Sino-NK

Park, Hwee-rhak Nuclear North Korea’s Challenge to Deterrence Theories and Policies: Uncomfortable Truths. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025. 391 pp. ISBN 9783032053107.

North Korea displays a ballistic missile during a military parade in Pyongyang in 2013. | Image: Stefan Krasowski.

Studying nuclear issues in North Korea is an intrinsically divided and difficult field to navigate. Analysis tends to fall into rigid camps, shaped as much by normative assumptions and political instincts as by evidence, making even basic assessments of risk or strategy impossibly contested. The erosion of non-proliferation norms and fragmentation of the authority of international institutions further complicate how deterrence functions on the Korean Peninsula. In Nuclear North Korea’s Challenge to Deterrence Theories and Policies: Uncomfortable Truths, Hwee-rhak Park confronts these challenges head-on, arguing that existing deterrence and denuclearisation frameworks are rapidly becoming inadequate for dealing with a nuclear-armed DPRK. The result is a book that is both conceptually innovative and informed by deep professional experience, while also marked by analytical assumptions that sometimes narrow the debate, rather than expand it.

Park brings a valuable profile to this subject: as both a former colonel in the South Korean Army, and senior academic with postings both in the United States and South Korea, he is able to bridge military practice and theoretical reflection. Unlike much deterrence literature (which tends to be either abstract or narrowly policy-driven), Park’s analysis consistently moves between conceptual models and real-world security dilemmas. This stands out as one of the book’s most appealing qualities, particularly for readers frustrated by deterrence studies that remain trapped in what feels like endless theoretical exercises detached from lived strategic realities.

One of the strongest contributions of this book is its willingness to situate the North Korean nuclear issue within a broader global context. Park explicitly addresses the weakening of international non-proliferation regimes and the declining credibility of the United Nations as an enforcement mechanism (pp. 2-10; 275-276). Rather than treating these developments as background noise, he frames them as central variables shaping the DPRK’s strategic calculations (pp. 6-12). This is a refreshing move. Park’s emphasis on understanding deterrence within a disintegrating global system is both well-judged and necessary.

Equally important is the perspective Park offers as a South Korean scholar deeply embedded in Korean security discourse. His discussion of alliance politics, extended deterrence and threat perception (Chapters 5 and 6) reflects an understanding of how these issues are debated within South Korea. This insider sensibility adds texture to the analysis, particularly when Park addresses alliance credibility and public trust in US security guarantees (pp. 149-176; 177-208). In this sense, the book usefully complements Western scholarship that sometimes underestimates the historical and political dimensions of deterrence as experienced directly in Seoul.

Conceptually, the book is ambitious, introducing several original analytical tools. This includes notion of a “balance of fear”, a concept that centres mutual fear, rather than nuclear capabilities to explain why a much weaker DPRK can still deter the US and shape US behaviour (pp. 17-18), and the idea of “institutional nuclear deterrence”, referring to deterrence not just as weapons and threats but as institutions able to lock in commitments and make extended deterrence more credible (Chapter 7).

Park also makes a distinction between “alliance correctness” and “alliance frankness”, alliance correctness describing an ally able to provide the right reassurances through solidarity and promises, without concretely matching them with real capabilities or burden-sharing. On the contrary, a “frank ally” is an ally able to bluntly lay out un-reassuring aspects such as costs and risks (p. 151). These concepts are not presented as abstract inventions but are actively employed to diagnose weaknesses in existing deterrence arrangements. Whether or not one ultimately accepts these frameworks, they represent a genuine attempt to move deterrence theory beyond its traditional assumptions and adapt it to a world of asymmetric capabilities and institutional decay.

Where the book becomes more problematic is in its interpretation of North Korean intentions. Park repeatedly argues that the DPRK seeks not merely deterrence or regime survival, but the eventual military subjugation of South Korea through nuclear use (pp. 4-7; 209-230). While it is true that this claim draws on North Korean official rhetoric, it often lacks sufficient engagement with alternative explanations such as deterrence signalling or internal propaganda. Treating Pyongyang’s statements as largely transparent expressions of intent risks flattening a political system that has long relied on exaggerated threats as a tool of survival, rather than conquest.

This tendency is especially visible in the book’s reliance on worst-case scenarios. Park suggests that North Korea could reach a point of desperation at which it would launch a nuclear strike despite the certainty of total annihilation (pp. 135-145). Yet this assumption sits uneasily with North Korea’s historical behaviour. Even during moments of extreme vulnerability (economic collapse, famine, diplomatic crises) the DPRK has consistently avoided actions that would guarantee regime destruction. Today, North Korea is arguably more secure than at any point in its history, benefitting substantially from its renewed partnership with Russia and continued Chinese support. Against this backdrop, the repeated emphasis on imminent catastrophic escalation feels overstated.

A similar issue arises in the discussion of external intervention. Scenarios involving Russian and Chinese military support for North Korea are explored in detail, despite their low likelihood under current geopolitical conditions (pp. 23-30). While such possibilities cannot be dismissed entirely, their frequent invocation creates a sense of exaggeration that weakens the book’s empirical grounding. Prudence in defence planning is understandable, but analytical plausibility is equally important.

The book’s treatment of denuclearisation also raises important questions. Park clearly views denuclearisation as both desirable and necessary, yet the comparative cases he invokes (most notably Ukraine and Iran) arguably undermine this conclusion (Chapter 3). Considering a North Korean point of view, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US-Israeli strikes against Iran in 2025 reinforced the belief that nuclear weapons deter foreign intervention rather than invite it. Park does briefly acknowledge this tension but does not further explore it in relation to the DPRK’s strategic logic (pp. 70-90). More broadly, the analysis would have benefited from deeper engagement with scholarship that challenges the book’s dominant narrative of failed diplomacy with Pyongyang. Alternative interpretations exist, and their relative absence gives this work a distinctly one-sided feel.

This imbalance is most evident in the policy recommendations. Proposals such as redeploying US nuclear weapons to South Korea (pp. 45-48), or expanding the nuclear role of the UN Command (pp. 245-267) are indeed bold, but they are presented with limited discussion of their political feasibility, or diplomatic costs. Similarly, calls to strengthen international institutions (pp. 7-11; 245-267) appear disconnected from the author’s own diagnosis of systemic institutional decline. The result is a noticeable gap between strategic ambition and political realism.

Despite this, Nuclear North Korea’s Challenge to Deterrence Theories and Policies remains a valuable contribution. Its greatest strength lies in its willingness to confront uncomfortable questions and challenge complacent thinking about deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. While its assumptions about North Korean intentions and its policy prescriptions may not persuade all readers, the book succeeds in stimulating debate at a moment when deterrence theory itself is under strain. For scholars and practitioners alike, it offers an interesting attempt to rethink how nuclear deterrence functions in an increasingly unstable world.