Sino-NK

Image: Sino-NK

DPRK state and party media coverage of China in February told readers and observers a great deal more than how the North’s official news organs view their biggest neighbour and oldest ally; they provided a window into how Pyongyang considers shifting great power competition amid US interventions – or threats thereof – in Venezuela, Greenland, and Iran.

North Korean media continued to cover announcements related to fraternal ties with its neighbour, as well as the ethnic Korean population living in China. However, coverage of the PRC in February also took on an increasingly international dimension with more to say on Chinese – and Russian – interactions with the rest of the world, brewing geopolitical rivalries, and resulting risks.

The Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, on 15 February ran an article (“미국의 대외정책을 비난/ Denouncing the foreign policy of the United States”), citing Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov criticising US foreign policy for “antagonising the vast majority of the world’s countries in order to maintain their own hegemony”, and for making “use of force” a “primary instrument” in their foreign policy. Specifically, he termed the expansion of US military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region a threat to both Russia and China, as per North Korean reporting.

This echoed the 6 February edition in which the newspaper also reported on remarks of the Russian deputy foreign minister (“일련의 국제문제들에 언급/ Addressing a series of international issues”), from three days earlier, on how “unilateral” actions by the US have destabilised the region, and how incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s mission of rearmament has further undermined regional peace. In reference to China in the article, Ryabkov contended that the US has been an unreliable interlocutor, causing the collapse of a previous strategic framework, something that Russia and China agree on. Whether this “strategic framework” refers to a specific agreement or the general undermining of international rules and norms was not clear from North Korean coverage.  

On 8 February, the Rodong Sinmun noted the growing global strategic emphasis on the Arctic region (“북극을 둘러싼 치렬한 각축전/ Fierce rivalry surrounding the Arctic”), as an area of geopolitical competition, and possibly a military buildup. The article noted that global powers have increasingly treated the region as a site of economic and strategic value, with the potential for confrontation between major powers, China included. North Korean coverage of this topic followed flared tensions between the US and Europe, with the former signalling an abiding interest in acquiring Greenland, by military force or sale, and the latter announcing support for Denmark, thereby placing Europe in further conflict with its NATO ally.  Although tensions over Greenland had largely subsided by February, the Trump administration’s designs on the territory have remained consistent (while, as we shall see elsewhere, North Korean coverage tends to lag the pace of global developments).

The fracturing of global rivalries beyond the United States on one side, and Russia and China on the other, as Transatlantic ties have also endured difficulties has not gone unnoticed in the DPRK. At the end of the month, on February 27, the Rodong Sinmun demonstrated that it has tracked this recent rise in tensions (“대미의존에서 벗어나보려는 유럽/ Europe seeking to break away from dependence on the United States”). As these accelerate, the newspaper noted that many European capitals have turned away from Washington towards China, as a country already managing a rivalry with the US and seeking to reduce dependence on the World’s main power.

This view contrasts with depictions of the US-China rivalry printed in the Rodong Sinmun in January, not only in prominence but in terms of where the battle lines have been drawn. The only mention of Europe and its place in the US-China rivalry covered by the North Korean press in that month occurred in the 26 January edition of the Rodong Sinmun (“유럽동맹의 부당한 처사를 규탄/ Condemning the unjust actions of the European Union”) in which it was noted that Beijing had retaliated against the EU for its “unjust” treatment of Chinese companies. The paper specifically quoted a 22 January statement by the PRC Ministry of Commerce denouncing the EU’s designation of certain Chinese companies as “high-risk suppliers”.

Russia was absent from this coverage on China, and broader discussions of the US-China rivalry were in January limited to two reports on Taiwan. On 2 January, the Rodong Sinmun reported on Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech (“중국주석 신년사 발표/ Chinese president delivers New Year’s Address”), in which Xi claimed that Chinese military drills around Taiwan were necessary to safeguard national security and territorial integrity, signalling a hardline stance against outside interference.

