Sino-NK

The speed with which facts, currencies, ideas and rumors flow through and weave around the Korean peninsula has clearly accellerated in the information age.  Students in Pyongyang trace (if vaguely) the spread of revolution in Syria; a grainy drone strike over remote Pakistan makes the paper in Sinuiju;  a village 25 miles from the Chinese border receives remittances sent from Kyonggi; sanguine events on the Tumen River are evoked to mobilize university students in Los Angeles.  Little wonder, then, that “the idea that everything is interconnected,” as Graham Harman explained, “has become a staple of intellectual life.”   But perhaps, as the philosopher argued in Berlin, everything is not connected.  And the disjunctures on the Korean peninsula remain particularly intense, tangible, and intractable.  What are the prospects for a political thaw between the Koreas?  Steven Denney, a master’s student at Yonsei and SinoNK’s Think-Tank Analyst, does his part today to bridge these divides and extend thereby a connection between merely published ideas and their actual elaboration and debate.   — Adam Cathcart, Editor-in-Chief

Opportunity for Engagement and Reform: An Interview with Dr. Park Young-jun

by Steven Denney

In a recent interview about the political conditions in North Korea and the future of North-South Korea relations, Professor Park Young-jun (朴榮濬/박영준 교수) of Korea National Defense University (國防大學校/국방대학교, KNDU, Korea National Defense University), referring to arguments he originally made in a JoongAng Daily (중앙일보) op-ed (English version; Korean version), claims that chances for further provocative action by North Korea are likely in the absence of military and diplomatic engagement from South Korea and other major powers with a stake in peninsular stability.

“Destination Pyongyang”: Image courtesy AP, via JoongAng Ilbo

As the discussion got underway, Professor Park made an effort to point out, first and foremost, that Kim Jong-un has yet to consolidate his control of power.  From a bureaucratic perspective, he has yet to be granted the positions his father and grandfather had occupied.  At present, Kim Jong-un has yet to be posted as National Defense Commissioner or elevated to the level of General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK).  There is still a delicate leadership and power transition taking place in the North.   This situation, according to Park, has set the stage for a possible show of military force in the form of another nuclear test or military provocation, a move Kim Jong-un and his closest aides could use to boost the legitimacy of the new regime – but not yet.

The Lull in Preparation for Celebration

In April, celebrations are set to take place marking the centennial birthday of the “Eternal President” Kim Il-sung (April 15, 2012).  Because of celebration preparations “the military has no extra resources at the moment, because a large amount of resources are being devoted to the commemoration event.” Given this pragmatic understanding of the material constraints of KPA units, Park believes that North Korea “will restrain itself from any form of military provocation” in order to celebrate the birthday of the founder of North Korea without complication.

For Park, the period leading up to and following the commemoration ceremony provides South Korea with an opportunity to engage the new Kim regime.  Failing to do so would, as he explained, “means failing to capitalize on a chance at achieving stability on the Korean peninsula.”  Park thus advocates a two-pronged South Korean engagement strategy, pairing military and diplomatic moves.  This requires South Korea – specifically the current Lee Myung-bak administration – to coordinate with three of the major regional powers:  the United States, China and Russia.  The type of coordination between South Korea and the three major powers advocated by Park highlights the unique role each country fills regarding peninsular affairs.

The United States:  Guns and Some Butter, but Mainly Just Guns

Certain constants hold true regarding peninsular issues, and the primacy of American military power is no exception.  Although bi-lateral talks between the US and North Korea, the likes of which are to re-start next week in Beijing, are important insofar as they “serve to pacify a volatile North Korea and induce an otherwise international recluse into dealing with other countries, but they don’t reflect America’s primary role on the peninsula,” Park believes.  He believes “the role of the United States is for purposes of deterrence.”  Thus, Park supports the use of joint US-Korea military cooperation, like the Key Resolve Foal-Eagle exercise, with full support from the US 7^th fleet of the Pacific Command.  “Robust military drills will,” Parks deems, “help prevent military provocations from North Korea.”  If the effectiveness to at least grab the attention of North Korea is any indication of its effectiveness, then the belligerent and apocalyptic response from North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun to plans for the joint US-South Korea exercise indicates it is achieving its intended effect.

Despite its history of involvement in dialogue and negotiations with North Korea, Park does not believe the US should be Korea’s main diplomatic partners.  “The US’s diplomatic reach is far too limited; however, China and Russia, as traditional allies of North Korea, are ideal candidates to serve as diplomatic interlocutors.”

