Xi in Seoul and History Textbook Wars: #Shigak no. 08

By | July 07, 2014 | No Comments

Xi Jinping's motorcade, making its way through Gwanghwamun Plaza, Seoul | Image: Jennifer McCane

Xi Jinping’s motorcade, making its way through Gwanghwamun Plaza, Seoul. | Image: Jennifer McCane

“Shigak” (시각), or “perspective,” is a multilingual data collection effort that uses Twitter to curate sources dealing in key political, social, and economic issues on South Korea. Each bimonthly issue takes only the most important tweets posted by Sino-NK analysts under the hashtag #시각 and augments them with essential annotations and a small dose of concentrated analysis.

Shigak is edited by Steven Denney and Christopher Green. Back issues can be found on the dedicated page.

Xi in Seoul and History Textbook Wars: #Shigak no. 08

by Sino-NK

This issue of Shigak follows several significant developments in South Korea’s foreign and domestic affairs. To start, relations between South Korea and Japan have been further strained by the Abe government’s decision to review the historic 1995 statement by then-Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono accepting the Imperial Japanese Army’s direct role in recruiting “comfort women” during the Second World War. At the same time, the two-day state visit by President Xi Jinping marked the beginning of closer ties between the two countries as Seoul and Beijing agreed to conclude talks on a bilateral free trade agreement by the end of this year.

Although Seoul remains highly critical of Japan’s revisionist attitudes towards its imperial past, South Koreans themselves are often divided on their own national narrative: case in point, the controversial approval of a “new right” text book by the National Institute of Korean History. The heated debate over not only depictions of sensitive subjects such as Japan’s colonial legacy and the merits of the developmental dictatorship under Park Chung-hee, but also the virtue of maintaining a unified textbook and history curriculum throughout the country is expected to intensify with the election of several progressive education superintendents in several provinces. South Korea’s educational establishment faces further tests as the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU) continues to protest the recent court decision to strip the organization of its legal status over the policy permitting dismissed teachers to retain membership.

Another core public institution, the military, has also come under fire after a shooting spree at an outpost along the DMZ raised questions on the army’s administrative capabilities and general readiness. Meanwhile, although it is difficult to imagine South Korean attitudes towards safety regulations remaining unchanged after the Sewol ferry disaster, review of the deadly 1994 Seongsu Bridge failure and the 1995 Sampoong department store collapse shows that memory of private and public malfeasance have not been incorporated into the national narrative of development. All these domestic troubles leave President Park in a precarious position as public support for the Blue House continues its downward trend and has even led to fissures in the ruling Saenuri Party over support for the ailing administration.

The following tweets were posted between June 20 and July 4.

The Economist writes about the “new chapter” in history textbook wars in East Asia, emphasizing that history in this part of the world “is a barometer of nationalism.” It is reasoned that, as of late, “the bickering has spread beyond Japan and China, its usual homes,” and has provoked strong domestic responses. The paragraphs devoted to coverage of South Korea underscore the current political debate over whether schools should be required to use a single state-approved textbook or continue to exercise discretion over which textbook in used in the classroom. The ruling party, it is reported, supports the use of one state-approved textbook.

The current governing body responsible for reviewing and approving history textbooks for schools, the National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), recently approved a controversial text written by so-called “new right” scholars, a move which provoked a strong backlash from progressive and civil society circles. Although the politics of remembering and the reproduction of history have long been a hot button topic in South Korea, the recent moves by the conservative government to consolidate control over which history is taught has ignited a political debate on a wide range of topics, such as “colonial modernity,” the “beautification” of colonialism and dictatorship, and “left wing revisionism,” amongst others. The recent election of several progressive education superintendents who have since vowed to fight against conservative efforts to control the national narrative is certain to intensify the debate in South Korea.

Analysts expected Xi Jinping’s official state visit to South Korea on July 3 to yield a joint statement condemning the Abe government’s recent decision to expand the role of the Japanese Self-defense Force. However, the meeting excluded any discussion on Japan; instead, the two leaders focused on efforts to denuclearize North Korea and accelerating negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement. With the two governments drawing even closer to one another through the establishment of financial institutions facilitating direct investment, it is most likely that Seoul and Beijing will live up to their promise to conclude talks on the FTA by the end of this year.

Upon ratification, South Korea will enjoy the unique privilege of being the only country in the world to maintain free trade agreements with the three largest economies in the world, the United States, the European Union, and the People’s Republic of China. However, given the public backlash against the ratification of the Korea-US FTA during the Lee Myung-bak administration and the standing dispute over South Korea’s heavily protected agricultural market, the spearheading of trade talks with China will inevitably draw the public’s ire. In anticipation, the Blue House has made efforts to persuade the public otherwise by emphasizing the mutually beneficial aspect of a FTA and highlighting Beijing’s cooperation in combating poaching by Chinese fishermen in South Korean waters. Nonetheless, the path to ratification will no doubt be fraught with candle-lit vigils and long discussions on the virtues of domestic production.

Two disasters of the 1990s remain prominent in the national memory of South Korea: the failure of Seongsu Bridge, which took place on October 21, 1994, and the collapse of the Sampoong Department Store on June 29 the following year. In the former case, a 48m section of the center of the bridge collapsed into the Han River at the beginning of rush hour one Friday, killing 32 and injuring 17. The latter tragedy was by far the greater: more than 500 people lost their lives when the entire building in Seocho-gu failed catastrophically while customers were shopping inside, thus making it the worst non-terrorist building failure in history (until the collapse of Rana Plaza in 2013).

