Sino-NK

Here at Sino-NK, we have been keen observers of the thorny question of North Korea news reporting ever since my July 2012 essay, “Beware the North Korean Rumor Mill“. We are not the only ones paying attention. In truth, interest in the whats, wheres, and whys of news about North Korea is set to persist for as long as the secretive state itself persists (or drastically amends its ways). In a new essay, Daily NK editor Robert Lauler delves deep into the details of a recent case in point: news of a COVID lockdown in Pyongyang during January, the truth of which is well worth attempting to establish.- Christopher Green, senior editor.

Staring into the “Fog” of North Korea Reporting: Pyongyang’s January Lockdown

by Robert Lauler

In late January, North Korea watchers were barraged with the news that Pyongyang had gone under lock down, a development ostensibly caused by the outbreak of “the flu,” a now common euphemism used by the North Korean authorities to refer to COVID-19. The broad outlines of the event were as follows: a stream of panic buying caused by rumors about an impending lockdown on Jan. 24 was followed by a five-day lockdown order on Jan. 25. North Korean state-run media didn’t report on the lockdown, and the lockdown was lifted on Jan. 30.

What is interesting about the lockdown news is how three outlets, NK News, Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Daily NK reported on it. For Daily NK, a city-wide lockdown never existed; RFA and NK News reported on the lockdown but had different interpretations about its scope. This brief article aims to highlight nuances in the reporting by the three outlets – all of which provide important details and insight into what’s going on inside North Korea – with a view to try to get a better picture of what recently transpired in Pyongyang, the DPRK’s capital and a city of 2.8 million people.¹⁾Full disclosure: I work as the English Editor/International Affairs Manager at Daily NK and have been with the organization for around five years. The opinions expressed in this article are mine alone.

Pyongyang Locked Down | News of the lockdown came amid reports of increasing “flu cases” in the China-North Korea border region. In fact, since at least mid-January, there were signs that that this expanding flu pandemic was leading to tightening restrictions on entry into Pyongyang. Daily NK reported on tightening entry restrictions into the city as early as January 16.

Fast forward to January 24, and NK News reported that panic buying had started in Pyongyang amid rumors of an impending lockdown. On January 25, NK News reported on a notice released by the authorities stating that a five-day lockdown was being implemented. NK News did not publish a copy of the document it had viewed, which the outlet said was directed toward citizens of Pyongyang. In contrast, the Russian embassy in Pyongyang published a document on January 25 announcing a five-day “special anti-epidemic period” for diplomatic missions in Pyongyang. On January 30, the Russian embassy released a document on stating that the special anti-epidemic period was over, news of which was republished by many South Korean and international news outlets.

RFA also reported on the lockdown on January 25. The outlet, using sources located outside of Pyongyang, provided some interesting details about its scope. Notably, the sources stated that the authorities had been considering implementing a lockdown in the capital since early January, and that entry into the city would be completely restricted from January 25 to January 31 during the special anti-epidemic period. Interestingly, RFA’s sources reported that the lockdown did not affect state-run shops and department stores; just markets and shops run by local people’s committees would be shutdown.

Meanwhile, Daily NK was silent on the lockdown, releasing at least two reports during the period of the lockdown with Pyongyang sources talking about life in the city. It was only after the lockdown ended, on February 3, that Daily NK released an article based on multiple sources inside the city saying that ordinary Pyongyangites had not been informed of the special anti-epidemic period and that shops in the city continued to operate normally. The outlet also noted that North Korea has generally moved away from implementing city-wide lockdowns, instead focusing on more localized lockdowns or isolation of specific areas where outbreaks occur.   

What Does Everyone Agree On?  | Drawing solid conclusions from this array of reporting is difficult. The word “fog” is commonly used in the context of reporting on North Korea, and for good reason. Reporting on North Korea is hard, and observers of the country need to utilize all resources available to understand what’s going on there. Governments are many times no help: in this case, South Korea’s National Intelligence Agency commented on the news of the lockdown on January 27, saying that “there are circumstances similar to that of a COVID-19 (outbreak)” and that the agency is “closely watching developments” inside the country.

What all three outlets appear to agree on is that Pyongyang’s diplomatic community was given a lockdown order. Outside of that, these three outlets – which all use sources to report what’s going on inside North Korea – vary in their interpretations about what happened. Daily NK’s reporting on January 26 about the sale of TVs at the Rakwon Department Store – a story the outlet followed up on February 9 – fits with RFA’s reporting that the reported lockdown did not affect state-run shops (or more broadly, that a city-wide lockdown didn’t occur), but does not fit with NK News’ assertion that the lockdown essentially shut down the entire city, with everyone banned from leaving their homes.

