DPRK Media Review: Condemning US Allies and Ignoring Iran

By and | April 22, 2026 | No Comments

Image: Roman Bansen/Wikicommons

As was the case in February, DPRK state and party media in March used references to the PRC to comment on varied global developments, including ongoing instability, notably in the Middle East. What may surprise readers, however, is that Iran featured in very little DPRK commentary despite ongoing US-Israeli kinetic operations in the Middle East, and Pyongyang’s ties with Tehran.

In fact, Iran featured in few North Korean media reports at all – whether or not related to China – but Israeli actions across the Middle East were heavily criticised, as were those of other US partners. A significant share of the North’s coverage of China instead served to amplify criticism of another shared target of both Beijing and Pyongyang – Japan.

Condemning the Anglosphere

The United States was, by itself, let off somewhat more easily in March compared to the prior two months, criticised just twice in DPRK media reports that quoted China. On 5 March the Rodong Sinmun, official paper of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, quoted China’s Defence Ministry spokesperson denying US claims of PRC nuclear testing, and instead blamed the US for causing instability due to its nuclear arsenal expansion and withdrawal from global arms control agreements (미국은 세계의 안정에 혼란을 조성하는 최대의 근원이라고 강조/ The United States is causing chaos to global stability).

At the end of March, the Rodong Sinmun quoted PRC Foreign Ministry criticisms of the US for its “discriminatory” policies toward Chinese nationals, and for broadening of the “national security” concept to justify harassment of Chinese students and scholars in the US (미국의 차별 정책을 규탄/ Condemning US discriminatory policies). The report went on to quote the ministry spokesperson as saying China would take “necessary measures” to protect the legitimate rights of its citizens, without specifying.

US partners Australia and the UK were not spared such criticism either, with a 5 March report quoting Chinese sources condemning the UK for “unilateral” sanctions on Chinese companies, which the report denied as having any legal basis, while vowing to protect the rights of Chinese firms (영국의 제재책동 규탄/ Condemnation of Britain’s Sanctions Maneuvers).

On 11 March, the Rodong Sinmun quoted China’s criticism of Australia over naval and aerial activities near Chinese waters, saying these “provocations” and intelligence-gathering operations constituted provocations (오스트랄리아의 국가주권침해행위 규탄/ Condemnation of Australia’s Acts of Infringement upon National Sovereignty).

Criticism of Japan

Perhaps the major takeaway from references to China in North Korean media for March, however, was just how much was devoted to criticism of Japan. With Sino-Japanese relations still on a downswing since Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s November statement that an attack on Taiwan would represent an attack on Japan also, much of the China-related content in the Rodong Sinmun last monthtargeted Tokyo, and on a variety of issues.

DPRK media reported on Japanese textbooks “distorting” historical facts to evade responsibility for “colonial-era crimes” (일본의 력사외곡행위를 비난, 《외부위협》타령을 배격/ Condemning Japan’s Distortion of History and Rejecting Its Rhetoric of “External Threats”, 29 March), and its refusal to accept responsibility for wartime-era “comfort stations” where women from China, Korea, and elsewhere in the region were forced to sexually service Japanese troops (절대로 책임을 회피할수 없는 일본의 성노예범죄/ Japan’s Sex Slavery Crimes: For Which It Can Never Evade Responsibility, 22 March).

The majority of these reports, however, condemned Japan for “remilitarisation”: no fewer than six articles were published in the Rodong Sinmun in March which quoted Chinese sources criticising Japanese on this front, specifically for deploying long-range missiles, hosting nuclear policy discussions, and using “external threats” rhetoric to justify its military buildup (일본의 군국주의부활책동을 단죄/Condemning Japan’s Maneuvers to Revive Militarism, 4 March). On 11 March, the DPRK’s main party newspaper reported on a PRC announcement that export control measures would target 20 Japanese defence-related companies (재무장화책동에 대응한 수출통제조치/ Export Control Measures in Response to Rearmament Maneuvers).

Coverage Targeting Israel

As noted, Iran featured in few of the references to China in DPRK state and party media for March. Even in stories which did not reference China, Iran played little role despite the ongoing conflict. Yet this was not true of Israel, which came in for repeated condemnation, regardless of whether Beijing was the source or not. Seven Rodong Sinmun articles featured criticism of Israel, for attacks on Lebanon and Syria, as well as its actions towards Palestinians.

While it has certainly been suggested that North Korea is using the Iran conflict – without mentioning Iran by name – to justify its own development of nuclear weapons to deter the United States, its recent trend of remaining muted regarding Tehran continues in local news media. Why the DPRK would consider Iran an unworthy subject of its support remains unclear, yet North Korean news media has demonstrated greater clarity when it comes to its targets for criticism amid turmoil in the Middle East. As global condemnation of Israeli actions continues to escalate, the North remains happy to lend its voice to this chorus. The extensive presence of Japan criticism in DPRK news reports, which cite comments by Chinese sources, also suggests Pyongyang’s desire to demonstrate common cause with Beijing, especially given their shared colonial histories, and Japan’s prominent presence in Northeast Asia.

China’s Role

Reports on bilateral relations between China and North Korea contained little out of the ordinary in March, with features on how Chinese artists have contributed to the relationship (제 34차 4월의 봄 친선예술축전참가를 지향해온 중국의 예술인들/ Chinese artists aspiring to participate in the 34th April Spring Friendship Art Festival, 29 March), and the General Association of Koreans in China personally expressing devotion to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (위대한 조국, 백전백승 조선로동당의 수반이시며 재중동포들의 자애로운 어버이이신 경애하는 김정은원수님께 삼가 올립니다, Respectfully Dedicated to the Respected Marshal Kim Jong Un—the Head of our Great Motherland and the Ever-Victorious Workers’ Party of Korea, and the Benevolent Father of our Compatriots Residing in China, 9 March).

Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping were also reported to have exchanged greetings following Kim’s reelection as General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which took place on 22 February (경애하는 김정은 동지께서 중국 공산당 중앙위원회의 총서기, 중화인민공화국 주석에게 답전을 보내시였다, The Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Sent a Reply Message to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China, 27 March).

China’s internal developments also remained an object of interest for the North, whether construction of a new airport in Guangdong Province (사회적진보와 발전을 위하여/For social progress and development, 31 March), the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (중국전국인민대표대회 제14기 제4회차의 진행, 4th Session of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Underway, 13 March), or reports on its progress (중국전국인민대표대회 제14기 제4회차의 진행, Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the 14th National People’s Congress of China).

Chinese diplomatic dealings of seemingly little consequence also captured the attention of DPRK news media, namely Beijing’s signed bilateral agreement with Serbia on science and technology cooperation, including on agricultural laboratories (사회적진보와 발전을 위하여, “For Social Progress and Development”, 30 March).

Where China currently ranks on the hierarchy of North Korea’s most-favoured nations remains unclear, in particular compared to Russia, but its status as a major player – especially in forging an alternative world order – remains evident, as seen in DPRK news media coverage. Consequently, who China supports or condemns remains of notable interest to the North, and offers an opportunity to demonstrate common cause for the benefit of the DPRK’s internal audience and that overseas, including in Beijing.

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