Sino-NK

There are few biographies of Kim Il-sung in any language, and those that exist were published before the opening of archives in Russia and China in the 1990s. A clear research gap has therefore awaited attention for quite some time — and earlier this year, Fyodor Tertitskiy set out to fill it. Hailing from a Russian academic family and honing his scholarly craft over countless cups of tea in the office of influential historian Andrei Lankov at Kookmin University in Seoul, Tertitskiy — himself both a professional historian and an advocate for the grievously violated human rights of the North Korean people—has produced a book that adds in several notable ways to our understanding of the “accidental tyrant” who led North Korea for more than four decades, Kim Il-sung. – Christopher Green, Editor-at-Large.

Stephen Finch (SF): We have not seen an attempt at a complete biography of Kim Il-sung in decades, at least not from outside of the DPRK, and those that have been published tend to acknowledge numerous gaps. Where do you feel your book has made progress in terms of filling out Kim’s biography, and what are the key unknowns in our understanding of his life that remain?

Fyodor Tertitskiy (FT): The last major biography of Kim Il-sung was Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader by Suh Dae-sook. Dr Suh made the most of the sources available to him at the time, but he was unfortunately writing in 1988 – arguably the worst year to publish such a book. Not long after, both China and the Soviet Union opened up, providing access to material that had previously been inaccessible. My book draws extensively on Soviet and Chinese sources that were unavailable to Dr Suh, and thanks to the advent of the Internet, I was able to access Japanese and Korean sources that he overlooked.

As such, I would argue that each chapter of my book offers something genuinely new to the existing narrative. I discuss Kim Il-sung’s adopted brother Ryong-ho – erased from the state record – and demonstrate that Kim was born in Chilgol, not in Mangyongdae as Pyongyang claims. I explore how he became a Communist, who recommended him to the Party, and go into great detail about his time in a Soviet rear unit (which later served as the de facto model for the KPA), as well as his remarkable rise to power – a story largely omitted in previous research.

I also examine his wives, including the forgotten Han Song-hui; how he convinced Stalin to approve the Korean War; how he waged it; and how, in October 1950, Mao was at one point prepared to allow North Korea to be annihilated. I cover the purges of the 1950s and the failed opposition attempts to fight back. I identify September 1957 as the month when North Korea truly began spiralling out of Soviet influence. Building on the previous findings of Cheng Xiaohe and Brian Myers, I delve into the 1960s, when Kim Il-sung dreamed of a Second Korean War, began promoting his ‘Juche Thought’ (an ideologically hollow pseudo-philosophy), and created his most terrifying legacy: the Singular Thought System – a totalitarian order proclaimed in 1967.

Chapter 12 focuses on the suffering Kim inflicted on his own people as they lived in a nation built around worshipping him. Drawing on new sources – both North Korean and foreign – I explore where he likely got the idea to install his son as successor, and finally examine his death, oddly enough caused by extreme weather. This is another area where my book has the advantage over Dr Suh’s – he was writing while Kim Il-sung was still alive, whereas I was able to reflect on the full extent of Kim’s legacy and the way it continues to define North Korea.

That said, I wouldn’t claim that any chapter of my book is definitive or beyond improvement. Far from it. Deep in Chinese archives, there may be records from Yuwen Middle School listing Kim Il-sung’s classmates or offering new insights into his childhood. It’s possible that unreleased documents exist on his partisan activities in Manchuria. Russian FSB or SVR archives may yet reveal whether, during his time in the Soviet army, Kim was monitored by Soviet counterintelligence – possibly shedding light on the persistent rumour that he worked as an informer.