Both RFA and Daily NK reported on strengthening entry restrictions on Pyongyang in the lead up to the reported lockdown. RFA provides details on this in its January 25 article, emphasizing repeatedly that entry into Pyongyang was completely restricted. In fact, the sources quoted in the article used expressions that stressed that the city has been cordoned off, rather than phrases that would suggest a total lockdown of residents inside the capital city.²⁾In the article, sources used the phrases “평양시 출입이 완전 봉쇄되었다” and “평양출입을 완전 봉쇄했다.” In any case, it is clear that entry restrictions were implemented to stem the flow of outsiders into the city to prevent the spread of “the flu.” The entry restrictions likely continued throughout the period of the lockdown. In fact, if we assume that the satellite evidence regarding a lockdown implemented outside of Pyongyang’s diplomatic community is insufficient,³⁾NK News has not published the document that it says states ordinary North Koreans were to go into lockdown. The outlet’s published satellite imagery appears to confirm lockdowns – or at least much reduced levels of movement – in parts of Pyongyang. Importantly, the satellite images do not include time stamps, which could be used to confirm specific times the imagery was taken and would be essential to make accurate comparisons of images taken over time. Taken alone, the satellite imagery published by the outlet does not appear to be conclusive, although a more thorough analysis of imagery taken of the entire city could yield different results. Satellite imagery is not infallible, as an RFA article published on January 30 reminds us: Martyn Williams, who heads the “North Korea Tech” website, reminded readers that “low resolution” satellite imagery presents limitations in being able to clearly observe the movement of vehicles and people. one could reasonably assert that the reported “lockdown” referred to strengthening entry restrictions on people entering the city, which would explain why Daily NK’s Pyongyang sources were not informed about a city-wide lockdown.⁴⁾RFA’s reporting was based on sources located outside of Pyongyang, including one Pyongyang cadre involved in trade activities who had left the city on Jan. 24 and was residing in Sinuiju at the time of the reported lockdown. It also important to note that North Korea commonly restricts entry to the city ahead of major events, in this case, a major parade scheduled for February 8.⁵⁾A VOA report published on January 27 provides commentary from various experts on this matter, with two experts laying out different theories in the same article about whether the lockdown measure was related to the February 8 parade or not. Kim Yong-hee, a defector who works at the One Hana Foundation, argued that the lockdown came too early to be related to the February 8 parade, while Cho Han-bum, an expert at the Korea Institute for National Unification, commented that the lockdown was “highly likely” to be a preliminary measure to deal with COVID-19 cases or prevent the spread of COVID-19 before a major event.

Further complicating the picture, in reporting that took its cue from the Russian embassy’s Facebook post, many outlets essentially treated the embassy’s document as proof that the lockdown was city-wide. In a January 27 VOA Korea article, the North Korean foreign ministry’s notice about the lockdown was quoted at length before noting, without mentioning any specifics regarding the scope of the lockdown, that the lockdown was the first lockdown declared in the city since one was declared in May 2022. Other international outlets also focused exclusively on the Russian embassy’s document. Some outlets reported the lockdown news citing both the Russian embassy and NK News, but given that only the Russian embassy document has been made available publicly, it is impossible to compare the documents. Furthermore, it is puzzling why only NK News could obtain such a document if it was directed toward the entire population of the city.⁶⁾NK News generally reports on events in North Korea through sources in the diplomatic and foreign community. The outlet has obtained documents directed at North Koreans in the past, including a decree published in late 2020 to “fire at” people illegally approaching the border, albeit after the same decree was published by RFA and Daily NK. It remains a mystery, however, why a document that would have been directed at ordinary North Koreans in Pyongyang would not have been picked up by any other news service with sources in the country. As such, based on the documentation available in the public sphere alone, it remains unclear to what extent ordinary Pyongyang residents were informed about the “special anti-epidemic period.”

Few “Slam Dunks” in North Korea Reporting | Reporting on North Korea requires breaking through a phenomenally compartmentalized web of information barriers. Having more eyes on the ground in North Korea can help break through this web. In fact, media organizations with sources in North Korea can be quite effective in searing through barriers on information put up by the North Korean regime. Several years ago, NK News reported on a spate of panic buying in Pyongyang, but lacked clarity about why it was happening. A Daily NK article published around the same time reported that a notice had been passed down days before in regards to restrictions placed on “unnecessary imports.” Notably, the notice was not made public and was only available to view within North Korean organizations. A Daily NK article published the same week confirmed that the panic buying was due to the notice. In another example of outlets confirming each other’s stories, Daily NK reported on preparations regarding the printing and distribution of government bonds, a story independently confirmed by RFA. In what blew up to become a global story, Daily NK’s report on Kim Jong-un’s medical procedure in April 2020 was given more credence by a NK News report spotlighting a new mark on his wrist.

Broadly speaking, one conclusion we can glean from these examples is that these media organizations all provide important nuggets of information, place a check on each other’s reporting, and can at times help confirm each other’s stories. In the end, observers of North Korea – consumers of news stories produced by these outlets – are much better served by having more information to get a better picture of what’s going on, even if contradictory stories do emerge. Going forward, more information about the Pyongyang lockdown may indeed appear, which would be a welcome development (for example the South Korean intelligence service could comment on it during a briefing to the National Assembly). But it should be noted that there are rarely “slam dunks” in reporting on North Korea.