Weekly Digest
This week’s Weekly Digest devotes a significant amount of space to the concept of social transformation and debates found throughout the interwebs on whether or not social change, revolution or some combination of the two are likely approaching in North Korea. Commentary on economic change and articles that relate to the concept of trust building between North Korea and other states are also considered. – S.C. Denney
Weekly Digest
By Steven Denney
Social Transformation and North Korea
Maxwell’s piece in the EurasiaReview allows for a revisiting of the topic of political and social stability and the prospects of social transformation in North Korea. Col. Maxwell believes that the Juche ideology (주체 사상) and the incentive system within North Korean society has so indoctrinated the people that rising up is out of the question. Joshua Stanton’s write-up disagrees with this conclusion and thinks that the “balance of evidence suggests that the system holds not because people still believe in it, but because they’re afraid of it.”
Orange Revolution, Kiev, Ukraine. By Gutsul at uk.wikipedia
Using a mathematical model to show how expectations factor into the start of social transformation, Sino-NK’s own Joe Litt also wrote about the issue of predicting the North’s demise. The model is an interesting look in what sets the stage and precipitates revolutions. The end of his article relates specifically to North Korea. Here Joe compares the views of scholars B.R. Myers (who represents a view similar to Col. Maxwell) and Andrei Lankov.
In an earlier article, Litt points out that if revolution (or social unrest, to the extent that the two can be distinguished) is to flare up in North Korea, Chongjin is the likely place for it to start.
The indefatigable Lankov further argues in a March 11 article for the Korea Times that, essentially, the reason a social schism is bound to occur is found in the generation gap between the state-respecting older generation and the bootlegged South Korean drama-watching younger generation. (For another perspective on this piece, see Sino-NK analyst Scott Bruce in his recent article about China and the DPRK’s generational change). Lankov succinctly wraps up his view on the prospects for political continuity in the DPRK:
So we have a new generation. These people are much less respectful of the state, less afraid to speak their minds, and make a living outside the state-controlled economy. They are somewhat less afraid of police spooks and spend their spare time watching South Korean movies or listening to foreign music. They might be more capable of organizing independently of the state, even though they are markedly more individualistic. In short, they constitute a potential force for revolution.
If a more theoretical approach to understanding social transformation, this article by Raj Kollmorgen entitled “Transformation Theory and Socio-Economic Change in Central and Eastern Europe. A Conceptual Framework” fills the bill. while focus of the analysis is on Europe, Kollmorgen puts forth multiple points worth considering from a Koreanist. The professor out of Germany takes a sociological point-of-view, which, given Myers’ thesis, seems rather appropriate. Asserting a need for a new theory of societal transformations, Kollmorgen the author arrives at examination of Ukraine and Russia – two cases often suggested as parallels to our neighbor to the north. (The DPRK’s own disdain for “color revolutions” has been well noted, and is shared by the Chinese leadership.)
Perhaps the problem with theories that attempt to explain revolt, revolution or social transformation is that they are theories, and thus tend to be retrospective – adjusted post-fact to explain what was then unknown (see Clash of Titans debate, a debate between John Mearsheimer and Zbigniew Brzezinski about merits and demerits of political theory; see esp. Brzezinski’s response under “Nukes Change Everything”). Given the natural reclusiveness of a Hermit Kingdom, perhaps we should just all wait until post-Kim regime to devise any theory. In the meantime, we can make our best guesses.
Maybe Not Immediate Social Transformation, but on the Economic Front and Diplomatic Front…
Marcus Noland points out a Hyundai Research Institute (HRI) report that shows the North Korean economy grew by 4.7 percent last year. Given his skepticism of data on North Korea’s economy, he expressed doubt but noted that HRI’s guess “is probably as good as any.”
From a diplomatic point-of-view, it will be interesting to watch the development of the “modest first step” taken in negotiations between the US and the DPRK.
The prospects for further progress in negotiations has implications not only for Kim JongUn’s credibility and regional stability but will also determine future DPRK-US relations, argues Lee Byong-chul in this article from the Asia Sentinel, an online publication much like the Diplomat that focuses on Asia issues.
Revisiting the Non-proliferation and Normalization Arguments
In this interview conducted with proliferation specialist Niv Farago, two interesting –and non-mainstream — arguments were put forward, the first more explicitly, the second more indirectly. 1. The US did not (or was unable, due to certain domestic constraints) carry out its part of the deal as agreed upon in the 1994 Agreed Framework; and 2. If the US is serious about engaging North Korea and concluding an Agreed Framework III (or perhaps more accurately Six Party Talks Redux) then it may be necessary to make a concession similar to the one President Clinton did in the 1990s. For Clinton then, it was proceeding with negotiations despite the presence of 0-10kg of undeclared plutonium. Now, it may be, as Lankov argues in a recent FP article, that “the United States learn to live with a nuclear North Korea …” According to Lankov, such a situation would “sooner of later” lead the “United States to relent and provide the North with regular ‘compensation’ for its willingness to freeze its nuclear program, without surrendering its existent nukes.” Of course, settling issues related to the wanted construction of light water reactorsin North Korea would be necessary to settle the issue 1.
By Felix König (Eigenes Werk (own work) - Samsung S750
As Yonsei University professors John Delury and Moon Chong-in argued in an article earlier this year, the transition from “security-first” to “security-plus-prosperity” will require building a level of trust that allows North Korea to look beyond its immediate survival. If Lankov’s arguments hold, this may mean, for the time being at least, an acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state.
Emphasizing the “prosperity” aspect of the “security-plus-prosperity” Delury-Moon formula might bring about the best result. As Delury has argued in the past, fostering an economic transformation can lead to reform and opening and “has the potential to induce and reinforce the D.P.R.K.’s peaceful transition into a country that can better provide for its people’s welfare and engage with other countries in a non-hostile manner.” (See Delury’s in 2009 task force report with Charles Kartman and Susan Shirk, entitled “North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement.”)
Whereas Niv, Delury, Moon, et. al. all agree that in order to produce real and lasting change, an adequate level of trust building is first necessary others are less willing to engage the DPRK. John Bolton argues in an acidic recent article for the WSJ that leaders in North Korea “were rewarded (for their art of “dissembling”) last week when the State Department proudly announced the umpteenth breakthrough towards the goal of denuclearizing North Korea.”
Whether or not this represents a genuine “first step,” events are indisputably in motion. We shall see where it all leads.
