Chinese Foreign Relations
The perception that China and North Korea no longer have the extensive bilateral contacts that they once did may be broadly speaking correct, but it is by no means the whole story. Here, Adam Cathcart brings to our attention an official event from July 25, 2017.
Lumps of Coal: How China’s Demand for Russia’s Natural Resources Affects North Korea Sanctions Enforcement
Anthony Rinna investigates the Russian role in the DPRK sanctions system, focusing on the country’s potential to export high-quality coal to China as a replacement for the DPRK.
Sam Swash looks at how the North Korean population is conditioned to read for conspiracies that may or may not be there. In the process he reminds us that we may be just as much if not more open to misinformation that shows their leadership to be infallible.
When a spokesman pushed back against the Trump administration assertions that China is in the driver’s seat with North Korea, Washington had no response. What was between the lines of this statement from Beijing?
East Asia’s cemeteries are a reminder that while leaders and rhetoric may change, the structure of the region remains the same. The borders set in 1953 have not moved. But is there something in the air? Steven Denney cogitates on the contingency of Korean War memory and what it may mean in the present.
Continuing his analysis of Russia’s position on THAAD from a regional security perspective, Anthony Rinna seeks to extrapolate some of the economic and geopolitical issues lying behind the THAAD factor in Russia-South Korea bilateral relations.
A year after it closed, South Korea is still eyeing the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The issues are not only financial, but also emotional. Christopher Green translates a recent report about North Korea allegedly trying to attract Chinese businesses into the manufacturing zone.
Using archival material from the Woodrow Wilson Center, Eungseo Kim dissects the politics of Sino-US détente in 1972. He concludes that Pyongyang’s grievance against Beijing for its refusal to push preconditions for Sino-US diplomatic normalization was why Pyongyang decided it needed to deal directly with the United States.