7, 2011

Vice Admiral Tian Zong, commander of the China’s north fleet visited Wonsan, DPRK to mark the 50th anniversary of the friendship treaty between the two nations and was met by Rear Admiral Kim Myong-sik.110

Note: This was the first PLAN ship visit to North Korea in 15 years.

August 23, 2011

Kim Ki-nam, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC of the WPK, met with the delegation of People's Daily led by Secretary General Yan Xiaoming at the Mansudae Assembly Hall.111

August 26, 2011

Kim Jong-il during a visit to China and Russia met with State Councillor Dai Bingguo in Heilongjiang province.112

Hosting Chinese Participants: Dai Bingguo, State Councillor, Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD of the CC of the CCP, Sheng Guangzu, minister of Railways, and other senior central officials

Visiting North Korean Participants: Kim Jong-il, General Secretary of the WPK, Kim Yong-chun, member of the Politburo of the CC of the WPK and minister of the People's Armed Forces, Kang Sok-ju, member of the Politburo of the CC of the WPK and vice-premier of the Cabinet, Jang Song-taek, alternate member of the Politburo of the CC of the WPK and vice-chairman of the NDC, Kim Yong-il, Kim Yang-gon, Pak To-chun and Thae Jong-su, alternate members of the Political Bureau and secretaries of the CC of the WPK, O Su-yong, chief secretary of the North Hamgyong


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Provincial Committee of the WPK, Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK ambassador to China, and Ri Ki-bom, DPRK consul general in Shenyang\textsuperscript{113}

Notes: This was a visit that was a stopover onto Kim Jong-il’s trip to Russia. In Leonid Petrov’s analysis of the visits and the role of Kim Jong-un, he stated that younger Kim was back in Pyongyang managing the state affairs as the U.S.-ROK military were doing drills and was used as a symbolic presence as he was the Vice-chair of the KWP Military Committee. His visit in Russia was to move a stalled energy agreement that would give both Koreas access to Russian natural gas.\textsuperscript{114} This was likely a calculated move to help North Korea improve its standing with Russia, which suffered after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and give itself further energy independence from China.

August 25-26, 2011

General Jon Chang-bok, chief of the General Logistics Bureau of the KPA Armed Forces Department led a KPA delegation to China and met with General Liao Xilong, chief of the PLA General Logistics Department and Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie.\textsuperscript{115}

Hosting Chinese Participants: General Liao Xilong, chief of the PLA General Logistics Department and Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie

Visiting North Korean Participants: General Jon Chang-bok, chief of the General Logistics Bureau of the KPA Armed Forces Department

Notes: This was likely a move on the PLA part to help improve and supply the ailing KPA as their supplies are largely outdated Soviet equipments. There was also likely further training sessions discussed and other joint military exercises scheduled to further cement ties between the two militaries.


November 15-18, 2011

The military delegation from the PLA led by Li Jinai, member of the CMC of the CCP and director of the General Political Department of the CPLA met with Kim Jong-il.

*DPRK officials present:* General Kim Jong-un, Vice-Chairman of the CMC of the WPK, Ri Yong-ho (who was later purged in 2012), member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the CC, the WPK and Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, Jang Song-taek, alternate member of the Politburo of the CC, the WPK and Vice-Chairman of the NDC; Kim Jong-gak, alternate member of the Politburo of the CC, the WPK and first Vice Department Director of the General Politburo of the KPA; KPA Generals Kim Won Hong and Pak Jae Gyong.

*Chinese officials present:* General Li Jinai, Lieutenant General Ding Jiye, Deputy Director of the PLA General Logistics Department, Lieutenant General Chen Xiaogong, Deputy Commander of the Air Force (and former director of PLA Intelligence), Lieutenant General Wang Dengping, Political Commissar of the North Sea Fleet of the Navy, Lieutenant General Zhao Zongqi, Chief of the Staff of the Jinan Military Area, Major General Kan Likui, Vice-Director of the Operation Department of the General Staff of the CPLA, Major General Ci Guowei, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the MND, Major General Li Fengshan, Deputy Secretary-General of the General Office of the General Political Department of the CPLA, Chinese Ambassador Liu Hongcai and Military, Naval and Air Attaché Senior Colonel Sun Yanfeng from the Chinese embassy.116

*Comment:* This was an unusually large and high-level delegation from China and of the largest delegations China sent within the review of the dossier. The stated goal of the meeting was the further strengthening of ties and bilateral exchanges between the two nations across all areas. The SinoNK Dossier No. 3 deals with this in greater depth.