China:  The Sugar-Coated Bullets of Economic Reform

When the conversation moved to China, the professor reminded the interviewer, again, how popular English is to Koreans.  To describe the dynamic of the paternalistic relationship that has developed between China and North Korea, Park recalled a well-known English proverb: “You can lead a horse to water; but you can’t make him drink.”  In other words, although China may have the ear of the North Korean leadership, including, presumably, Kim Jong-un, it does not necessarily follow that China has the sort of influence over the domestic political structure of North Korea to compel it to undergo economic reforms.  Despite reports that suggest North Korea will implement market reforms a la Deng Xiaoping, the verdict is still out on how, exactly, Kim Jong-un would “liberate his nation’s economy.”

Nevertheless, Park believes that Kim Jong-un is too pragmatic not to seek Chinese-style economic reforms.  He uses an interesting parallel to illustrate his position.  Park compares Kim Jong-un to former South Korean President Park Chung-hee.

Park Chung Hee, right, with JFK — Image links to the extensive new Harvard University Press volume re: President Park

“In the 1960s, despite ill feelings towards Japan because of Japan’s colonization of Korea, President Park Chung-hee normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in order to secure economic aid,” Park recalled.  As those familiar with modern Korean history know, following the normalization of relations with Japan and the subsequent influx of economic assistance, Park Chung-hee oversaw a host of state-led economic development projects like the Gyeongbu (Seoul-Busan) highway and the construction of the steel company POSCO.  This was all done as part of a pragmatic approach to economic reform paired with tight social controls and harsh penalties for dissenters (see: Yushin Regime).[1]  For Professor Park, the same applies to North Korea.

If the Park Chung-hee parallel is to hold true, Kim Jong-un would logically utilize North Korea’s special relationship with China in order to implement pragmatic economic reforms.  The notion of a strong foreign patron overseeing political controls in the name of economic growth is hardly a unique phenomenon in the recent history of the Korean peninsula.  Granted Kim Jong-un is able and willing, China’s current level of economic integration positions it to be the country best-suited to invest in economic growth in North Korea.

Russia:  Why Not A Round of Diplomatic-Roulette at APEC?

The last part of Park’s argument revolves around the issue of Russia.  A member of the faltered Six Party Talks and North Korea’s de facto second major power ally, Russia is positioned to play a vital role in Northeast Asia.

The economic opportunity given to Russia due to its unique geopolitical position is not lost on its leaders.  Discussions for a Russian gas pipeline running from north to south on the Korean peninsula started in earnest in 2008.  Economic opportunity begets channels for diplomatic engagement; the relations between the two are not lost on Professor Park.  “Russia’s plan to develop eastern Siberia … by extending the Siberian railroad system further east, perhaps even to the Korean peninsula,” as indicated in a meeting transportation officials last year in Odessa, “is one of many reasons why South Korea must involve Russia in its efforts to engage the new regime in Pyongyang.”

To help foster better relations between the major powers involved, Park suggests that the “new” Russian leaders, who will be elected in the upcoming March elections, work with South Korean leaders to bring Kim Jong-un to the upcoming APEC summit, which is slated for this September in Vladivostok.

Park admonishes the Lee Myung-bak administration to seek coordinated policies between Seoul, Washington and Moscow in order to take advantage of a time of relative quiet in North Korea.  Effective military and diplomatic moves will, according to Park, “mitigate the provocative tendency of North Korea” at least until “South Korea gets a new president.”

Not a Trivial Matter

As the interview came to a close, Professor Park looked out through the checker-framed windows out onto the busy Hongdae (홍대) street filled with college-age Koreans and others who enjoy the youthful energy characteristic of this area of Seoul.  As a professor at the National Defense University, Park’s students are different from most:  they’re all young military officers.  This doesn’t stop them from enjoying Korea’s bustling student culture, though.  He smiled a bit when he said, “Hongdae is an important cultural appendage of Seoul.  My students enjoy coming here to learn about the latest in fashion, club music and other aspects of a burgeoning social culture.”

He didn’t say so explicitly, but his long gaze, following this comment, at the line forming outside what appeared to be a sort of club-café-restaurant fusion – “fusing” things is popular in South Korea – suggested the greater importance of the topic of our interview.  The topic of engaging North Korea isn’t about debating abstract theory or historical counterfactuals.  A failure to find the best method to engage North Korea and maintain stability on the peninsula has serious consequences for its neighbor to the south.