Most Chinese archives covering the Korean War and the subsequent years – when Kim Il-sung was seeking Beijing’s approval for a second invasion – also remain closed. And of course, none of these possibilities compares to the potential opening of North Korea’s own archives. While records from the earliest years were likely destroyed by US bombing during the Korean War, post-1953 material could fundamentally reshape our understanding. Despite everything I’ve uncovered, I feel I’ve only scratched the surface. A deeper, more comprehensive biography is still waiting to be written. Even Kim Il-sung’s infamous “25 May Instructions” – the chilling speech that triggered North Korea’s transformation into a true totalitarian state – remains locked away. That is, of course, assuming these documents survive the inevitable changes North Korea will one day face.

SF: Kim’s biography remains a pillar of the ideology in the DPRK more than 30 years after his death. Why then have there been so few biographies of the North Korean leader?

FT: The primary reason is rather simple: most of the people who might have written such a biography – and had the interest and motivation to do so – live in North Korea. We’ve been in a strange situation since the 1940s, where North Korea is studied almost exclusively by outsiders, as internal censorship prevents North Koreans from conducting their own serious research.

As for the outside world – and particularly South Korea – you might be surprised how few scholars study North Korean history beyond 1953. Here in Seoul, and from what I’ve observed, also to a large extent in Europe, Australasia and North America, interest tends to centre on the division of the peninsula and the Korean War, especially where it relates to the South or the wider world. But from July 1953 onward, when the narrative becomes purely North Korean, academic and public interest quickly fades.

Fyodor Tertitskiy’s Kim Il-sung biography has been published in English, Russian and Korean. | Images: Author.

SF: Post-liberation in 1945, to what extent do you see Kim as having been personally responsible for his choices as the leader of North Korea, and how much is the result of North Korea’s unique origins as the Soviet-controlled half of a divided country in the early Cold War period?

FT: It’s true that Kim Il-sung did not actively seek power in the early 1940s; a series of coincidences thrust him into a leadership role. From what we know, his aspiration within the Soviet army was to become a division commander – and upon returning to Korea, to become a businessman. In fact, his initial position in the real power structure was quite low. As North Korea’s nominal leader, he was subordinate to several Soviet generals and officers.

That said, Kim Il-sung quickly proved to be a highly unruly puppet. From the earliest months of his rule, it’s evident that he was already beginning to pursue his own independent agenda. In the 1940s, his main goal was to use Soviet assistance to build a strong army. Once that was secured, he embarked on his first major independent project – the Korean War. This was very much the brainchild of Kim and Pak Hon-yong, not a Kremlin invention.

By the 1950s, he was actively scheming to consolidate full political control, and once he succeeded, the developments that followed in North Korea were entirely his responsibility.

One more small but important point: I would strongly encourage colleagues to reconsider using the word ‘liberation’ when referring to the establishment of North Korea in 1945. Swapping a colonial master for a cruel native one was anything but true liberation.

SF: We are now on to our third Kim. In your view, are there any indications in the DPRK that the dynastic cycle may be broken following Kim Jong-un?

FT: I don’t trust my instincts when it comes to predicting the future – especially on a question as complex as this. The system in North Korea is built to be extremely stable so long as the leader is alive or has designated a successor. As of now, Kim Jong-un has none. And that’s where the vulnerability lies: if he were to die suddenly, the country could enter a period of rapid disintegration.

So, I prefer not to speculate. I can envision the regime collapsing in the 2020s – but I can just as easily imagine it surviving for decades more, perhaps even into the twenty-second century.

SF: In regards to your own research, what are you working on currently, and what output do you have planned in the near term?

FT: My next project has the working title Pyongyang on the Brink: Sixteen Turning Points That Could Have Ended North Korea As We Know It. The aim is to examine critical junctures in North Korean history where the country might have taken a different path. I’ll explore what these turning points were, why they didn’t come to pass, and offer some thoughts on what could have been.

This book is intended to be more popular than academic, aimed at secondary school students through to undergraduates with an interest in international history. I plan to publish both English and Korean editions.

Sino-NK will publish a review of Accidental Tyrant: The Life of Kim Il-sung, by Fyodor Tertitskiy, on 17 October, 2025.