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November 19, 2011

Xi Jinping, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC met with the 100-strong Korean youth delegation led by Ri Yong-chol, first secretary of the CC at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.\textsuperscript{117}

Notes: While the meeting involved members of the Youth Leagues of each respective countries, Xi Jinping is considered a member of the rival faction known as the pricelings, members who were descendant from CCP revolutionaries while the Youth League is considered apart of Hu Jintao’s faction comprised of members from the Youth League of the CCP. Ri Yong-chol was relieved of his position a few months after meeting Xi Jinping.

November 24, 2011

Head of Publicity Department Liu Yunshan met with the delegation from the Rodong Sinmun led by Deputy Editor Choe Kap-song at the Great Hall of the People.\textsuperscript{118}

November 25, 2011

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with the DPRK delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Vice-Minister Kim Song-gi in Beijing.\textsuperscript{119}

Notes: While the reports stated that Yang expected China and North Korea to enter into a ‘new stage’ in their relationship it is known that the MFA is the most sympathetic to initiating harsher penalties on North Korea for their actions and frequently has to


play the heavier handed role when dealing with North Korea’s provocations.

**December 17, 2011**

Kim Jong-il dies from a heart attack.\(^\text{120}\)

*Comment:* Kim Jong-il’s death is not publicly announced until the 19\(^{th}\) of December. Despite being strong allies of the DPRK China seems to have been caught unaware by the announcement. The Chinese response is dealt with in great depth in SinoNK Dossier No. 1.

**December 21, 2011**

Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, and many others at the highest level met at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing to offer condolences over the death of Kim Jong-il.\(^\text{121}\)

*Hosting North Korean Participants:* Pak Myong-ho, *charge d'affaires* at the DPRK embassy in Beijing

*Visiting Chinese Participants:* Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the NPC, Li Changchun, Propaganda Chief of the CCP Xi Jinping, Vice-President of the CCP

*Comment:* Such a high-level delegation sends a strong public signal that the PRC wanted to show its commitment to its relationship with the DPRK.

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2012

February 20-25, 2012

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying met with DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Sung-gi to discuss aid. 122

Note: This was the first Chinese delegation sent after the death of Kim Jong-il. This delegation was likely sent over as way to assure North Korea that China was going to be there to support the new regime with aid to ensure stability during the leadership transition.

February 26, 2012

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun meet with 1st Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan in Beijing to discuss Chinese-DPRK relations and the Six-Party Talks. 123

March 16, 2012

PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun met with DPRK Ambassador to China Ji Jae-ryong to discuss China’s concern over North Korea’s planned satellite launch. 124

Comment: China made a rare showing of registering its concern prior to the launch and pressured North Korea to cancel the launch. Though it is likely that the launch was scheduled under Kim Jong-il before his death as way to mark the centenary birth of his father, Kim Il-sung, and apart of his last will.

March 19, 2012

PRC Special Representative for Korean Affairs Wu Dawei meet with DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho (not to be confused

with General Ri Yong-ho) to discuss the Six Party Talks and DPRK satellite launch plan.  

*Notes:* Clearly the PRC was not satisfied with the results of the March 16 meeting.

**April 4, 2012**

A reception was given to the visiting delegation from the PLA in Pyongyang.  

*Hosting North Korean Participants:* Unknown KPA Generals and other officers  

*Visiting Chinese Participants:* Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, members of the delegation, Zhang Ping military attaché and staff of the military attaché office  

*Notes:* Who Major General Qian Lihua actually met with cannot be estimated, but if North Korean satellite and missile technology was at issue (either in terms of cooperation or the Chinese desire to slow down the program), it would appear that this was a significant opportunity for the Chinese to render such.

**April 6, 2012**

Vice-Marshall of the KPA Kim Yong-chun, Minister of the PAF, met with the visiting delegation of the CPLA led by Major General Qian Lihua.  

*Hosting North Korean Participants:* Kim Yong-chun, Vice-Marshall of the KPA, Minister of the PAF

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Visiting Chinese Participants: Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, members of the delegation, Zhang Ping military attaché and staff of the military attaché office

Notes: Again, it appears likely that the visit dealt with the North Korea’s satellite and missile technology.

April 20-23, 2012

A delegation headed by Kim Yong-il met with Hu Jintao and other CCP leaders in Beijing.128

Hosting Chinese Participants: Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, Wang Jiarui, head of the CCP International Department, Li Yuanchao, head of the Organization Department

Visiting North Korean Participant: Kim Yong Il, alternate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CC of the KWP

Comment: This visit occurred almost immediately after Kim Jong-un deliberately defied the international committee and launched what the international community believed to be an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile test on 13 April, but which the DPRK termed a satellite launch. The missile launched was not successful in placing anything in orbit.

