Missile Launch: A Show of Weakness or Strength?

By | March 31, 2012 | No Comments

Kim Jong Un at March 15 Combined Navy-Marines Drill – 金正恩最高司令官指导朝鲜人民军陆海空军联合打击训练 | Image via Rodong Sinmun, Chinese edition

Conjectural writings on the meaning of the announced North Korean missile launch are in no short supply these days, but answers remain difficult to come by. Filip Ek, Sino-NK’s Analyst at Lund University, Sweden, arrives at the subject with a solid reading of some of the recent journal literature, seeking patterns of provocation, fissure, and response.  — Adam Cathcart, Chief Editor

Missile Launch: A Show of Weakness or Strength?

by Filip Ek

With the North Korean promise to launch a satellite into orbit, now, as before, regional tensions have risen. This time, Pyongyang has at least taken the precautions to launch its missile in a southern direction to avoid the territorial space of its neighbours with the ICBM missile.  However, the region is skeptical.  Japan has made preparations to shoot down the missile if it would enter their territorial space, as has South Korea.

The question one could ask is: why did the DPRK decide to go ahead with a launch after the North Korean government had already made an agreement with American partners, who, consequent to the launching announcement cancelled the food aid.

There could be many explanations for the reason of the launch at this particular time. The first and most obvious is the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung on the 15th of April, making the launch a demonstration directed to the domestic arena. Or it could also be seen as a power political struggle between different factions struggling for primacy in policymaking.  With the latter hypothesis, the launch is a move against the deal with the US, which limited the ability of North Korean military. Furthermore, it could be that the Pyongyang regime is too weak to pull itself out of the orbit of doctrines of the late Kim Jong Il.

If this were to be true, then the expectations would be that the missile launch will be followed by a nuclear test; a pattern that has been seen before (Hassig, Oh; 2011:38). There have been sources from 2010 indicating on a North Korean third nuclear test coming up (Blank, 2011:89), but as with anything concerning North Korea, things are not always what they are said to be.

The achievement that can be connected to the launch can be used for the foundation for the national pride in the domestic arena in North Korea (International Crisis Group, 2009:14). The production of missiles and nuclear weapons have been posted as achievements of the state and indicators showing on the technological advancement of the industry and thus giving prestige to the leadership (Ibid. p. 15). Thus by showing the strength on the 100th birthday celebration of Kim Il Sung, the leadership will show strength and ability in the eyes of the people and political groups.

Choi and Shaw (2010) have noted that with a successful nuclear blast or test of technologically advanced weapons Kim Jong Eun will be able to take credit with his rank as a four star general (p. 196). Thus the test can be seen as more than promoting the strength of the state, but as an effort to promote Kim Jong Eun’s military prestige and his overall leadership prestige domestically.

DPRK Leadership, including General O Kuk-Ryol, Marks 100 Days of Mourning for Kim Jong Il in Front of about 100,000 Pyongyangites 金正日同志逝世百日中央追悼大会隆重举行 | Rodong Sinmun, March 26, 2012

Choi and Shaw also presents an interesting idea that earlier nuclear tests have been to stop other faction’s progress of implementing different political policies (p. 183), thus indicating that the missile launch could function as a design by a faction in opposition to the deal that was struck with the US. In theory, a launch would then show the limitations of the Kim Jong Eun regime and its current weakness, either if it is a launch prepared by an opposite faction or if it is a follow up to the Kim Jong Il policies and doctrines.

By factional competition, the regime would show its weakness through competition over power and that the Kim family regime thus is being challenged from within. And if the process is a result from a follow-up of old ideas (i.e., the behest of Kim Jong Il), it would indicate that the Kim Jong Un regime is not sufficiently consolidated to impose its own political will.   Who, after all, is in charge of this project? There are two scenarios for this question: it is either a.) the regime wanting to show its strength to the domestic political groupings and the people, or b.) it is a faction that has decided to challenge the policies of the earlier deals with the US.

To unravel the real reason behind the missile launch we will have to wait and see the follow up; from the perspective today, it is virtually impossible to draw a clear conclusion.

References:

  • Blank, Stephen. ”Rethinking the Six-Party Process on Korea”. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 20:1, pp. 88-122. Seoul: KINU. 2011.
  • Choi, Jinwook; Shaw, Meredith “The Rise of Kim Jong Eun and the Return of the Party”. International Journal of Korea Unification Studies, 19:2, pp. 175-202. Seoul: KINU, 2010.
  • Hassig, Ralph; Oh, Kongdan. ”Kim Jong-un Inherits the Bomb”. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 20:1, pp. 31-54. Seoul: KINU. 2011.
  • International Crisis Group. ”North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs”, Asia Report No. 168., 18 June 2009. Brussels: International Crisis Group. 2009.

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