In a report on Taiwan a day later (“대만문제에 대한 서방의 이중적인 태도를 비난/ Denouncing the West’s double standards on the Taiwan issue”), Chinese sources were quoted in the North Korean newspaper criticising “Western double standards” on the island, which China considers a breakaway province, demanding adherence to the “one China principle” recognising Taiwan as part of China, and the PRC the sole legitimate ruler of the Chinese nation. (The US and many of its partners abide by the ‘One China Policy’, which has since 1972 acknowledged both PRC and ROC claims regarding the indivisibility of Greater China, but which remains ambiguous on its legitimate ruler). The “double standards” the speech reportedly denounced included Western criticisms of “China’s just actions aimed at safeguarding its national sovereignty and territorial integrity” but not “the separatist machinations of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces seeking independence through the use of force” (who in Taiwan they were criticising for “use of force” in seeking independence was not specified). 

Perhaps DPRK content on the US-China rivalry, and growing coverage on ambiguity regarding global relations, can be explained by the fallout following Operation Absolute Resolve in which the US seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from Caracas on 3 January. Taiwan coverage in the Rodong Sinmun would, however, appear not to be connected to US involvement in Venezuela, since these reports slightly predate the US operation targeting Maduro. Nonetheless, both the PRC and the North have since denounced this US intervention against their nominal South American ally.

Overall, while the focus of North Korean state and party media – even in its China coverage – remains inwardly focused, the Rodong Sinmun’s expanding discussion of global rivalries demonstrates the DPRK as a consistent observer of the emerging fault lines in this shifting great power competition. While DPRK relations with Russia appear to be expanding quickly, and into areas with significant implications for the North as an emerging military power, for example the Ukraine conflict, its press coverage on China recognises its neighbour as an opportunistic global power keen to capitalise on the diplomatic and military stumbles of the Trump administration.

It is perhaps coincidence that publication of the Rodong Sinmun’s analysis on growing fault lines in the US-Europe relationship – potentially to China’s benefit – appeared on 27 February, the day before the US launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. North Korea’s press has nonetheless had a high volume of US interventionism to denounce in recent weeks, as Pyongyang contemplates its own role as an emerging military power, having witnessed similar US pressure regarding its nuclear program as has Iran.

DPRK Media Roundup

February saw a continuation of recent warm DPRK media coverage on China, and related bilateral ties. This included discussion of fraternal relations, with Xi Jinping congratulating Kim Jong-un on his reelection as the head of the KWP ( “경애하는 김정은동지께 중국공산당 중앙위원회 총서기 습근평동지가 축전을 보내여왔다/ Respected Comrade Kim Jong-un received a congratulatory message from Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”), and the CCP congratulating the KWP on its Ninth Party Congress the same month (“조선로동당 제９차대회에 중국공산당 중앙위원회가 축전을 보내여왔다/ The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a congratulatory message to the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea”) .

The North Korean Embassy in China called for closer ties with its neighbour in its Lunar New Year celebration messaging (“중국주재 우리 나라 대사관 ２０２６년 설명절연회 마련/ The DPRK Embassy in China held a Lunar New Year reception in 2026”), as printed in the DPRK’s state press, while China was reportedly among those countries which sent floral tributes to commemorate the birthday of Kim Jong-il on 16 February (“위대한 수령 김일성동지와 위대한 령도자 김정일동지의 동상에 국제기구, 외국의 인사, 해외연고자가족, 재중동포들이 꽃바구니를 보내여왔다/ International organisations, foreign figures, families of overseas compatriots, and Koreans in China sent flower baskets to the statues of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-sung and the Great Leader Comrade Kim Jong-il”).

Other North Korean publications, such as the Minju Chosun, the official paper of the Cabinet of North Korea and the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and Voice of Chosun, the state-run international radio service, carried similar content on bilateral formalities and celebrations in relation to China, typically following the Rodong Sinmun’s lead.

This indicates bilateral diplomatic contact remained elevated in February, as relations have apparently improved from last year, and that the Rodong Sinmun, as the flagship party publication, continues to serve as the preferred medium for North Korean discussion of international relations, particularly global geopolitical developments.

Rob York is Director for Regional Affairs at Pacific Forum in Honolulu. He earned his PhD in Korean history from the University of Hawaii in 2023. Aiden Ham is a research intern at Pacific Forum.