April 26, 2012

A delegation of the Ministry of People’s Security headed by Councilor and Department Director Ri Song-chol left DPRK for

China. At the same time, the delegation of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament led by Vice-President Li Wuwei, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference left for the DPRK.  

May 31, 2012

Chinese Ambassador Liu Hongcai held a reception in memory of Kim Jong-il visits to China in 2010 and 2012. Officials that were present included: DPRK- Kim Ki-nam and Kim Yong-il, Secretaries of the CC of WKP, Kim Song-nam, Vice-Department Director of the CC WKP, Kim Hyong-jun, Vice-Foreign Minister of the DPRK.

Comment: DPRK took hostage and kept 28 Chinese fishermen just prior to this reception. After a great deal of activity by the Ambassador, they were released on 21 May, making this an event that, in the short term, marked the "return to normal" for the Embassy's relationship with North Korean counterparts.

July 24, 2012

Talks were held between the DPRK Ministry of People’s Security and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security in Beijing. Officials that were present- DPRK Minister of Public Security Ri Myong-su, Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK Ambassador to China, Meng Jianzhu, Chinese Minister of People's Security and unnamed DPRK and Chinese officials.

Notes: Border security was increased under Kim Jong-un’s reign likely to prevent further refugees from crossing the borders and has been working with China to improve its border security by ordering thousands of spy cameras to monitor the borders.

132 Alexander Abad-Santos, “Kim Jong-un’s horde of spy cameras makes it harder to escape in North Korea,” The Atlantic, 01/15/2013.
August 3, 2012

Kim Jong-un received a Chinese delegation from the ILD led by Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD and Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK.

Also attending there were Kang Sok-ju, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the WPK and vice-premier of the DPRK Cabinet, Kim Yang-gon, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the WPK, Kim Song-nam, deputy director of a department of the CC, the WPK, Choe Ryong-hae, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the CC of the WPK and director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA, Jang Song-taek, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the WPK and vice-chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission, Kim Yong-il, and Mun Kyong-dok, alternate members of the Politburo and secretaries of the CC of the WPK, and Kim Pyong-ho, and Ri Su-yong, deputy department directors of the CC of the WPK.133

Comment: This was the first official meeting between the International Department and Kim Jong-un. At the time, many observers theorized Kim Jong-un asked to visit China just prior to China’s decennial change of leadership.

August 17 – 18, 2012

Jang Song-taek led a delegation to China where he met with General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. During Jang’s visit he held the third meeting of the China-DPRK Joint Guidance Committee to secure further economic trade with China and discussed the management of the Rason Economic Trade Zone, Hwanggumphyong. Wihwado Economic Zones. The officials present at the meetings were: members of the DPRK-China Joint Guidance Committee, Ji Jae-ryong, DPRK ambassador to China, Chen Deming, minister of Commerce of China, Wang Jiarui, head of the ILD, Zhang Ping, head of the National Development and Reform Committee, Shi Xuren, minister of Finance, Wang Min,
secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the CCP, Sun Zhengcai, secretary of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the CCP, Zhang Zhijun, executive vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Chen Jian, vice-minister of Commerce, and Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK.  

*Comment:* At the time, many observers believed that Jang was laying the groundwork for a Kim Jong-un visit. There were no notable achievements from the SEZ meetings. A visit by SinoNK's editor to the region at this time indicated that things were moving relatively slowly on the North Korean side.

**September 27, 2012**

Chinese Ambassador Liu Hongcai gave a reception to mark the 63rd anniversary of the PRC. Officials present were Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun, Vice-department Director of the CC of the WPK Kim Song-nam, officials concerned, foreign diplomatic envoys and representatives of international organizations.  

**October 5, 2012**

A Chinese delegation from the Ministry of Agriculture led by Vice-Minister Niu Dun visited the DPRK.

*Note:* It is rather rare for either side to talk openly about the amount of grain aid China is giving to the DPRK, but this delegation would clearly have been an opportunity for the discussion of Chinese grain, or estimates for North Korea's food needs for the coming winter, could be broached.

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October 22, 2012

A Chinese delegation from the Dandong Municipal Committee of Liaoning Province of the CCP led by Deputy Secretary Li Shumin visited the DPRK. 137

Comment: Dandong is directly across the border from Sinuiju, North Korea. This event directly followed on the heels of a large Sino-Korean trade fair in Dandong at which few new contracts were signed, but the idea of more full-scale North Korean-Chinese trade was everywhere evidenced in word, if not in deed.