The South Korean government is not indifferent to such tragedies, as this National Emergency Management Agency video about the Seongsu Bridge incident shows. However, the state has also not successfully incorporated the memory of private and public malfeasance into the national narrative of development, which is constitutive of Seoul’s governing legitimacy. That leaves those who died in both tragedies lingering in a grey zone of semi-memorialization.

JTBC reports on the recent protests from members of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU). Last year the Ministry of Labor striped the KTU of its legal status for permitting dismissed teachers to retain membership–a decision the union ardently opposes, unsurprisingly. Amongst other things, the KTU is known for its opposition to the Korean labor law which prohibits union members who have retired or been dismissed from retaining their union membership. More recently, the KTU has demanded the resignation of president Park Geun-hye for her administration’s poor management of Sewol rescue efforts.

The KTU, well known for its leftist political orientation and activist agenda, has long struggled against conservative administrations. Founded in 1989, the union only received official recognition in 1999 after the election of progressive candidate Kim Dae-jung. Despite its dwindling ranks and regardless of its legal-status, the KTU is supported by the International Labor Organization and others who oppose Korea’s labor law on the grounds that it restricts freedom of association. The recent election of thirteen progressive education superintendents is certain to ignite a fire under an already militant union; of the thirteen (out of nineteen) new superintendents, eight have KTU connections.

JTBC reports that support for president Park Geun-hye’s is continuing its downward trend, a consequence of the rift of domestic scandals that have reflected poorly upon her administration. Gallup polls from June 27 show Parks approval rating has dropped to the low 40s. The percentage of people who disprove of the administration is now higher than those that approve (at 42 percent).

With the July 30 by-elections fast approaching–what some are calling a “mini general election“– and the race for party leadership positions in full swing, a deterioration in public support for Park’s administration seems likely to hurt support for the ruling party and intensify intra-party division within the Saenuri Party. In fact, one time leader of the “pro-Park” (친박) faction, Kim Moo-sung, has now emerged as one of her most vocal intra-party critics. Kim is now described as a leader of the “non-mainstream” faction. Even an official state visit by Xi Jinping is not likely to give Park a domestic boost in popularity.

The ruling Saenuri Party will hold a national convention on July 14, 2014 to choose its next party leader. There are nine candidates on the docket, but the most favored are Kim Moo-sung and Suh Chung-won. The party is currently divided between anti-President Park and pro-President Park camps: Kim is viewed as anti-Park, and Suh the opposite.

Positioning himself for the leadership, Kim has been stepping up his criticism of President Park and distancing himself from her administration. He even went as far as to say that the administration has the potential to fall into “self-righteousness [독선]”. His plan is to institute a new system of checks and balances [행정부 견제] over administrative functions.

On the other side, though Suh has admitted to the mistakes of the incumbent administration, if victorious he is expected to try and work closely with President Park. Suh even launched his leadership campaign from former President (and Park Geun-hye’s father) Park Chung-hee’s hometown of Gumi in North Gyeongsang Province. He promises to “rescue the government from crisis,” apparently believing this to be the job of the ruling party. No matter who wins, people will carefully observe how the Saenuri Party moves forward after the factionalism of this leadership race.

The shooting spree at an outpost on the eastern front of the demilitarized zone on June 21 has prompted questions regarding the state of the South Korean military. The 23-year old conscript responsible for the attack had been initially categorized as a Class A ”at-risk soldier” (관심병사), but was reevaluated to a lower category and deemed eligible to serve in a position requiring handling of live ammunition. With the army’s psychological screening of conscripts in question, the Ministry of National Defense noted that its classification of “at-risk soldier” is broad, covering about 20% of soldiers in the 22nd Division. Furthermore, interviews of reserve soldiers revealed that psychological evaluations are often conducted by people with little to no training and discriminate based on income, sexual orientation, and family background.

Such administrative carelessness is a major problem, as is the culture of bullying in the military, which was repeatedly highlighted in investigations of past shootings. However, there is a larger problem: the fact that the military knowingly deployed a soldier who exhibited questionable psychological health to a forward position along the DMZ suggests a deficit of troops available to fill these critical posts. A consequence of South Korea’s declining birthrate, the most recent shooting will no doubt force Seoul to question established socio-cultural and institutional norms such as female conscription and service duration. One can expect more articles in the Korean media lauding Israel’s universal conscription.

The rift between Seoul and Tokyo over Japan’s imperial past found itself in rough waters as the Abe government published a parliamentary review of former Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono’s 1993 statement recognizing the role of the Imperial Japanese Army in recruiting the so-called comfort women. Tokyo’s claim that the specific wording of the historic statement was made in collusion with Seoul is viewed by certain South Korean media outlets as an excuse to further “disown responsibility for the atrocities.”

With Beijing seeking to draw Seoul closer on efforts to censure Tokyo’s reexamination of contentious historical issues, this incident may have the potential to influence the dynamics of the relationships between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. During his visit to Seoul in April this year, Obama advocated finding resolution of South Korean comfort women issue, but wants the Abe government to maintain the political authority to push through a reinterpretation of its constitution that would allow the Japanese military to engage in collective self defense. Such a change will permit more active trilateral cooperation, but might also impede bilateral security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo due to Seoul’s displeasure with the change. Such cooperation helps not only Washington, which would need it to engage in a more effective pivot, but also Seoul, which needs to coordinate with Tokyo on negotiations with Pyongyang.

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