October 26, 2012

Ceremony for the Rason Economic and Trade Zone Management Committee was held in Rason City, DPRK. Present at the Ceremony were - Jo Jong-ho, chairman of the Rason City People's Committee, officials concerned and people in Rason City from the DPRK side and Zhang Anshun, secretary of the Yanbian Autonomous Region, Jilin Province, Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chen Weigen, vice-governor of the Jilin Provincial People's Government, Tian Baozhen, consul general to Chongjin and officials concerned from the Chinese side. 138

Notes: This event most likely developed out of the discussions lead by Jang Song-taek during his August trip to China. For much greater detail about Tian Baozhen in Chongjin, see SinoNK Dossier No. 3.

November 27, 2012

Japan and the DPRK affirmed that they would be holding another round of high-level discussions from December 5-6\textsuperscript{th} in Beijing over the abduction issue of Japanese citizens by North Korea.\textsuperscript{139}

Comment: The abduction is key to Japanese domestic perceptions of North Korea.

November 29-30, 2012

A Chinese delegation of the CCP and the WKP meet in Pyongyang where they discussed the relations between the two countries, cooperation between the parties, and areas of joint concern. DPRK officials present were Kim Ki Nam, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CC of the WPK, and other officials of the CC of the WPK including Vice-Department Directors Ri Yong-sik and Kim Song-nam.

Chinese officials present were Li Jianguo, member of the Politburo of the CC of the CCP and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Wang Jiariu, head of the ILD, Wang Xiaohui, deputy head of the Publicity Department of the CC of the CCP, Liu Jieyi, deputy head of the ILD (not to be confused with Liu Jieyi, Director-General of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association), Yao Zengke, vice-minister of Supervision, other members of the delegation and Liu Hongcai, Chinese ambassador to the DPRK.\textsuperscript{140}

Comment: Li Jianguo was a last minute change. Originally, the delegation was to be led by someone else. Li also delivered a message from Xi Jinping to Kim Jong-un.

December 3, 2012

DPRK announced that it would launch another version of its Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite by mid-December. China pledged that it would “communicate and coordinate” with all concerned


parties. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated the DPRK had the right for peaceful exploration of space but only within the confines of the UN Security Council resolutions.

*Comment:* DPRK embarrassed their Chinese guests by publicly making such an unsettling announcement only a few days after a personal letter from Xi Jinping to Kim Jong-un.

**December 8, 2012**

*KCNA* issued a statement saying that the launching of the second version of the Kwangmyongsong-3 was going to be delayed.

**December 12, 2012**

*KCNA* issued a statement stating that Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite had a successful launch.

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Appendix:
Graphs of Various Visits to and from DPRK

In this section, we present various graphs depicting the various visits back and forth as well as quantitative and qualitative (political, economy, security aspects) of the visits. Since we cannot compare this to any other data, we do not claim that the amount of activity was high or low.

Chinese Delegation Visits to DPRK in 2010

Source: North Korean and Chinese State media reports

Top Chinese Officials Who Met with the DPRK Officials 2010

Source: North Korean and Chinese State media reports
Source: North Korean and Chinese State media reports
Top DPRK Officials Who Met with Chinese Officials 2010

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Ambassador Meetings:
Liu Hongcai meetings with DPRK Officials 2010

Source: North Korean and Chinese State media reports
**DPRK Ambassador Meetings in Beijing:**

**Ji Jae-Ryong Meetings with Chinese Officials 2010**

Source: North Korean and Chinese State media reports
Chinese Delegation Visits to DPRK in 2011

Source: North Korean and Chinese State media reports
Top Chinese Officials Who Met with DPRK Officials 2011

2010: Chinese Officials Meetings

- **Hu Jintao**
- **Xi Jinping**
- **Yang Jiechi**
- **Wang Min**
- **Wu Dawei**

*Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports*
DPRK Delegations Visits to China 2011

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
DPRK Officials Who Met with Chinese Officials 2011

- Kim Jong-il
- Kim Jong-un
- Kim Yong-nam
- Jang Song-taek
- Kim Kye-gwan

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Ambassador Meetings:

Liu Hongcai Meetings with DPRK Officials 2011

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Ambassador Meetings:
Ji Jae-ryong Meetings with Chinese Officials 2011

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Chinese Delegation Visits to DPRK in 2012

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Top Chinese Officials Who Met with DPRK Officials 2012

*Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports*
DPRK Delegations Visits to China 2012

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
DPRK Officials Who Met with Chinese Officials 2012

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Ambassador Meetings:

Liu Hongcai Meetings with DPRK Officials

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Ambassador Meetings:

Ji Jae Ryong Meetings with Chinese Officials 2012

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports
Ambassadorial Meetings:

Comparison between PRC Ambassador Liu Hongcai and DPRK Ambassador Ji Jae-ryong 2010-2011

Source: Chinese and North Korean state media reports